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LECTURE 6

LECTURE 6. NECESSITY & G. E. MOORE ON THE ERROR OF THE ABSOLUTE IDEALISTS. G.E. MOORE GAVE A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF “ INTERNAL RELATION ” AND DIAGNOSED AN ERROR OF THE ABSOLUTE IDEALISTS . G. E. MOORE 1873-1958. WE GIVE A (SLIGHTLY) SIMPLER EXPLANATION OF MOORE’S POINT.

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LECTURE 6

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  1. LECTURE 6 NECESSITY & G. E. MOORE ON THE ERROR OF THE ABSOLUTE IDEALISTS

  2. G.E. MOORE GAVE A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF “INTERNAL RELATION”AND DIAGNOSED AN ERROR OF THE ABSOLUTE IDEALISTS. G. E. MOORE 1873-1958

  3. WE GIVE A (SLIGHTLY) SIMPLER EXPLANATION OF MOORE’S POINT CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: (1) “ NECESSARILY, IF A HAS PROPERTY P, THEN IF XDOES NOT, THEN X IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH A.” HERE WE ARE SUPPOSING THAT PIS A RELATIONAL PROPERTY, BUT IT DOESN’T REALLY MATTER.

  4. ELABORATION IF A THING A HAS ANY PROPERTY THAT X DOES NOT, THEN A IS NOT THAT THING X. AND THIS IS WHOLE STATEMENT IS NECESSARILY TRUE. THIS IS BASED ON A PRINCIPLE OF LOGIC WHICH GOES UNDER VARIOUS NAMES: SUBSTITUTIVITY OF IDENTITY, LEIBNIZ’S LAW, INDISCERNIBILITY OF IDENTICALS. “IF ANYTHING IS TRUE OF A THAT ISN’T TRUE OF X, THEN X ISN’T A”.

  5. NOW CONSIDER: (2) IF A HAS PROPERTY P, THEN NECESSARILY: IF XDOESN’T HAVE P , THEN X IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH A.” • THIS MAY SOUND VERY MUCH THE SAME – THAT’S WHY SOME ABSOLUTE IDEALISTS CONFUSED THEM.

  6. WITH JUST A LITTLE SYMBOLISM(FOR THOSE WHO LIKE THAT SORT OF THING) (1) [IF A IS P, THEN (IF X IS NOT-P, THEN XA)] THIS IS TRUE NO MATTER WHAT THINGS X AND A AND PROPERTY P WE CONSIDER. (2) [IF A IS P, THEN (IF X IS NOT-P, THEN XA)] THIS IS NOT TRUE FOR ALL THINGS X AND A AND PROPERTY P.

  7. THE SECOND DOES NOT FOLLOW FROM THE FIRST AND IS NOT GENERALLY TRUE SUPPOSE THAT YOU ARE A FRIEND OF JONES. THEN ANYONE X WHO IS NOT FRIEND OF JONES IS NOT YOU. BUT EVEN IF YOU ARE A FRIEND OF JONES, YOU MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN. IN THAT CASE IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: NECESSARILY, ANYONE WHO WAS NOT A FRIEND OF JONES WOULD NOT BE YOU.

  8. THIS A SUBTLE DISTINCTION HERE IS A SIMPLER CASE OF THE SAME ERROR: THE SEA BATTLE TOMORROW (ARISTOTLE): “IF YOU WILL WIN THE SEA BATTLE TOMORROW, THEN NECESSARILY YOU WILL WIN.” “IF YOU WILL LOSE THE SEA BATTLE TOMORROW, THEN NECESSARILY YOU WILL LOSE.” “THEREFORE, YOU WILL NECESSARILY WIN OR YOU WILL NECESSARILY LOSE.” (FATALISM)

  9. THERE’S NO USE PREPARING, IT IS ALREADLY NECESSARILY DETERMINED SOLDIERS IN BATTLE HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO SAY “IF A BULLET HAS YOUR NAME ON IT, THEN THAT’S IT. YOU’RE DEAD. IF NOT, YOU’LL BE O.K.” I AGREE, BUT YOU SHOULD WEAR YOUR HELMET ANYWAY.

  10. THE SEA BATTLE ARGUMENT (3) (IF WILL WIN, THEN WILL WIN) (4) (IF WILL LOSE, THEN WILL LOSE) THESE ARE BOTH TRUE, BUT DON’T SAY THAT THE OUTCOME IS DETERMINED. THE STATEMENTS NEEDED FOR THAT ARGUMENT ARE: (3’) IF WILL WIN, THEN  (WILL WIN) (4’) IF WILL LOSE, THEN (WILL LOSE) THESE SEEM TO BE FALSE (?)

  11. THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES “IF X AND Y HAVE ALL THEIR QUALITIES IN COMMON, THEN X IS IDENTICAL WITH Y.” MAX BLACK’S COUNTEREXAMPLE:

  12. MOORE’S DEFINITION OF “INTERNAL RELATIONAL PROPERTY” SIMPLIFIED A PROPERTYP IS ESSENTIAL TO A THING A IF AND ONLY IF A WOULD HAVE PIN EVERY POSSIBLE WORLD IN WHICH IT EXISTED. A RELATIONAL PROPERTY P IS INTERNALTO A THING A IF AND ONLY IF P IS ESSENTIAL TO A.

  13. MOORE POINTS OUT THAT IT IS EXTREMELY IMPLAUSIBLE TO THINK THAT ALL RELATIONAL PROPERTIES ARE INTERNAL (IN HIS SENSE). IF A IS TEN FEET FROM B, THEN IT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE ESSENTIAL TO A THAT IT HAVE THE RELATIONAL PROPERTY OF BEING TEN FEET FROM B.

  14. ON EITHER OF THESE WAYS OF DEFINING ‘INTERNAL RELATION’, IT SEEMS THAT THERE ARE EXTERNAL RELATIONS • MAYBE THERE IS MORE THAN ONE SUBSTANTIAL THING AFTER ALL!!

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