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Through a glass darkly: American and North Vietnamese Intelligence and the Easter Offensive

Through a glass darkly: American and North Vietnamese Intelligence and the Easter Offensive. Dr. Steve Randolph National Defense University 21 October 2006 randolphs@ndu.edu/202-685-4493. Sources and Sequence. Sources North Vietnamese Politburo’s Selected Party Documents , 1971-1972

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Through a glass darkly: American and North Vietnamese Intelligence and the Easter Offensive

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  1. Through a glass darkly:American and North Vietnamese Intelligenceand the Easter Offensive Dr. Steve Randolph National Defense University 21 October 2006 randolphs@ndu.edu/202-685-4493

  2. Sources and Sequence • Sources • North Vietnamese • Politburo’s Selected Party Documents, 1971-1972 • NVA/NVAF campaign and unit histories; memoirs • NVA Military Studies Institute campaign analyses • Le Duc Tho conversation in Paris, May 1972 • American • Nixon Presidential Material (NARA) • NSC files • White House Tapes • CREST (NARA) • MACV records (NARA, CMH, USAMHI) • JCS/DIA records (NARA) • CHECO histories (AFHRA, online) and Corona Harvest material • Vietnam Archive/Virtual Vietnam Archive • Sorley, The Abrams Tapes • United Kingdom: Consular reports (PRO) • Sequence • North Vietnam’s Strategic Estimate • U.S. Intelligence and the Policy Interface • How It All Played Out • Thoughts for Today

  3. North Vietnam’s Strategic Estimate • Relevant Background: • Tet Offensive and its aftermath • Lam Son 719 • Planning the 1972 Campaign • Structure and process of NVA decisionmaking • Strategic objectives • Major considerations: • International environment (Beijing and Moscow) • State of the Battlefield • Military, economic, political, diplomatic restraints on Nixon • Strategic/Operational concept • Cascade of violence on three fronts (main force, rural, urban) • Continuous attacks into the fall • Projected American response • Risk factors • Operational and logistical • State of local forces and the infrastructure • Nixon • Preplanned branches and sequels • Tactical/technical intelligence fails to project impact of new-generation US weapons

  4. NVA Axes of Attack, March-May 1972

  5. American Intelligence and the Policy Interface • Initial projections: “high point” offensives in MRs I/II • The picture gradually sharpens, Nov 71-Jan 72 • Intent: North Vietnamese press, defectors, POWs, documents,…. • Input: Tracking imports through ports and rail systems • Throughput: • COMINT along the Ho Chi Minh Trail • Electronic Battlefield and the Flow of Materiel • Intelligence-Policy Reviews and their Results: • February 1972: Triangular diplomacy and air operations • March 1972: the US inter-agency’s tangled web • Meanwhile the Politburo assesses the situation and adjusts the plan • Logistics • Local forces • Capability against fortified towns • Combined arms • US withdrawal and gaps in tactical intelligence

  6. How it all played out: the parameters of surprise • US projects major offensive but surprised by: • Timing • Weight • Duration • Technology • NVA shocked by Nixon’s response: massive reinforcement of air/naval forces, sustained offensive against NVN • Strategic miscalculation forces counter-mobilization: military, logistical, diplomatic, civil • Tactical/technical intelligence failures compound problems: fighting the last war • Strategic leaders on both sides struggle to understand the state of the campaign and impose their will on actors and events • Events on the battlefield drive negotiating positions (Clausewitz in reverse) • Superpowers all pursue their essential interests at the expense of their client states • US and North Vietnam converge toward negotiated settlement reflecting the battlefield situation: everyone meets their essential requirements (except the South Vietnamese)

  7. Through a glass darkly II:Some thoughts for today • Low-tech adversary met its essential strategic ends: • Persistence • Resilience • Study of US forces, relentless search for seams and weakness • Uses and limitations of technical intelligence • Coalition ops and intelligence in a dependent relationship • Conflict defined by action-reaction cycle at all levels • Evolving definition of victory—for both sides • Pressures and dilemmas inherent in protracted warfare in a democracy

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