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Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism. PO 483: The Politics of Terrorism. Counterterrorism: Introduction. Large advantage in relative capabilities doesn’t necessarily translate into direct advantage Constrained by principles of legitimacy and proportionality

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Counterterrorism

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  1. Counterterrorism PO 483: The Politics of Terrorism

  2. Counterterrorism: Introduction • Large advantage in relative capabilities doesn’t necessarily translate into direct advantage • Constrained by principles of legitimacy and proportionality • Focus specifically on difficulty of counterterrorism by democratic states • Domestic constraints • Democratic principles • Tradeoff between effective surveillance/combat and conservation of civil liberties • International Constraints

  3. Counterterrorism: Introduction • General Concerns • Collection, analysis and dissemination • Use of military/police • Legislative responses

  4. General Counterterrorist Strategy • Continuum of Strategies: Compromising <------------> Intolerant • Acceptability of measures to various audiences must be counterbalanced with potential success and effectiveness

  5. General Counterterrorist Strategy • Either extreme is dangerous to democratic counterterrorist efforts • Compromising: Maintains strict association with acceptability, but undermines successful defense of SQ • Intolerant: Staunch defense of SQ, but little acceptability • Parallel to psychological theories of IR: deterrence vs. downward spiral

  6. General Counterterrorist Strategy • Best choice: Somewhere in middle; evidence indicates that negotiation can be used without concession • Alternatives (Bobrow): • Contingent Concession • Ransom with Entrapment • Ransom with Eventual Retribution

  7. Counterterrorism: The Intelligence Function • Wardlaw’s Suggestion • Develop highly intrusive technologies as preemptive tools (surveillance, monitoring)

  8. Counterterrorism: The Intelligence Function • Prevention • Network for collection, analysis, dissemination of info on extremists (potential terrorists) • Direction • Data collection requirements • Productivity checks • Produces systematic and effective organization AND provides legitimacy (no ad hoc measures) • Collection – identify groups, keep tabs • Infiltration • Monitor procurement • Intimidation/payoffs

  9. Counterterrorism: The Intelligence Function • Analysis • Threat validity • Group and individual psychological profiling • Targeting/protection • Propaganda analysis • Redirection of potential joiners • Importance of generality • Dissemination • Effective and efficient • Information sharing • Important Issues • Application of civil liberties • The paradox of successful intelligence

  10. Counterterrorism: The Military Function • Wardlaw’s Suggestions: • Creation of special ops forces to deal specifically with terrorist situations • Increase size of security forces; increased procedural and physical security • Develop alternatives to hostage negotiation that are not predicated upon intolerance

  11. Counterterrorism: The Military Function • Combating terrorism (intelligence failure) • Use of military to counter domestic terrorism in democratic states fraught with problems • Clash of military/democratic ethics • Supercedes existing criminal justice system; issues of rule of law • Can encourage societal polarization • Detracts from external security • Still, tradeoff sometimes necessary • Potential solution: use of important military expertise within existing legal approach

  12. Counterterrorism: The Military Function • The use of the military to combat international terrorism • Pros: • Fewer civil liberties issues • Retribution answers demands for tough action • Cost imposition = deterrent • Cost imposition = internal dissension • Cons: • International Intelligence much more difficult to accomplish • Provocation of wider conflict • Collateral damage and the loss of the “moral high ground” • Strain alliances • Can create impossible benchmark for future success

  13. Counterterrorism: Domestic Institutional Responses • Wardlaw’s Suggestions: • Capital punishment • Long-term solutions (address inequities) • Increase security force powers • Legal limitation of media’s capacity to report terrorist acts • Special anti-terrorist legislation (extra-legal measures) • Legislation limiting rights of assembly; ID cards and registration • Signatory to international treaties (extradition, suspension of services) • Recognition of terrorist groups as political entities

  14. Counterterrorism: Domestic Institutional Responses • Effectiveness necessary for intelligence/combat, but tradeoff inherent • Alter fundamental citizen-government relationship • Need support of majority in majoritarian government • Lack of support destroys legitimacy, sets dangerous precedent • History of difficulty in relinquishing powers once taken

  15. Legislative Responses - General • Legislation allowing for electronic eavesdropping, curtailment of freedoms of assembly, anti-government speech, due process • Can give terrorists “what they want” • Why no legislative responses in US before 9/11? Illegitimate to majority of populace

  16. Legislative Responses – Specific West Germany (1970s): • Exercise of executive power w/o parliamentary approval • Judging of terrorists by legislature • Termination/denial of employment based on disloyalty (“legal but questionable” activity) • Suppression of anti-gov’t opinions • Greater prison sentences • Relaxed criteria for detention and searches • Problem: Overt harshness (unpopular with majority) based on ad hoc reaction

  17. Legislative Responses – Specific Great Britain (1970s): • Many of same types of laws (no pro-IRA demonstrations, detention without arraignment, security checks) But: • Part of an existent anti-terror scheme • Not unprecedented • Not as harsh • Subject to relatively strict governmental review • Different histories • Led to popular acceptance of legislation allowing for more effective counterterrorist policies

  18. Legislative Responses – Specific USA PATRIOT ACT: • Section 802: Expanding the type of violence and activity that is considered political terrorism • Section 216: Tracking Internet Usage • Section 218: Amends government wiretap and physical search capability • Section 411: Expands class of immigrants subject to removal (profiling) • Section 412: Detention of Immigrants at AG’s decree

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