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Introduction to Access Control and Trust Management

Introduction to Access Control and Trust Management. Daniel Trivellato. Outline. Introduction to Access Control Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control Role-Based Access Control Distributed Trust Management Reputation-based TM Rule-based TM. Authentication vs. Access Control.

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Introduction to Access Control and Trust Management

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  1. Introduction to Access Control and Trust Management Daniel Trivellato

  2. Outline • Introduction to Access Control • Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control • Role-Based Access Control • Distributed Trust Management • Reputation-based TM • Rule-based TM Minor project course

  3. Authentication vs. Access Control • Authentication: • establishing who you are (of whether you possess a certain pseudonym) • Access Control: • establishing if you have the right of doing a certain action • Authentication is often necessary for access control Minor project course

  4. Outline • Introduction to Access Control • Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control • Role-Based Access Control • Distributed Trust Management • Reputation-based TM • Rule-based TM Minor project course

  5. Basics: Subject, Object, Action • Subjects • Alice, Bob, Alice’s program • Objects • a file, the printer • Actions • read, write, execute, modify, send Minor project course

  6. Discretionary Access Control • Goal: prevent illegitimate access to resources • Access is granted to users, or user groups • Ownership: Users have all the rights about the objects they create • Delegation: Users can grant the rights they have to others • Users that have control can remove rights Minor project course

  7. DAC Models • Take-grant model • Lampson (1974) • Graham-Denning (1972) • Harrison-Rizzo-Ullman (1976) • Griffiths-Wade (1976) • Originator control (1989) Minor project course

  8. Lampson’s Access Matrix • Set of objects O • Set of users U • Access Matrix A (UxU and UxO) • Entries are sets of allowed actions (read, write, call,…) • Plus owns for administration of rights • * flag for delegation right Minor project course

  9. Access Matrix - Example Minor project course

  10. Mandatory Access Control • Goal: prevent illegitimate flow (leakage) of information • Attach security labels to subjects and objects • Users, processes are given a clearance • Objects, resources are given a label • Information can not flow to lower or incomparable security classes Minor project course

  11. ……..... ……..... ……..... ……..... MAC – Example • Bell-La Padula: NO READ UP NO WRITE DOWN SUBJECTS OBJECTS write TS TS read write S S read Information flow write C C read write read U U Minor project course

  12. Outline • Introduction to Access Control • Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control • Role-Based Access Control • Distributed Trust Management • Reputation-based TM • Rule-based TM Minor project course

  13. Role-Based Access Control • Users are assigned to roles • Roles are assigned rights Minor project course

  14. RBAC • Roles can be hierarchical • Rights are inherited Project leader Tester Programmer Project member Minor project course

  15. Outline • Introduction to Access Control • Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control • Role-Based Access Control • Distributed Trust Management • Reputation-based TM • Rule-based TM Minor project course

  16. Trust Management • Typical access control mechanism • TM alternative shows lookup subject ID authorization has infers subject attributes authorization Minor project course

  17. Distributed Trust Management • Deals with authorizations in a distributed system (e.g., the Internet) • need to interact with people you don’t know • 2 types of DTM • Reputation-based TM • Rule-based TM Minor project course

  18. Outline • Introduction to Access Control • Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control • Role-Based Access Control • Distributed Trust Management • Reputation-based TM • Rule-based TM Minor project course

  19. Reputation-based TM (concrete) • community of cooks (200 people) • to establish trust: • you ask your friends • and friends of friends • ... • some recommendations are better than others • you check the record (if any) • after success trust increases Minor project course

  20. Reputation-based TM (virtual) • eBay (hundreds of millions of users) Minor project course

  21. Reputation-based TM (virtual) • Buyers and sellers rate each other after a transaction • Positive (r(i,j) = 1) • Neutral (r(i,j) = 0) • Negative (r(i,j) = -1) Minor project course

