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Non-interactive key establishment in mobile ad hoc networks

Non-interactive key establishment in mobile ad hoc networks. Authors: Zhenjiang Li and J. J. Garcia-Luna-Aceves Sources: Ad Hoc Networks, article in press Reporter: Chun-Ta Li ( 李俊達 ). Outline. Introduction Self-certified key cryptosystem (SCK) S-NIKAP and A-NIKAP

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Non-interactive key establishment in mobile ad hoc networks

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  1. Non-interactive key establishment in mobile ad hoc networks Authors: Zhenjiang Li and J. J. Garcia-Luna-Aceves Sources: Ad Hoc Networks, article in press Reporter: Chun-Ta Li (李俊達)

  2. Outline • Introduction • Self-certified key cryptosystem (SCK) • S-NIKAP and A-NIKAP • Ad hoc on-demand secure routing (AOSR) protocol • Comments

  3. Introduction • Motivation • Key establishment in mobile ad hoc networks • without an on-line centralized authority • non-interactively establish and update pairwise keys between nodes • Self-certified key (SCK) cryptosystem [Peterson and Horster, 1997] • Non-Interactive Key Agreement and Progression (NIKAP) protocol

  4. Self-certified key cryptosystem (SCK) • Initialization Node A CA called Z (xZ,yZ= αxZ (mod p)) 1. Z chooses large primes p, q with q|(p-1), a random number kA Z*q and generator α 3. A computes yA = yZh(IDA,rA) * rA (mod p) 4. A publishes rA and IDA 2. Z computes rA = αkA (mod p) and xA = xZ* h(IDA,rA) + kA (mod q) 5. Initial key pair as (xA,0,yA,0) xA, IDA, rA(guarantee) 6. Any node can compute yA,0 that has yZ, IDA and rA secure channel

  5. Self-certified key cryptosystem (cont.) • User-controlled key pair progression Node A 1. A can use the key pair (xA,t,yA,t) in time interval [t*ΔT, (t+1)* ΔT] 2. A can choose n random pairs {kA,t Z*q, rA,t = αkA,t}, where 1 < t < n and publishes guarantees rA,t 3. The private key of node A progresses as xA,t = xA,0* h(IDA,rA,t) + kA,t (mod q) 4. The corresponding public key can be computed according to yA,t = yA,0 h(IDA,rA,t) * rA,t (mod p)

  6. Self-certified key cryptosystem (cont.) • Non-interactive pairwise key agreement and progression Node A Node B

  7. S-NIKAP and A-NIKAP • Synchronized NIKAP (S-NIKAP)

  8. S-NIKAP and A-NIKAP (cont.) • Asynchronous NIKAP (A-NIKAP)

  9. Ad hoc on-demand secure routing (AOSR) protocol • Notations

  10. Ad hoc on-demand secure routing (AOSR) protocol (cont.) • Route request initialization Node S Node 1 Node 2 Node D 0 {null} credential

  11. Ad hoc on-demand secure routing (AOSR) protocol (cont.) • Route request forwarding Node S Node 1 Node 2 Node D Node 1: PREQ = {PREQ, S, D, QNum, 1, {S}, QMAC1,d} QMAC1,d = H(QMACs,d, 1, {S}, K1,d) Node 2: PREQ = {PREQ, S, D, QNum, 2, {S,1}, QMAC2,d} QMAC2,d = H(QMAC1,d, 2, {S,1}, K2,d) Node D: Check PREQ and QMAC2,d

  12. Comments • Replay attack • Guarantee management

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