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Response to an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND): New FEMA Training Courses PowerPoint Presentation
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Response to an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND): New FEMA Training Courses

Response to an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND): New FEMA Training Courses

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Response to an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND): New FEMA Training Courses

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  1. DOE/NV/2596--2044 Response to an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND): New FEMA Training Courses Richard HansenGerald Newman Carol Gonzalez CTOS — Center for Radiological/Nuclear Training at the Nevada National Security Site National Security Technologies, LLC April 7, 2014 14th Annual National Radiological Emergency Preparedness ConferenceSession 3 FEMA Key Leader Tool - Response to an Improvised Nuclear Device, Part 1 This work was done by National Security Technologies, LLC, under Contract No. DE-AC52-06NA25946 with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and was supported by Memorandum of Agreement Number DE-GM58-11NA25492, between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Directorate (FEMA/NPD), Training & Exercise Integration Secretariat and the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO).

  2. CTOS Training Development for FEMA • DHS/FEMA tasked to develop multi-course training programs for IND response: • Operations Level/First Responder • Incident Commander/Command and General Staff • Command and control issues identified through workshops and course development CTOS/NNSA

  3. Two New FEMA Courses on IND Response • PER-307-W Introduction to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Effects and Response Strategies • MGT-423-W Key Leader: Incident Command Improvised Nuclear Device Response Program, Course 1 – Initial Actions CTOS/NNSA

  4. Credit for FEMA Pilot Course of MGT-423-W • To receive credit for pilot version of MGT-423-W, fill out • FEMA Registration Form • FEMA Level 1 Student Assessment Form • To take the full versions of PER-307-W and MGT-423-W, register on CTOS Web Campus www.nts-ctos.comThen select the course catalog REGISTRATION FORM Please print in capital letters Part 1 Answer question“Are you a US citizen?” Part 2Leave the box blank for FEMA SID(Student Identification number)

  5. Introduction to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Effects and Response Strategies • Course Description • Response guidance: recognition, immediate actions, response planning, damage zones, fallout/radiation hazards, and shelter and evacuation strategies • Foundation for additional courses in IND response operations, management, and planning • Overview of effects of an IND • Overview of the current preplanning guidance and response strategy recommendations to maximize the preservation of life in an urban nuclear detonation • Target Audience

  6. WBT Course Methodology • Two Fire Chiefs as virtual instructors: • Narrate content • Give their perspectives • Guide through student activities

  7. WBT Course Methodology (cont.) • Big Picture Perspective • Individual Perspective (Responders and Public)

  8. WBT Course Methodology (cont.) • Throughout course, provides information and links for guidance and reference: • Documents • Organizations • Best Practices

  9. Module 1. Introduction • Identify critical elements and gaps in planning for response to IND detonation • Without a plan, there can't be an effective IND response • Working groups are addressing response, recovery, medical, communications, and scientific support • Local and state authorities must develop plans for IND response • Scientific assessments and community specific analysis • Local situational awareness needs to be established In the first hours • Pre-establishing processes for damage assessments, public communications, and determining fallout zones will be crucial • Decision-makers rely on key leaders in the public safety community and technical reachback in the first 72 hours following a detonation • The community and local citizens may well be the primary source of additional manpower in the first hours and days

  10. Module 2. Prompt Effects and Planning Guidance Zones • Select the identifiers of an IND detonation and main elements of each damage zone • Prompt effects and recognition factors for low yield (10 KT) nuclear detonation in urban environment: • Flash • Thermal radiation • Gamma and Neutron Radiation • Blast • Electromagnetic Pulse • Identifying boundaries for Severe, Moderate, and Light Damage Zones • Advanced modeling has improved understanding of effects

  11. Module 3. Fallout and Dangerous Fallout Zones • Identify the Dangerous Fallout Zone (DFZ), Hot Zone, Cold Zone, and state the safety considerations: • Greatest danger from fallout is the exposure to penetrating radiation from accumulated fallout particles. • The most dangerous particles can be seen. • Fallout is not a significant inhalation hazard. • DFZ extends only tens of miles and shrinks rapidly within the first day. • Responders should avoid working in the DFZ. • Hot Zone extends up to several hundred miles after about a day and then begins to shrink. Work can proceed in the Hot Zone, with exposure controls. • Once fallout is on the ground, you may not know if you are in a fallout contaminated area. The only sure method of knowing if radiation is present is to use a radiation instrument.

  12. Module 4. Response Strategies: Sheltering and Evacuation Considerations • Identify the effective sheltering and evacuation considerations • Adequate shelter would be: • Central location within heavily constructed building • Basement • Underground garage or tunnel • Lowest Protection Factor for adequate shelter is a 10. • Immediately seek adequate shelter. • The data required to make an informed evacuation are the directions and speeds of the high altitude winds. • Evacuations should not begin until situational awareness has been established, and the planned routes should be phased to reduce the time spent transitioning through the fallout area. • Identify why cascading effects multiply dangers and impede response efforts.