  22. Key features • open system (different security domains) • trust is a measure & changes in time • essential risk component • recommendation based (NOT identity-based) • peers are not continuously available • Algorithms (e.g., EigenTrust) Minor project course

  23. Outline • Introduction to Access Control • Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control • Role-Based Access Control • Distributed Trust Management • Reputation-based TM • Rule-based TM Minor project course

  24. Rule-based TM (concrete) • Bart is entitled to a discount If he is a student of the local university Minor project course

  25. Rule-based TM (virtual) • When is Bart now entitled to a discount? Minor project course

  26. Bart is entitled to a discount… • If he is a student of any accredited University. • But perhaps also… • If he is an employee of any governmental organization • If he is a member of the library club • If he is a veteran • …. • Too many to mention • Which problems does this raise? • Scalability • Knowing where and what to search Minor project course

  27. Reputation vs. Rules • open system (different security domains) • trust is a measure & changes in time • risk-based • no delegation • recommendation based (NOT identity-based) • peers are not continuously available • scalability • open system (different security domains) • trust is boolean & less time-dependent • no risk • delegation • rule (credential) based (NOT identity-based) • peers are not continuously available • scalability Minor project course

  28. Credentials • A credential is a statement • Signed by the issuer • about a subject • Containing info about the subject • Requirements • Unforgeable (!) • Verifiable (that it belongs to the subject asking for the service) • Signed (e.g. X509) Minor project course

  29. Credential Chains Bart TU/e Is student of Accreditation Bureau Is accredited by Shop Is accepted by • We have a chain of credentials • The subject of one is the issuer of the other one Minor project course

  30. Languages for TM • A good language for TM must be able to express: • Decentralized attributes • Delegation of attribute authority • Inference of attributes • Attribute fields (e.g., age) • Attribute-based delegation of authority Minor project course

  31. Decentralized Attributes • An entity asserts that another entity has a certain attribute • e.g., student(TU/e,Alice) • The TU/e asserts that Alice is a student • Issuer: TU/e • Subject: Alice • Where is it stored? Minor project course

  32. Delegation of Attribute Authority • An entity delegates (i.e. trusts) the authority over an attribute to another entity • e.g., student(DSA,X)  student(TU/e,X) • The “Dutch Students Association” considers as students all the students of the TU/e • Operationally: anyone showing a TU/e student credential can get a student credential from the DSA • Issuers: DSA, TU/e • Subject: X Minor project course

  33. Inference of Attributes • An entity uses one attribute to make inferences about another attribute • e.g., employee(TU/e,X)  professor(TU/e,X) • The TU/e asserts that every TU/e professor is also a TU/e employee Minor project course

  34. Attribute Fields • Credentials may carry field values • e.g. student(DSA,Alice,university=TU/e) • Field values can be used to infer additional attributes and for conditional delegation • e.g. ccard(VISA,X)  client(ABN,X,credit=Y) AND Y > 2000 • VISA releases credit cards only to ABN clients with more than 2000€ in their account Minor project course

  35. Attribute-based Delegation of Authority • An entity may delegate the authority to another entity depending on its attributes • e.g. ccard(VISA,X)  client(Y,X) AND certified(EB,Y) • VISA releases a credit card only to clients of banks which are certified by the “European Bank” • By doing so, VISA does not need to explicitly mention all the banks which are trusted • VISA trusts EB’s opinion about banks Minor project course

  36. Credential Storage • Every credential can be stored by its issuer, its subject, or a third party • When we try to build a credential chain, we must be able to retrieve the appropriate credentials • Credential chain discovery algorithms suggest storage schemas according to which credentials are retrieved • RT: backward and forward search algorithm • TuLiP • POLIPO Minor project course

  37. In the next lecture… • The POLIPO framework • a rule-based TM language • a reputation system • an algorithm for credential chain discovery Minor project course

  38. Thank you for your attention! Questions? n.zannone@tue.nl d.trivellato@tue.nl Minor project course

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