Staff Assessment of Progress in Implementation

1. Staff Assessment of Progress in Implementation IMF, World Bank and UN Sudan Consortium Paris, March 9 2006

2. Overview • Macroeconomic and fiscal developments and prospects • Systemic constraints and suggested next steps • Government of National Unity • Government of Southern Sudan • Development Financing – Trends and Prospects • Domestic Efforts • Trends in Donor Assistance • Financing Requests

3. Economic Developments Good Performance In 2005

4. Economic Developments Good Performance In 2005

5. Economic DevelopmentsDifficulties and Delays • Overruns in fiscal spending, mainly because of the unplanned fuel subsidy • Non-concessional borrowing target exceeded by large margin • Public financial management: Government Finance Statistics (GFS), capacity building

6. ProspectsThe Government Program for 2006 Lower fiscal deficit, reduce fuel subsidies, reorient spending

7. ProspectsKey economic reforms in government program Protect tax base • Revamp tax incentives (VAT and profit tax holidays) Improve fiscal transparency • GFS classification and reporting

8. ProspectsKey economic reforms in government program Public financial management • Establish rules and procedures for the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission • Conduct Public Expenditure Review to strengthen expenditure management and allocations Improve oil sector transparency • Publication of detailed oil sector data • Audits of Sudapet • Regular and transparent profit transfers from oil companies to the treasury

9. Economic Key economic reforms in government program Implement CPA related banking reforms • Proceed with restructuring of the central bank • Enable dual banking • Introduce new Sudanese Pound Commercial bank restructuring • Raise capital adequacy ratios and minimum capital requirements

10. Addressing Systemic Constraints: GNU • Ongoing conflict in Darfur and tensions in the East undermine efforts to realize JAM priorities, and threaten further instability • Slow, and in some cases incomplete, implementation of the CPA • Limited public resources available for basic service delivery and infrastructure, despite some progress • Budgets for development (pro-poor) purposes still limited, and below commitments, both by government and donors • Record on budget execution is weak, especially to states and Three Areas  Increasing implementation efforts in disadvantaged regions – including Three Areas – are needed to get progress on track

11. Keys to Accelerating Progress on Poverty Eradication: GNU • Improving governance and transparency = the CPA agenda, esp. • Effective decentralisation, building on the increased planned fiscal transfers, is critical to improved basic service delivery: • Transparency and predictability on mechanisms and amounts of resources to sub-national levels • Review allocation criteria to improve distribution • Improve budget execution (combat, e.g., salary arrears) • Build local and national government capacities for policy development and service delivery • Facilitate more open and consultative governance • National Petroleum Commission must begin effective operation

12. Keys to Accelerating Progress on Poverty Eradication: GNU 2. Supporting rural development – especially small farmers and firms • Abolish the monopoly on raw Gum Arabic and on livestock exports • Reform agenda: Gezira and semi-mechanized farming • Develop sustainable support services, including credit, with private sector • Support private investment in disadvantaged regions; re-establish land use rights 3. Enabling private sector development & trade more broadly • Reduce bureaucratic barriers facing business registration, customs, land use; and streamline port procedures and logistics/transport • Reduce tariffs, clarify tax authority of different levels of government and broaden the tax base • Facilitate access to long-term financing for firms

13. Systemic Constraints: GOSS • Severe lack of capacity constrains progress on key priorities; still need to establish core capacities within key line agencies and the cabinet, and at lower levels of government • Weak public financial management systems and controls pose a risk to the whole development program • Absence of an effective payroll system for both security forces and public servants • Lack of clarity on decentralisation: expenditure and revenue assignments, & links between central line agencies and lower levels

14. Keys to Accelerating Progress on Poverty Eradication: GOSS • Building core capacities and establishing the public service • Establish a recruitment policy, and a payroll system • Implement anti-corruption safeguards • Provide support to state and local level institutions • Improving coordination of development policies and programs • Establishing a base for sound public financial management • Urgently attend to key decisions, especially to formalise systems of payment and accounting, and to enact and enforce transparent procedures including for procurement  • Treasury Single Account, public finance legislation and procurement rules • Establishing processes and accounting for intergovernmental transfers • Enabling productive activities and delivery of basic services • Facilitating access to micro-credit • Expand access to basic healthcare and education, based on emerging sector programs

