Will survival instincts override the omission bias?

1. Will survival instincts override the omission bias? Jessica Holttum – Psych 469 Final Project

2. INTRODUCTION - Background • Omission bias • Preference for inaction if action has foreseeable negative consequences • Preference exists even in the face of a higher cost of inaction (e. g. 4 lives lost as opposed to 1 life lost) • Moral dilemmas • Can activate heuristics such as “do no harm,” etc., that interfere with logic (Baron, 1994) • Lead to non-consequentialist decisions

3. INTRODUCTION – Hypothesis • Questions presenting a risk or gain directly in relation to the participant will yield higher rates of commission. • Selfishness  higher consequentialism when making decisions (Baron, 1994) • Fitness advantage for individuals prone to these decisions (Gutiérrez et al., 2013) • Risk seeking in loss-framed situations (Kahneman& Tversky, 1984)

4. METHODS - Participants • N = 28 • 30 responses, 2 eliminated due to possible confounds • Mean age: 32.9 (15.3), median = 22 • Range = 19-75 • Variety of majors/occupations

5. METHODS • Catalyst survey • Completed anonymously online • Distributed via direct email to potential participants/Facebook link viewable by all friends • 6 questions • Questions were all moral dilemmas adapted from references (Graham, Iyer, & Koleva, 2013; ) • 3 with direct self-related consequences • 3 with indirect or non-self-related consequences • Structured so that omission was always consequentially unfavorable response • Asked about confidence (1 = Very Unsure, 7 = Very Confident), reasons for answer

6. METHODS – Sample Question (Self) You are on a cruise ship when there is a fire on board, and the ship has to be abandoned. The lifeboats are carrying many more people than they were designed to carry. The lifeboat you're in is sitting dangerously low in the water – a few inches lower and it will sink. The seas start to get rough, and the boat begins to fill with water. It seems to you that there is only one way to stop the boat from sinking, and that is to start throwing other passengers overboard, starting with old people who are too weak to resist. Is it morally appropriate for you to throw some of your fellow passengers overboard in order to save yourself and the other lifeboat passengers?

7. METHODS – Sample Question (Non-Self) A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. On the tracks extending to the right is a single railway workman. You are standing on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a switch that can redirect the trolley. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed, causing the deaths of the five workmen. The only way to save the lives of these workmen is to hit the switch, which will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman. Is it morally appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to save the five workmen?

8. RESULTS • Opposite of hypothesis • In self cases, 66.7% (16.9%) preferred omission • In non-self cases, 47.6% (45.4%) preferred omission • Not significant difference (Paired 2-Sample t-test) • One-tailed, p = 0.31 • Slight omission bias overall • 57.1% (32.3%) across all scenarios • Mean confidence = 5.58 (0.63) across all scenarios

9. RESULTS

10. DISCUSSION • Survivor’s guilt? • “It was easier for me to be rational when I was not a player in the scenario. When my life was on the line, I felt more guilty about selecting the option where I save myself.” • Self-imposed constraints  more complicated problems • “He’s a terrorist, how can you trust him?” • “Taking the life of a healthy person is wrong for any reason. It is murder.” • Lots of comments re: personal responsibility • Questionnaire may not invoke instincts well enough (too abstract)

11. DISCUSSION – Future Studies • More constraints on other possibilities, “tighter” situations • Try to normalize risks and benefits more • Perhaps variety influenced responses • Maybe focus on one question only to eliminate other effects • Better plan for randomization, counterbalancing, etc.

12. REFERENCES • Baron, J. (1994). Nonconsequentialist decisions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17(1), 1-42. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X0003301X • Baron, J., & Ritov, I. (2004). Omission bias, individual differences, and normality. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 94(2), 74-85. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2004.03.003 • Graham, J., Iyer, R., & Koleva, S. (2013). Moral psychology on the internet. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA. • Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart, L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2009). Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. Cognition, 111(3), 364-371. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.02.001 • Gutiérrez, F., Gárriz, M., Peri, J. M., Ferraz, L., Sol, D., Navarro, J. B., Barbadilla, A., & Valdés, M. (2013). Fitness costs and benefits of personality disorder traits. Evolution and Human Behavior, 34(1), 41-48. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.09.001 • Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American Psychologist, 39(4), 341-350. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.39.4.341 • LeBoeuf, R. A., & Shafir, E. (2003). Deep thoughts and shallow frames: On the susceptibility to framing effects. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 16(2), 77-92. doi: 10.1002/bdm.433 • Spranca, M., Minsk, E., & Baron, J. (1991). Omission and commission in judgment and choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27(1), 76-105. doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(91)90011-T

13. QUESTIONS • Please contact me at jholttum@uw.edu for further information about this study.