1 / 42

2006 Asian Energy Security Workshop November 6-7, 2006 Beijing, China Tatsujiro Suzuki

The Nuclear Power Sector in Japan: Nuclear Materials Management/Fuel Cycles Practices, Plans and Policies. 2006 Asian Energy Security Workshop November 6-7, 2006 Beijing, China Tatsujiro Suzuki The University of Tokyo tatsu@pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp. CONTENTS. Japan’s New National Energy Strategy

orpah
Télécharger la présentation

2006 Asian Energy Security Workshop November 6-7, 2006 Beijing, China Tatsujiro Suzuki

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. The Nuclear Power Sector in Japan: Nuclear Materials Management/Fuel Cycles Practices, Plans and Policies 2006 Asian Energy Security Workshop November 6-7, 2006 Beijing, China Tatsujiro Suzuki The University of Tokyo tatsu@pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp

  2. CONTENTS • Japan’s New National Energy Strategy • Japan’s New Nuclear Energy Policy • Three Major Issues • Nuclear Power under Liberalized Electricity Market • Spent Fuel, Reprocessing and Plutonium • Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Cycle Approaches and Japan’s Response

  3. Japan’s New Energy Strategy (2006) • Responding to emerging global and regional energy security risks • Concern over “politicization” of global oil market • Diversified energy security risk • Applying “comprehensive energy security” approach • Set numerical targets for key policy goals by 2030 • Acceleration of Nuclear Power Programs, including Nuclear Fuel Recycling and Fast Breeder Reactor(FBR) programs

  4. Japan’s New National Energy Strategy (2) Basic Perspectives of “Comprehensive” Energy Security Strategy Source: New National Energy Strategy (May 2006) http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/data/newnationalenergystrategy2006.pdf

  5. Japan’s New National Energy Strategy (3) (1)Target of energy conservation At least another 30% improvement of efficiency will be attained by 2030. (2)Target of reducing oil dependence The ratio will be reduced from current 50% to be lower than 40% by 2030. (3)Target of reducing oil dependence in the transport sector The percentage will be reduced from 100% to around 80% by 2030. (4)Target on nuclear power generation. The ratio of nuclear power to all power production will be maintained or increased at the level of 30 to 40% or more up to 2030 or later. (5)Target of overseas natural resources development Oil volume ratio will be increased from current 18% to around 40% by 2030. Source; New National Energy Strategy (May 2006) http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/data/newnationalenergystrategy2006.pdf

  6. Maintain Share of Nuclear Power • Source; New National Energy Strategy (May 2006) • http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/data/newnationalenergystrategy2006.pdf

  7. Japan’s “Resource Diplomacy” BBC World News, August 28, 2006 “In the game of regional politics, Japan feels it has a role to play in helping offset growing Russian and Chinese influence” Col Christopher LangtonInternational Institute of Strategic Studies source: BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5291858.stm

  8. Overview of Japan’s Nuclear Power Programs and Policies • Total of 55 nuclear power plants (49.6 GWe) are now providing roughly 1/3 of total electricity generation in Japan (as of March 2006) • While primary energy consumption is not growing much, electricity demand is still growing, but at slower rate, primarily due to stabilized population growth. • Nuclear power is expected to maintain its share (30~40%) until 2030, for both energy security and environmental reasons.

  9. METI’s New Nuclear Energy Policy “Nuclear Power Nation Plan”(2006) • Realization of replacement and new orders under the liberalized market • Higher utilization of existing reactors with enhanced safety performance • Steady progress in nuclear fuel cycle • Early commercialization (2050) of FBR • Strengthening industry’s technical and human resource • Promotion of international activities of nuclear industry • Active contribution to effective international regime in reconciling expansion of nuclear power and non-proliferation • Strengthening confidence building between local community and the government • Steady progress in waste disposal

  10. Liberalization of Electricity Market in Japan • Japanese electricity market is gradually being liberalized after 1995. • 1995 IPP* was introduced • Independent Power Producer • 2000. 3~ : >2,000 kWe market (~25%) • 2004. 3~ : > 500 kWe market (~40%) • 2005. 3~ : > 50 kWe market (~63%) • 2007 Full market liberalization will be discussed

  11. Future projection of nuclear capacity without any new orders Capacity (10MW) source: METI, “Nuclear Power Nation Plan,” Aug.2006 (in Japanese) http://www.meti.go.jp/report/downloadfiles/g60823a01j.pdf

  12. Measures to promote nuclear power under liberalized market • Financial mechanism • Allow levelized depreciation of capital investment • Allow reserve system for future reprocessing (beyond Rokkasho) • Reexamine funding mechanism for decommissioning fund • Realize benefits of CO2-free power • Promote “extended regional power management” to allow maximum use of nuclear power

  13. Japan’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Program

  14. Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant - Owner : JNFL - 800 tHM /yr of capacity - 3,000tHM of spent fuel storage capacity. - Active testing started from March.31, 2006. - Operation year: 2007 - Plutonium will be separated and MOX powder will be produced by the end of November for the first time.

