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Let’s Play Poker: Effort and Software Security Risk Estimation in Software Engineering

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27 diapositives · 446 Views · Jul 31, 2014

Let’s Play Poker: Effort and Software Security Risk Estimation in Software Engineering . Laurie Williams williams@csc.ncsu.edu. Picture from http://www.thevelvetstore.com. Another vote for…. “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” --Albert Einstein.

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Let’s Play Poker: Effort and Software Security Risk Estimation in Software Engineering
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  1. Let’s Play Poker: Effort and Software Security Risk Estimation in Software Engineering Laurie Williams williams@csc.ncsu.edu Picture from http://www.thevelvetstore.com

  2. Another vote for… “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” --Albert Einstein http://imagecache2.allposters.com/images/pic/CMAG/956-037~Albert-Einstein-Posters.jpg

  3. Estimation Planning Poker How many engineers? How long? What is the security risk? Protection Poker Pictures from http://www.doolwind.com , http://news.cnet.com and http://www.itsablackthang.com/images/Art-Sports/irving-sinclair-the-poker-game.jpg

  4. Effort Estimation: Planning Poker How many engineers? How long? Pictures from http://www.doolwind.com , http://www.legendsofamerica.com/photos-oldwest/Faro2-500.jpg

  5. Historical Effort Estimation • Gut feel often based on: • Disaggregation • Analogy • Expert opinion Pictures from http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2003/09/0309hirmanpour_f1.gif , http://www.cs.unc.edu/~stotts/145/cocomo4.gif and http://www.timoelliott.com/blog/WindowsLiveWriter/IntestineBasedDecisionMaking_2C89/gut%20feel_1.png and http://www.isr.uci.edu/icse-06/images/keynotes/Boehm.jpg and http://www.rallydev.com/images/mike_photo_color.jpg

  6. Coming up with the plan Desired Features 5 story points/ iteration 6 iterations 30 story points June 10

  7. Estimating “dog points” • Estimate each of the dogs below in dog points, assigning each dog a minimum of 1 dog point and a maximum of 10 dog points • A dog point represents the height of a dog at the shoulder • Labrador retriever • Terrier • Great Dane • Poodle • Dachshund • German shepherd • St. Bernard • Bulldog

  8. What if? • Estimate each of the dogs below in dog points, assigning each dog a minimum of 1 dog point and a maximum of 100 dog points • A dog point represents the height of a dog at the shoulder • Labrador retriever • Terrier • Great Dane • Poodle • Dachshund • German shepherd • St. Bernard • Bulldog Harder or easier? More or less accurate? More or less time consuming?

  9. Estimating story points • Estimate stories relative to each other • Twice as big • Half as big • Almost but not quite as big • A little bit bigger • Only values: • 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 20, 40, 100 Near term iteration “stories” A few iterations away “epic”

  10. Diversity of opinion is essential! • Vote based on: • Disaggregation • Analogy • Expert opinion

  11. Not working as fast as planned? Desired Features 5 story points iteration 3 story points iteration July 8 June 10 30 story points 6 iterations 10 iterations

  12. (Subjective) Results of Planning Poker • Explicit result (<20%): • Effort Estimate • Side effects/implicit results (80%+): • Greater understanding of requirement • Expectation setting • Implementation hints • High level design/architecture discussion • Ownership of estimate

  13. Security Risk Estimation: Protection Poker What is the security risk? http://news.cnet.com and http://swamptour.net/images/ST7PokerGame1.gif

  14. Software Security Risk Assessment via Protection Poker

  15. Computing Security Risk Exposure Ease points Value points

  16. Protection Poker Overview • Calibrate value of “assets” • Calibrate ease of attack for requirements • Compute security risk (value, ease) of each requirement • Security risk ranking and discussion “Diversity of ideas is healthy, and it lends a creativity and drive to the security field that we must take advantage of.” -- Gary McGraw Picture from: http://farm1.static.flickr.com/203/488795952_9007f93c71.jpg

  17. Diversity of devious, attacker thinking is essential! • Informal discussions of: • Threat models • Misuse cases

  18. Memory Jogger

  19. Security Risk Assessment Sum of asset value (e.g. one 20 and one 40)

  20. Academic Trial • 50 students in undergraduate software engineering course 1. Security cannot be obtained through obscurity alone. 2. Never trust your input. 3. Know your system. 4. Know common exploits. 5. Know how to test for vulnerabilities.

  21. Industrial Trial • Active participation by all on-site team members • Requirements revised for added security fortification • Cross site scripting vulnerability found on the spot • Expressed need for education on cross site scripting • Expressed need for governance to prioritize security fortification • Increase awareness of necessary security testing

  22. (Subjective) Results of Protection Poker • Explicit result (<20%): • Relative security risk assessment • Side effects/implicit results (80%+): • Greater awareness understanding of security implications of requirement • Collaborative threat modeling • Collaborative misuse case development • Requirements changed to reduce risk • Allocation of time to build security into new functionality “delivered” at end of iteration (appropriate to relative risk) • Knowledge sharing and transfer of security information

  23. http://www.photosofoldamerica.com/webart/large/254.JPG http://www.cardcow.com/images/albert-einstein-at-beach-1945-celebrities-28954.jpg