AGRICULTURAL BIOTERRORISM

1. AGRICULTURAL BIOTERRORISM It can happen on the farm, in your grocery store, or your refrigerator, too! Several quotes that may be of use to begin this session: The United States has ignored the potential for agricultural bioterrorism at its peril. -Parker, 2002 Among the many items abandoned in Afghanistan by the fleeing al Qaeda were hundreds of pages of US agriculture documents translated into Arabic. -Peters, 2003 As unprepared as America is to combat terrorism in general, the nation is even less prepared to counter terrorism directed against the food and agriculture infrastructure. -Parker, 2002 Biological attack against an agricultural target offers terrorists a virtually risk-free form of assault, which has a high probability of success. -the Gilmore Commission Several quotes that may be of use to begin this session: The United States has ignored the potential for agricultural bioterrorism at its peril. -Parker, 2002 Among the many items abandoned in Afghanistan by the fleeing al Qaeda were hundreds of pages of US agriculture documents translated into Arabic. -Peters, 2003 As unprepared as America is to combat terrorism in general, the nation is even less prepared to counter terrorism directed against the food and agriculture infrastructure. -Parker, 2002 Biological attack against an agricultural target offers terrorists a virtually risk-free form of assault, which has a high probability of success. -the Gilmore Commission

2. Acknowledgements South Carolina Area Health Education Consortium (AHEC) Funded by the Health Resources and Services Administration. Grant number: 1T01HP01418-01-00 P.I. : David Garr, MD, Executive Director AHEC BT Project Director: Beth Kennedy, Associate Program Director AHEC Core Team: BT Co-director: Ralph Shealy, MD BT Project Manager: Deborah Stier Carson, PharmD BT CME Director: William Simpson, MD IT Coordinator: Liz Riccardone, MHS Web Master: Mary Mauldin, PhD P.R Coordinator: Nicole Brundage, MHA Evaluation Specialist: Yvonne Michel, PhD Financial Director: Donald Tyner, MBA

3. Acknowledgment This material has been prepared for SC AHEC Bioterrorism Training Networkby William M. Simpson, Jr., MDMedical Director of Agromedicine Professor of Family Medicine

4. Objectives Describe the threat and impact that bioterroism could have on the agricultural industry, the overall economy, and the health of plant, animal and human populations. Describe patterns of symptoms, signs, and diseases that suggest agroterrorism. List the first steps to take when agroterrorism is suspected.

5. Agricultural Bioterrorism--Agroterrorism for short The center for Food Security and Public Health of Iowa State has defined it as: The use, or threatened use, of biological (to include toxins), chemical, or radiological agents against some component of agriculture in such a way as to adversely impact the agriculture industry or any component thereof, the economy or the consuming public There is no official definition of Agroterrorism, but this definition is a pretty good one, from a prominent university center. It might be appropriate here to ask the audience to think of ways that an attack against agriculture is different from the 9/11 attacks. There is no official definition of Agroterrorism, but this definition is a pretty good one, from a prominent university center. It might be appropriate here to ask the audience to think of ways that an attack against agriculture is different from the 9/11 attacks.

6. The Wisconsin Case 1996 an anonymous call about contaminated fat product added to feed Chlordane (pesticide) in rendered product supplied to large feed manufacturer and distributed to 4000 farms in four states Milk and other products from these farms were potentially contaminated $4 million just to dispose of products The call came from the rendering plant. The caller said liquid fat from the plant had been contaminated with chlordane, an organochlorine pesticide that persists in the environment and accumulates in animal fat. It is considered a food adulterant in low levels (0.3ppm in fat). Within two days all customers who received the product were notified and the feed was replaced. Samples of milk from herds that had eaten the feed were negative for the adulterant or had levels so low that there was no human health risk. Since many agencies were involved in the issue the final price tag was probably much higher. A �minor� incident, reported almost immediately--imagine what could happenThe call came from the rendering plant. The caller said liquid fat from the plant had been contaminated with chlordane, an organochlorine pesticide that persists in the environment and accumulates in animal fat. It is considered a food adulterant in low levels (0.3ppm in fat). Within two days all customers who received the product were notified and the feed was replaced. Samples of milk from herds that had eaten the feed were negative for the adulterant or had levels so low that there was no human health risk. Since many agencies were involved in the issue the final price tag was probably much higher. A �minor� incident, reported almost immediately--imagine what could happen

7. A Brief History of Agroterrorism 6th Century BC--Assyrians poisoned enemies� wells with rye ergot Union troops introduced Harlequin bug to attack Confederate crops WWI--German experimentation with equine diseases for use against cavalry WWII--Germany/France-FMD, rinderpest, late potato blight, beetles Ergot isn�t good for people that don�t have headaches. It makes blood vessels constrict, and so can result in all sorts of bad things. The Harlequin bug story is not well documented, probably written by a still disgruntled Southerner! Many other countries were involved in agroterrorism, but the Germans kept the best records! Unfortunately the Manchurians used human prisoners for their bioterrorism experiments. Rinderpest is a disease of cattle, late potato blight(naturally occurring) probably was the cause of the Potato Famine in Ireland. Ergot isn�t good for people that don�t have headaches. It makes blood vessels constrict, and so can result in all sorts of bad things. The Harlequin bug story is not well documented, probably written by a still disgruntled Southerner! Many other countries were involved in agroterrorism, but the Germans kept the best records! Unfortunately the Manchurians used human prisoners for their bioterrorism experiments. Rinderpest is a disease of cattle, late potato blight(naturally occurring) probably was the cause of the Potato Famine in Ireland.