  15. Overview of Rokkasho Project(as of 2006.4) *200 litter each Source: http://www.fepc.or.jp/menu/cycle/cycle1.html

  16. Estimated Total Life Cycle Cost of Rokkasho Project Source: Report of Study Group on Cost Estimate for Nuclear Fuel Cycle (METI, 2004)

  17. Debate at JAEC’s LTP - Recycling vs Direct Disposal - (1) • JAEC established technical-subcommittee on economic comparison of fuel cycle options. • Four scenarios until 2060 • Reprocessing all spent fuels (Rokkasho+2nd Plant) • Reprocessing at Rokkasho, and direct disposal • Direct disposal of all spent fuels • Interim storage of all spent fuels (decisions to reprocess or direct disposal will be deferred)

  18. Debate at JAEC’s LTP - Economic Comparison (\/kWh, 2% DR) - (2)

  19. Debate at JAEC’s LTP - Recycling vs Direct Disposal - (3)

  20. Debate at JAEC’s LTP - Recycling vs Direct Disposal - (4) • JAEC LTP committee decided that maintaining “all reprocessing/recycling policy” is appropriate • 2nd reprocessing plant will be needed after 2040, and FBR should follow. • JAEC now included R&D on direct disposal as a future option.

  21. Cost Sharing Scheme General Power Users PPS Customers Back end cost “not covered” by the existing scheme (about \12.7 trillion) Electricity Rate Transmission cost charge Newly Created “Back End” Fund Source: Denki Shimbun, May 12, 2004

  22. Need to cover future reprocessing and SF Storage costs

  23. Back-End of Fuel CycleSpent Fuel Management Issues • Legal Constraints • Reactor and Radioactive Material regulation requires reactor operators to specify “final disposal method” of spent fuel • “reprocessing” is the only method for utilities since JAEC’s LTP does not allow direct disposal • Amendment made in 1998 to allow “interim storage” (outside reactor and reprocessing sites) • Law for HLW Disposal (1999) • Law defines HLW as “vitrified waste from reprocessing” (spent fuel is not included as HLW and cannot be disposed by Nuclear Waste Management Organization [NUMO])

  24. Back-End of Fuel CycleSpent Fuel Management Issues • Physical and Political constraints • Utilities promised reactor site communities to remove SF to reprocessing facility • Physical storage capacity has been limited by political opposition to: • Expansion of storage capacity on site • Acceptance of SF from other reactors/sites • Spent fuel handling tax is being raised at reactor sites • Now, some utilities plan to build first Away-from-Reactor (AFR) interim storage facility (5000 tons) at Mutsu city (Aomori) • But the condition is to continue reprocessing policy

  25. Cumulative inventory and management of spent fuel in the future

  26. 2019 Start of Mutsu interim storage 2014 2016 Rokkasho pool only Additional storage capacity needed beyond NPP sites Assumption: Rokkasho storage pool: 1,500tHM for BWR and1,500tHM for PWR (1,096tHM for BWR and 680tHM for PWR was already filled by the end of April 2006.)

  27. Japan’s Pu Balance(as of April 2004) Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Answers to the questions raised by Inami Tetsuo (The House of Representatives member) for the Pu management in Japan(August 2004). The number is rounded off to one decimal.

  28. 81tPu 74tPu 81tPu 37tPu 48tPu 6tPu Figure 4. Future plutonium stockpile until 2020 Assumption Before2004: actual data After2005 : Demand MOX fuel:From 2012, 9.3 tPu/year/plants x18 plants Monju: re-start from 2010, 0.47tPU/year Supply Rokkasho reprocessing plant: start from 2006 (2 -6tPu/year from 2006-2009, 8tPu/year from 2010)

  29. Progress of MOX fuel program as of September 2006

  30. Plutonium Issues • Japan’s plutonium stockpile could increase up to 150 tons by 2020. • If Rokksho plant start its operation as planned without any progress in MOX recycling programs • Even with full MOX recycling programs as planned, Japanese plutonium stockpile will be around 80 tons in 2011. • In order to consume such large stockpile of plutonium, Japanese utilities must speed up and scale up its MOX recycling programs substantially.

