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Analysis of the 802.11i 4-Way Handshake

Analysis of the 802.11i 4-Way Handshake. Changhua He, John C Mitchell 2004 ACM International Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe'04). Sang-Rok Kim Dependable Software Lab at KAIST 2006. 9. 14. Contents. Introduction. 4-way Handshake. Problem Statement. Countermeasures. Conclusion.

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Analysis of the 802.11i 4-Way Handshake

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  1. Analysis of the 802.11i 4-Way Handshake Changhua He, John C Mitchell2004 ACM International Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe'04) Sang-Rok KimDependable Software Lab at KAIST2006. 9. 14

  2. Contents Introduction 4-way Handshake Problem Statement Countermeasures Conclusion

  3. Introduction Introduction 취약점 취약점

  4. Station Access Point RADIUS IEEE 802.11i Introduction • Ratified on June 24, 2004 • Secure Data Communication over Wireless links • WEP(Wired Equivalent Privacy) • TKIP(Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) • CCMP(Counter-mode/CBC-MAC Protocol) • RSNA(Robust Security Network Association) Conversation • Handshake • Three Entities of RSN • Supplicant • Authenticator • Authentication Server

  5. PTK PTK PMK PMK MSK MSK RSNA Conversation Introduction IEEE 802.11 & 11i IEEE 802.1x IEEE 802.11i Handshake IEEE 802.11i

  6. RSNA Conversation 4-Way Handshake Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server UnAuth/UnAssoc 802.1X Blocked No Key UnAuth/UnAssoc 802.1X Blocked No Key No Key

  7. RSNA Conversation 4-Way Handshake Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked No Key Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked No Key No Key 802.11 Association

  8. RSNA Conversation 4-Way Handshake Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked MSK Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked No Key MSK 802.11 Association EAP/802.1X/RADIUS Authentication

  9. RSNA Conversation 4-Way Handshake Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked PMK Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked PMK No Key 802.11 Association EAP/802.1X/RADIUS Authentication MSK

  10. RSNA Conversation 4-Way Handshake Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK No Key 802.11 Association EAP/802.1X/RADIUS Authentication MSK 4-Way Handshake

  11. RSNA Conversation 4-Way Handshake Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked GTK Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked GTK No Key 802.11 Association EAP/802.1X/RADIUS Authentication MSK 4-Way Handshake Group Key Handshake

  12. RSNA Conversation 4-Way Handshake Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK/GTK Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK/GTK No Key 802.11 Association EAP/802.1X/RADIUS Authentication MSK 4-Way Handshake Group Key Handshake Data Communication

  13. {AA, ANonce, sn, msg1, PMKID} {SPA, SNonce, sn, msg2, MIC, RSN IE} {AA, ANonce, sn+1, msg3, MIC, AA RSN IE, GTK} {SPA, sn+1, msg4, MIC} RSNA Conversation 4-Way Handshake Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK No Key 802.11 Association EAP/802.1X/RADIUS Authentication MSK 4-Way Handshake AA/SPA: MAC Address Nonce: random value sn: sequence number MIC:Message Integrity Code

  14. {ANonce, msg1} {SNonce, msg2, MIC} {msg4, MIC} Simplified 4-Way Handshake Problem Statement • Murφ Modeling • Finite-State Verification • Modeling Result • Ignored filed • PMKID • RSN IE • GTK • Necessary field • Message Flag • Nonce • Redundant field • Sequence Number • MAC address • Exclusive supplicant and authenticator • Fresh Nonce Supplicant Authenticator Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK {ANonce, msg3, MIC}

  15. {ANonce, msg1} {SNonce, msg2, MIC} DoS Attack Problem Statement Authenticator Supplicant Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked PMK Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked PMK PTK Derived {AA, Anonce, msg1} PTK Derived Attack PTK’ Derived {ANonce, msg3, MIC} PTK’≠ PTK {msg4, MIC} Blocked & Fail 802.1X UnBlocked PTK 802.1X UnBlocked PTK

  16. DoS Attack Problem Statement • Solution? • Store TPTK / PTK • Can not correctly verify the MIC in Msg3 • Keep all states for every Msg1 • Mess Forged Attack (Mem/CPU exhaustion) • Inherent cause of Attack • Authenticator can discard an unexpected response • Supplicant can not do so • Cause deadlock and block the protocol • Supplicant must allow any Msg1 (Parallel Instance) • Limitation of Attack • Dynamic PMKID • attacker can forge Msg1 after reading Msg1 • EAPOL-Key format • limit the attacks to occur only before the first PTK establishment Attack can be occurred only after reading Msg1 and before establishing the first handshake

  17. Random-Drop Queue Countermeasures Randomly replaced by the new state if queue is filled

  18. Message 1 Authentication Countermeasures • Add a MIC to msg1 • Reuse shared PMK • Set Nonce to specific value(e.g.,0) • Derive a trivial PTK • Calculate the MIC with derived PTK • Limitation • If PSK or cached PMK? Vulnerable to Reply attack • Repaired Countermeasure • Add SN increasing monotonically • Use local time as SN • Weakness of this countermeasure • Modification on Packet format

  19. Nonce Re-use Countermeasures • Reuse Nonce • Supplicant reuse the value of SNonce until a legitimate handshake is completed successfully • Not update Nonce • No requirement for Authenticator to reuse ANonce • Eliminate the memory DoS Attack • Limitation • More computation on the supplicant side • Fixed SNonce – easy guessing the PMK • Weakness of this countermeasure • CPU exhaustion attack

  20. {AA, ANonce, msg1} {SNonce, msg2, MIC} Proposal Countermeasures • Combination of countermeasures • Reuse SNonce • Store PTK and ANonce of the first Msg1 • If stored ANonce = received ANonce in Msg3, use PTK • If stored ANonce ≠ received ANonce in Msg3, calculate new PTK PTK Derived Store PTK, ANonce PTK Derived ANonce ≠ ANonce PTK’ Derived, Use derived PTK {AA, ANonce, msg1} Attack {ANonce, msg3, MIC} Calculate MIC Anonce=Anonce Use stored PTK {msg4, MIC}

  21. Proposal Countermeasures • Combination of countermeasures • Reuse SNonce • Store PTK and ANonce of the first Msg1 Eliminate the Memory Exhaustion Attack • If stored ANonce = received ANonce, use PTK • If stored ANonce ≠ received ANonce, calculate new PTK Eliminate the CPU Exhaustion Attack No Modification on Packet format • Adopted by TGi

  22. IEEE 802.11i Conclusion • Conclusions • RSNA conversation • Simplified Protocol by using Murφ • DoS Attack • 3 Countermeasures and the their effectiveness • Proposed solution • Combined Reuse Nonce Solution • Advantages

  23. Thank You !

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