8. More Agroterrorism History US also had an offensive biological weapons program beginning in 1941 FMD, Newcastle, hog cholera, multiple plant diseases, expanded during Korean War. Shut down 1970 Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, ratified by US in 1975 Offensive biological weapons development was a very costly program. We had shut down our development and production programs before the BWC of 1972 because of the cost, their general unpredictability, and aging research facilities. Banning biological and chemical weapons theoretically left nuclear weapons as the only weapons of mass destruction Offensive biological weapons development was a very costly program. We had shut down our development and production programs before the BWC of 1972 because of the cost, their general unpredictability, and aging research facilities. Banning biological and chemical weapons theoretically left nuclear weapons as the only weapons of mass destruction

9. More Agroterrorism History Mau Mau Tribe-Kenya-used plant toxins to kill livestock-1950�s Tamil separatists-Sri Lanka-threatened to infect humans and crops with pathogens-1980�s Rajneeshee cult-Oregon-infected salad bars with Salmonella-1984 Cyanide in grapes from Chile-1989 The Mau Mau incident was a result of tribal warfare. Tamils made the treats but, probably did not carry them out. The Rajneeshee cult wanted to control a town council, so tried to make most of the voters in the community sick by spreading Salmonella over several salad bars in the community. The origin of the cyanide has not been determined. Some research suggests that the cyanide was added after the crop got to the American port. The Mau Mau incident was a result of tribal warfare. Tamils made the treats but, probably did not carry them out. The Rajneeshee cult wanted to control a town council, so tried to make most of the voters in the community sick by spreading Salmonella over several salad bars in the community. The origin of the cyanide has not been determined. Some research suggests that the cyanide was added after the crop got to the American port.

10. Why agroterrorism? Attacks on plants or animals less emotionally sensitive than attacks on humans Often delay in recognition, making �get away� easier Plausible deniability �Under the radar� Attacks on plants and/or animals, less emotionally powerful and less likely to result in retaliation. Since the agroterrorist event can occur in nature, the terrorist can much more easily deny any contribution to the event. We tend to expect terrorists to target people rather than plants or animals, making it possible for an agroterrorist event to pass �under the radar.� Attacks on plants and/or animals, less emotionally powerful and less likely to result in retaliation. Since the agroterrorist event can occur in nature, the terrorist can much more easily deny any contribution to the event. We tend to expect terrorists to target people rather than plants or animals, making it possible for an agroterrorist event to pass �under the radar.�

11. What does agroterrorism look like? Just like what may happen anyway on the farm, but Traceback of animals leads to dead-end No shared factor among animals Concurrent outbreaks/repeated outbreaks Unusual signs/unusual season Overwhelming mortality Traceback processes often allow the source of an outbreak or illness to be determined. In an agroterrorist event, the outbreak/illness appears to arise without a cause. No shared factor is found among affected animals, animals haven�t passed through a common barn or auction site. A pattern of repeated outbreaks in the same farm or similar outbreaks on distant farms may suggest an agroterrorist event. Just as influenza in the summer makes the physician consider unusual diagnoses (anthrax, tick-borne disease, etc), illnesses that occur in unusual seasons or with unusual signs should heighten suspicion of an unusual event such as agroterrorism. Traceback processes often allow the source of an outbreak or illness to be determined. In an agroterrorist event, the outbreak/illness appears to arise without a cause. No shared factor is found among affected animals, animals haven�t passed through a common barn or auction site. A pattern of repeated outbreaks in the same farm or similar outbreaks on distant farms may suggest an agroterrorist event. Just as influenza in the summer makes the physician consider unusual diagnoses (anthrax, tick-borne disease, etc), illnesses that occur in unusual seasons or with unusual signs should heighten suspicion of an unusual event such as agroterrorism.