15. Development Spending: Domestic and External • Assessed needs in the JAM were huge, but increased domestic revenue due to high growth and oil prices, coupled with pro-poor efforts, and support from international partners can meet the needs • For the GNU and the GOSS, the budget is critical not only as a means of actually financing priority programs, but as a central signal of domestic policy priorities • Increasing pro-poor spending is key: defining and measuring ‘pro-poor’ is fraught with difficulty, but working definition developed (see next session) • Assessment of the nature and level of trends since 2004, on both domestic and external fronts, is broadly positive

16. Increased Domestic Efforts • GNU – in the context of high economic growth and rising revenue  measured pro-poor spending has increased significantly in absolute terms since 2004 (baseline, which was very low) • In 2005 budget, transfers to states and the South increased substantially over 2004 • The 2006 fiscal framework shows a large increase in transfers to states, and an increase in pro-poor spending, that approaches JAM commitments • GOSS – • For 2005, a transition year – formal budget process cycle, but experience underlines the importance of getting systems established – for payments and reporting • For 2006, a promising process was launched, and sectoral ceilings show close correspondence with JAM priorities, as these continue to evolve. BUT public financial management poses a major challenge

17. Significant Increases in Donor Assistance since CPA Total Reported Donor Assistance to Sudan by Region, 2003-05 (US$ million) 2004: Estimated figures based on FTS Geneva and Darfur Funding Overview; assumes Southern Sudan received all non-Darfur funding for 2004. 2005: Recorded by UN for 2005, MDTF contributions, and US and EC reports.

18. Humanitarian Aid Still Dominates (especially in Darfur, also in the South) Reported Donor Assistance to Sudan by Category and Region, 2005 (US$ million) Source: World Bank staff estimates based on all funding recorded by UN for 2005, MDTF contributions, and reporting by US and EC. Note: MDTF commitments are included under Development.

19. Assessment of Financing Requests:GNU • The JAM assessed financing requests based on domestic pro-poor efforts and development needs  staff endorse this approach, including progress against the Matrix • GNU financing request of US$ 386 million in 2006 is appropriate on a commitment basis • If full execution of the pro-poor GNU budget = external financing request would cover 22 percent of pro-poor needs  Somewhat less than the JAM estimate of 36 percent — that is, 4:1, not 2:1, ratio of domestic to external effort • Role of the MDTF – North. US$48 million of donor funds in 2005, nearly fully committed via approved full program proposals  Staff support Government’s request that development financing be directed through the MDTFs to allow for maximum ownership of program design and implementation, and to strengthen links with the domestic budget

20. GNU Development Financing Trends and Plans, 2005 – 06 (US$)

21. Assessment of Financing Request: GOSS • Based on the emerging program for 2006 and the strong pro-poor efforts evidenced in the budget, the GOSS’s financing request of US$300 million is appropriate, but again, on a commitment basis • Slower than expected disbursement of donor commitments in 2005 related to delays in CPA implementation, and practical problems and delays in partners in getting started in Juba; progress expected to accelerate in 2006 • Assuming full financing of this request and full execution of pro-poor spending per the budget, the external share would be about 37 percent (close to JAM estimate of 41 percent) • The MDTF for the GOSS received US$99.2 million in 2005, and has committed all existing funds, indicating that replenishments are needed

22. GOSS Development Financing Trends and Plans, 2005 – 06 (US$)

23. Domestic share of pro-poor needs higher than JAM projections, 2006 Share of Pro-Poor Needs Covered by Own Efforts, JAM vs. Revised Estimates, 2006 (%)

24. Conclusions • Progress in CPA implementation, but delays on key institutions and lags in donor assistance • Economic developments in 2005 broadly favorable • GNU pro-poor spending broadly in line with JAM commitments, but negligible transfers to Three Areas • The 2006 modified budget framework (agreed with the Fund) and government commitments on macro-structural reforms are promising • Good effort by GOSS, but steps needed to improve transparency and increase spending on critical services • Financing framework and requests for external assistance in 2006 appropriate; resources in both MDTFs nearly fully committed  In SUM: call for accelerated progress on all fronts, deepening partnerships and mutual accountability