  13. Optional Modules • Presidential PreparednessDirective 8 (PPD-8) and National Preparedness • Lessons Learned from the Response to Hurricane Katrina

  14. Key Leader: Incident Command Improvised Nuclear Device Response Program, Course 1 — Initial Actions • Course Description • Command-level responsibilities and functions related to the detonation of an IND in a major U.S. city. • First course in a program for senior personnel in jurisdictions likely to be targeted for an IND attack such as the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) regions, the jurisdictions surrounding the likely targeted jurisdictions (“collar communities”), and other jurisdictions throughout the nation that could provide support to and/or receive evacuees and casualties from the targeted jurisdiction.

  15. Target Audience • Senior level response personnel and select department heads and supervisors in the disciplines listed above. • Those likely to assume supervisory roles within the Incident Command System (ICS) or Emergency Operations Center (EOC) structure, such as positions at the ICS Branch, Division, or Group level, ICS General Staff, ICS Command Staff, and Incident Commander. • Includes personnel in jurisdictions with or preparing IND response plans, jurisdictions surrounding the likely targeted jurisdictions, and other jurisdictions throughout the region and nation that that could provide support to and/or receive evacuees and casualties from the targeted jurisdiction.

  16. Course Methodology • Web-Based Training (WBT) to better match the schedules of senior personnel • Sample IND Annex to an All Hazards Plan used as example of preplanning efforts throughout a multi-county region • Imaginary city of Springfield allows showing example plans, procedures, equipment, public education efforts, etc. without implying that these are the plans from a specific city, county, or state

  17. Course Methodology (cont.) • After teaching the course objectives, the course concludes with a 25-minute scenario of an IND detonation in the fictitious city of Springfield. • Scenario uses a cast of responders from many disciplines, working together to implement the initial actions from sample Springfield IND Annex that was used in the earlier “teaching sections” of the course.

  18. Module 1. Introduction • Establishes the course goals and identifies the intended audience for this course. • Emphasizes the concept of A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management assisting the Incident Command’s capabilities for early response and recovery. • Introduces the same two instructor/guides as used in the previous course.

  19. Module 2. Planning • Provides background and key elements of the (fictitious) Springfield IND Annex to the All Hazards Plan used in the Springfield Region. • Emphasizes the importance of preplanning and how that plan improves the chances of survivability for both residents and responders, after the detonation.

  20. Module 2. Planning (cont.) Key elements to the plan are: • Establishment of redundancy within the Springfield Jurisdiction • Training and exercise of both responders and municipal employees to prepare for catastrophic events • Use of atypical resources to supplement responder assets • Rapid establishment of Incident Command • Rapid establishment of EOC operations

  21. Module 3. Initial Actions of the Incident Commander • Presents the incident command and IND-specific tasks to protect citizens and responders in the areas of recognition of detonation, activation of the annex, establishment of command: • Per agency Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), assume command • Immediately terminate response • Direct all responders, citizens, and employees to seek adequate shelter • Assess the most functional location for Incident Command • Communications post detonation may be lost or in disarray (actions for units out of communications) • Establish Incident Command Post and EOC • Command Team Development • Other preplanned actions, for example Districts will become Divisions within the Incident Action Plan (IAP)

  22. Module 4. Early Situational Awareness • Initial goals for situational awareness • List the sources of situational awarenessinformation available to the Incident Commander during the first 15 to 30 minutes of the IND incident: • Responders/Municipal employees • Aerial Assets • General Public • Communication Centers to Reporting Units • Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) Post-Detonation Resources • Analyze the situational awareness information to determine the approximate location of ground zero and damage zone boundaries • Select appropriate EOC and ICP locations using appropriate incident commanders in existing or preplanned backup facilities identified in each district in the juriscidtion

  23. Module 5. The Story • Demonstration of Springfield’s response to an IND detonation using the concepts and techniques discussed in the previous modules

  24. Conclusion • Preplanning – foundation for success. • All incidents begin as local incidents. • An IND detonation will immediately become a regional and national incident. • Plan, develop, adopt “The New Normals” required for an IND. “Those who lead emergency response efforts must communicate and support engagement with the whole community by developing shared goals and aligning capabilities to reduce the risk of any jurisdiction being overwhelmed in times of crisis. Layered, mutually supporting capabilities of individuals, the private sector, NGOs [Nongovernmental Organizations], and governments at all levels allow for coordinated planning in times of calm and effective response in times of crisis.” DHS National Response Framework 2013

  25. Contact Information Richard Hansen, Senior Scientist (702) 295-7813 Jerry Newman, Senior Operations Specialist (702) 295-5181 Carol Gonzalez, Senior Operations Specialist (702) 295-3735 CTOS-Center for Radiological/Nuclear Training at the Nevada National Security Site National Security Technologies, LLC, Contractor to the U.S. Department of Energy