1 / 10

CMC (RFC 2797)

CMC (RFC 2797). Michael Myers VeriSign, Inc. mmyers@verisign.com. Objectives. Industry de-facto standard use of PKCS-10 for certificate requests and PKCS-7 for responses. Primary objectives: Simplify online certificate management by building on existing PKCS7 and PKCS10 practice.

odina
Télécharger la présentation

CMC (RFC 2797)

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. CMC (RFC 2797) Michael Myers VeriSign, Inc. mmyers@verisign.com

  2. Objectives • Industry de-facto standard use of PKCS-10 for certificate requests and PKCS-7 for responses. • Primary objectives: • Simplify online certificate management by building on existing PKCS7 and PKCS10 practice. • Reuse existing security encapsulation mechanism then being standardized as CMS in the IETF. • Define core functions useful for automated certificate management. • Straw poll of WG at San Jose IETF ratified the need for an alternative.

  3. Background • VeriSign, Cisco started work earlier. • Went through several variations (including a draft called Certificate Request Syntax (CRS)). • Emerged as Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) with Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) as a by-product. • Brian LaMacchia and Jim Schaad are principal technical architects of final versions. • Now RFC 2797.

  4. Top-Level Requirements • Based as much as possible on the existingCMS, PKCS#10 and CRMF specifications. • Support the current industry practice of aPKCS#10 request followed by a PKCS#7 response as a subset of theprotocol. • Must easily support the multi-key enrollmentprotocols required by S/MIME and other groups. • Must supply a way of doing operations in asingle-round trip whenever possible. • Enable all key generation to occur on the client. • Support mandatory and optional algorithms. • Support pending responses to certificate requests for cases where external procedures are required to issue a certificate. • Support Registration Authorities.

  5. Protocol Overview • Standardizes use of bare PKCS-10 for environments with a need for it. • Defines a means to “wrap a 10 in a 7”. • i.e use of CMS to encapsulate the PKCS 10 object. • May also use CRMF instead of a 10. • Responses based on CMS signedData. • Again, this could be nothing more than a “7”. • Or a responseBody in a CMS encapsulation.

  6. Services • Issuance (direct and deferred) • Revocation • Registration authority intervention • Certificate/CRL retrieval • Replay detection through nonces • Transaction management through transaction IDs.

  7. Simple request/response Simple PKI Request Simple PKI Response ------------------------- -------------------------- +----------+ +------------------+ | PKCS #10 | | CMS "certs-only" | +----------+--------------+ | message | | | +------------------+------+ | Certificate Request | | | | | | CMS Signed Data, | | Subject Name | | no signerInfo | | Subject Public Key Info | | | | (K_PUB) | | signedData contains one | | Attributes* | | or more certificates in | | | | the "certificates" | +-----------+-------------+ | portion of the | | signed with | | signedData. | | matching | | | | K_PRIV | | encapsulatedContentInfo | +-------------+ | is empty. | | | +--------------+----------+ | unsigned | +----------+

  8. Full Request/Response +----------------+ +----------------+ | CMS signedData | | CMS signedData | | object | | object | +----------------+--------+ +----------------+--------+ | | | | | PKIData object | | ResponseBody object | | | | | | Sequence of: | | Sequence of: | | <enrollment attribute>* | | <enrollment attribute>* | | <certification request>*| | <CMS object>* | | <CMS objects>* | | <other message>* | | <other message>* | | | | | | where * == zero or more | | where * == zero or more | | | | | | All certificates issued | | Certificate requests | | as part of the response | | are CRMF or PKCS#10 | | are included in the | | objects. Attributes are | | "certificates" portion | | (OID, ANY defined by | | of the signedData. | | OID) pairs. | | Relevant CA certs and | | | | CRLs can be included as | +-------+-----------------+ | well. | | signed (keypair | | | | used may be pre-| +---------+---------------+ | existing or | | signed by the | | identified in | | CA or an LRA | | the request) | +---------------+ +-----------------+

  9. Control Attributes Control Attribute OID Syntax ----------------- ---------- -------------- cMCStatusInfo id-cmc 1 CMCStatusInfo identification id-cmc 2 UTF8String identityProof id-cmc 3 OCTET STRING dataReturn id-cmc 4 OCTET STRING transactionId id-cmc 5 INTEGER senderNonce id-cmc 6 OCTET STRING recipientNonce id-cmc 7 OCTET STRING addExtensions id-cmc 8 AddExtensions encryptedPOP id-cmc 9 EncryptedPOP decryptedPOP id-cmc 10 DecryptedPOP lraPOPWitness id-cmc 11 LraPOPWitness getCert id-cmc 15 GetCert getCRL id-cmc 16 GetCRL revokeRequest id-cmc 17 RevokeRequest regInfo id-cmc 18 OCTET STRING responseInfo id-cmc 19 OCTET STRING QueryPending id-cmc 21 OCTET STRING idPOPLinkRandom id-cmc 22 OCTET STRING idPOPLinkWitness id-cmc 23 OCTET STRING idConfirmCertAcceptance id-cmc 24 CMCCertId

  10. A few other technical details • Subscriber privacy achieved through use of CMS enveloped data mechanisms. • Three transport wrapping options • MIME for HTTP and email • Binary for out of band floppy disk transfer (either bare or MIME) • Socket-based using the raw BER encoding. • Able to prove identity based on a shared secret. • Able to prove possession of encryption-only keys. • Able to link identity proof to possession proof.

More Related