The Intercultural Ethics Agenda from an Objectivist Point of View

1. The Intercultural Ethics Agenda from an Objectivist Point of View Kenneth Einar Himma Seattle Pacific University himma@spu.edu

2. A Variety of Different Intercultural Ethics Projects • Ess and Buchanan: Get cultures to agree on intercultural ethics to facilitate coordinated activity in a global economy • Hongladarom: Reconcile ordinary doctrines of privacy with Buddhist denial of self • Capurro and Britz: Organized series of conferences, most recently in South Africa, to facilitate dialogue between IE in different parts of the world.

3. Three Views of Truth • Subjective truth: a proposition or norm P is subjectively true if and only if its truth-value depends on what some relevant individual thinks and that individual thinks P is true. • Intersubjective truth: a proposition or norm P is intersubjectively (or conventionally) true if and only if its truth-value depends on what some group of individuals thinks and members of the group converge in thinking P is true. • Objective truth: a proposition or norm P is objectively true if and only if its truth-value is independent of what any person or group of persons think about the truth-value of P.

4. Two Classes of Intercultural Ethical Tasks • Descriptive ICE: Identify ethical principles that different cultures have in common and those on which they disagree. • Empirical in character • Normative ICE: Identify ethical principles that different cultures should agree on in governing global information and economic activity. • Moral, prudential, or aesthetic in character

5. Skepticism about Objective Truth • Skepticism about objectivity is not limited to skepticism about objectivity of moral principles. • The earth is roughly spherical

6. Skepticism about Objective Truth • Skepticism about objectivity is not limited to skepticism about objectivity of moral principles. • The earth is roughly spherical • Grounded in Kantian claim that we do not have unmediated access to reality an sich. Can’t think or talk about the world without concepts and language that are social inventions.

7. Problems with Skepticism about Objective Truth 1. Kantian claim, however, is an epistemological claim that cannot support the ontological claim that there are no objective truths about the world – or no way that the world is independently of our concepts. 2. Indeed, given our concepts, everyone could be mistaken about the shape of the world, which is the hallmark of objectivity. 3. The claim that there are objective truths purports to be an objective truth, so the denial of this claim, if it is to engage the position, must also purport to be objective, which is self-contradictory.

8. Skepticism about Moral Objectivity • Moral principles are neither objectively true nor objectively false; if they have truth-value, they are determined by cultural practices.

9. Arguments for Skepticism about Moral Objectivity • The Disagreement Argument: Cultures disagree on moral principles; so, moral principles not objective. • The Epistemological Argument: We have no epistemically reliable way to resolve moral disagreements between cultures. • The Tolerance Argument: Intersubjectivism more likely to encourage tolerance of cultural differences than objectivism.

10. Normative ICE and Skepticism about Objective Truth • Intersubjectivism and subjectivism cannot provide coherent motivation for normative project of pursuing agreement on moral principles. Can’t argue for agreement on moral grounds because there is no universal principle that agreement is morally good. Can’t argue for agreement on prudential grounds because prudential grounds are irrelevant with respect to choosing or adopting moral principles. Only moral grounds can justify adoption or choice of moral principles. (see William Frankena, “The Concept of Morality”).

11. Normative ICE and Moral Objectivism • Moral objectivism faces a lot of difficult issues. • E.g., what is ground for believing moral objectivism is true?

12. Normative ICE and Moral Objectivism • Moral objectivism faces a lot of difficult issues. • E.g., what is ground for believing moral objectivism is true? • But moral objectivism can coherently pursue the normative goal by giving moral reasons for the goodness of agreement.

13. Normative ICE and Moral Objectivism • Moral objectivism faces a lot of difficult issues. • E.g., what is ground for believing moral objectivism is true? • But moral objectivism can coherently pursue the normative goal by giving moral reasons for the goodness of agreement. • Moral objectivism also has a viable methodology for producing agreement: Gert’s “common morality” + Rawls “reflective equilibrium”

14. Normative ICE and Moral Objectivism • Moral objectivism faces a lot of difficult issues. • E.g., what is ground for believing moral objectivism is true? • But moral objectivism can coherently pursue the normative goal by giving moral reasons for the goodness of agreement. • Moral objectivism also has a viable methodology for producing agreement: Gert’s “common morality” + Rawls “reflective equilibrium” • Much disagreement that appears moral is not about fundamental moral principles at all: much disagreement involves disagreement about how to apply shared principles or disagreement about factual matters that condition applicability of shared moral principles.

15. Normative ICE and Moral Objectivism • Moral objectivism faces a lot of difficult issues. • E.g., what is ground for believing moral objectivism is true? • But moral objectivism can coherently pursue the normative goal by giving moral reasons for the goodness of agreement. • Moral objectivism also has a viable methodology for producing agreement: Gert’s “common morality” + Rawls “reflective equilibrium” • Much disagreement that appears moral is not about fundamental moral principles at all: much disagreement involves disagreement about how to apply shared principles or disagreement about factual matters that condition applicability of shared moral principles. • Indeed, one reason that diversity of moral views has been reduced during Information Age is precisely that new information technologies have made possible dialogues seeking reflective equilibrium.

16. Conclusion • The most promising foundation for the normative ICE project is moral objectivism. If intersubjectivists succeed in producing agreement, it will be, in part, because they have ignored their own skepticism about objectivity to adopt methodologies available only to moral objectivists.

17. The End • Thank you.