  31. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycle(1) • Need for tighter control on enrichment and reprocessing facilities/technologies • IAEA Elbaradei Proposal and MNA (multilateral nuclear fuel cycle approach) • Assurance of fuel supply • Enrichment and reprocessing facilities under multinational ownership or multilateral control • Multinational management of spent fuel and HLW

  32. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycle(2) • US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) –US, Russia, France, Japan, UK, China • Fuel supply guarantee to those who give up enrichment/reprocessing facilities • Accept spent fuel/HLW from those who give up enrichment/reprocessing facilities (cf. “Fuel Leasing scheme proposed by Russia) • Develop Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR) and proliferation resistant fuel recycling technologies • Develop a small reactor for developing country • Develop advanced safeguards technologies

  33. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycle(3) • Uncertainties about GNEP • Double standards for enrichment/reprocessing facilities (separate “have” and “have not”) • Under development of advanced fuel recycling and ABR technologies • No firm prospect for accepting foreign spent fuel and HLW • Not clear how these approaches are effective for current non-proliferation issues

  34. Multilateral Approach over Nuclear Fuel Cycle • Closing nuclear fuel cycle is one of the corner stones of Japan’s energy security • Considered as “semi-domestic” energy source • At first, reluctant to support “multilateral approaches” as it may conflict with Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle strategy • New energy strategy has adopted more positive policy toward multilateral approaches • Contributing to enhanced global non-proliferation regime • Japan can be a supplier nation of nuclear fuel cycle in the future

  35. Japan’s response to GNEP • Feb.7: Japan's view • Positive statement and “will discuss what Japan can do to contribute to the proposal” (PM office, METI/MOFA/MEXT) • Aug.8: "Nuclear power nation plan" • METI Nuclear Policy Committee and Japan’s New Energy Strategy published in June • Reaffirm commitment to FBR and closed fuel cycle • Sep.8: Proposal for Expression of Interest (EOI) • JAEA, JNFL, Fuji electric group, Mitsubishi heavy industries ltd., etc. • Sept.: Japan’s proposal for Nuclear Fuel Assurance (METI, JAEC)

  36. Japan’s ProposalIAEA Standby Arrangements System for Nuclear Fuel Supply (1) • Japan’s strategic thinking • Make Japan's presence in the GNEP • Secure the position as a supplier of enriched uranium service in the future (do not want to limit future suppliers to only six nations) • Basic concepts • Supplementary to six country proposal • Intend to reduce possibility of “supply disruption” in addition to preparation for possible disruption- need to enhance “transparency”of the market • Six country proposal separate countries into “have” and “have not”. This proposal is intended to cover as many countries as possible as future suppliers.

  37. Japan’s ProposalIAEA Standby Arrangements System for Nuclear Fuel Supply (2) • Each country can voluntarily register the following supply capability at IAEA • Natural uranium • Uranium conversion • Enrichment service • Uranium fuel fabrication • Uranium fuel stockpile • Registration can be categorized into the following three groups. • Level 1: Has commercial supply capability, but has not exported to international market • Level 2: Has already exported to int’l market • Level 3: Has stockpile which can be readily exported

  38. Japan’s ProposalIAEA Standby Arrangements System for Nuclear Fuel Supply (3) • Role of IAEA • Managing the Standby Arrangements System, including establishing database • Clarifying conditions to receive fuel assurance • Safeguards, safety, PP, export control, etc. • Note that “giving up supply capability” may not be appropriate under the sprit of “universal” condition • IAEA does not have any legal ownership, but will play important role in making arrangements between supplier and recipient states • Reflecting negative response to six country proposal • 6 country proposal could deny the right (Art. 4) of NPT • Japan’s proposal does not deny such right

  39. Possible Multinational Approach involving Japan

  40. Possible Multinational Approach involving Japan

  41. CONCLUSION (1) • Energy Security Strategy has changed significantly • More complex, diversified, multi-layered strategy • Nuclear power is critical component of Japan’s energy strategy • Maintain 30~40% share of electricity generation • Various measures are needed to ensure competitiveness of nuclear power under liberalized energy market

  42. CONCLUSION (2) • Japan’s commitment to closed fuel cycle remains strong • But such commitment may create financial, political and social risks to Japanese nuclear program • Reprocessing is costly • Plutonium stockpile may increase • In order to avoid such risks, Japan should explore socio-political solutions, including multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle

More Related