12. Why so difficult to deal with? Multiple points of entry Multiple possible delivery methods Natural v. intentional Accidental v. intentional Real v. hoax Recognition and prevention of agroterrorism are extremely difficult for several reasons. There are a large number of steps from the beginning of the growing process that could be attacked. Along each of these steps there are multiple possibilities for delivery of an agent. For example, a vegetable farming operation could be targeted by infecting, irradiating or over-drying seeds; tampering with chemicals used to prevent weed growth or control a pest; introducing a contaminant in the wash process prior to packing or after display in a supermarket. In the above example multiple possible delivery methods are illustrated. The �plausible deniability� issue is again raised. Crops sometimes fail to produce as expected. Seed lots sometimes are defective, sometimes a chemical doesn�t work as expected, etc. Sometimes the distinction between something which has occurred naturally or as a result of intentional activity is difficult, and sometimes accidents do happen. In addition, and probably most importantly, the event doesn�t actually have to happen, but if there is fear that it has, and people/consumers change their behavior because of that fear, the damage may already be done. Recognition and prevention of agroterrorism are extremely difficult for several reasons. There are a large number of steps from the beginning of the growing process that could be attacked. Along each of these steps there are multiple possibilities for delivery of an agent. For example, a vegetable farming operation could be targeted by infecting, irradiating or over-drying seeds; tampering with chemicals used to prevent weed growth or control a pest; introducing a contaminant in the wash process prior to packing or after display in a supermarket. In the above example multiple possible delivery methods are illustrated. The �plausible deniability� issue is again raised. Crops sometimes fail to produce as expected. Seed lots sometimes are defective, sometimes a chemical doesn�t work as expected, etc. Sometimes the distinction between something which has occurred naturally or as a result of intentional activity is difficult, and sometimes accidents do happen. In addition, and probably most importantly, the event doesn�t actually have to happen, but if there is fear that it has, and people/consumers change their behavior because of that fear, the damage may already be done.

13. Why pick agriculture as a target? US: 2 million farms, 1 billion acres Food and fiber account for ~16% of the US Gross domestic product (GDP)--$1.5T 17% of the total workforce (although only 2% are actually farmers) Heavily tied to other industries (transportation, food retailers, tourism,etc) Agriculture is a huge, widespread series of small and large-scale operations. While there are many fewer farms than there were at the beginning of the 20th century, there are still almost 2 million farms in the US with average size of nearly 500 acres. Controlling access to this large a number of sites of such size is essentially impossible. The production of food and fiber accounts for 16% of the GDP and is heavily tied to a number of other industries as noted. Damage to the confidence in the American food supply could have staggering economic consequencesAgriculture is a huge, widespread series of small and large-scale operations. While there are many fewer farms than there were at the beginning of the 20th century, there are still almost 2 million farms in the US with average size of nearly 500 acres. Controlling access to this large a number of sites of such size is essentially impossible. The production of food and fiber accounts for 16% of the GDP and is heavily tied to a number of other industries as noted. Damage to the confidence in the American food supply could have staggering economic consequences

14. IMPACT! Potential for mass disruption Loss of freedoms/consumer confidence Food shortages/higher prices Loss of trade Associated industries Direct costs Terrorism targeting agriculture has the potential to weaken the workforce (including fighting forces) and to destabilize government. A widespread terrorist attack isn�t necessary to cause possible economic hardship, loss of consumer confidence, or panic. A foreign animal disease outbreak could result in severe restrictions of freedom of movement, limitations on outdoor leisure activity, etc. Foreign trade could plummet and ripple effects on other industries could be widespread. Food prices would likely rise, leading to hardship especially for the poor. Terrorism targeting agriculture has the potential to weaken the workforce (including fighting forces) and to destabilize government. A widespread terrorist attack isn�t necessary to cause possible economic hardship, loss of consumer confidence, or panic. A foreign animal disease outbreak could result in severe restrictions of freedom of movement, limitations on outdoor leisure activity, etc. Foreign trade could plummet and ripple effects on other industries could be widespread. Food prices would likely rise, leading to hardship especially for the poor.

15. Who�s minding the store? US Department of Agriculture Animal, Plant and Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Veterinary Services Emergency Programs Plant Protection and Quarantine Division The lead federal agency in safeguarding American livestock and poultry health and in responding to a foreign animal, emerging or reemerging disease is the USDA-APHIS, Veterinary Services Division. There are 400 trained foreign animal disease diagnosticians in the US whho can be called on for assistance. All suspected outbreaks of FAD must be investigated within 24 hours of notification. The Emergency Programs Division prepares and trains for response to foreign or newly emerging animal diseases. The lead federal agency for plants is the USDA-APHIS, Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) Division The lead federal agency in safeguarding American livestock and poultry health and in responding to a foreign animal, emerging or reemerging disease is the USDA-APHIS, Veterinary Services Division. There are 400 trained foreign animal disease diagnosticians in the US whho can be called on for assistance. All suspected outbreaks of FAD must be investigated within 24 hours of notification. The Emergency Programs Division prepares and trains for response to foreign or newly emerging animal diseases. The lead federal agency for plants is the USDA-APHIS, Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) Division

16. Department of Homeland Security 3000 USDA inspectors at airports, borders, seaports 1800 Beagle Brigade inspectors at airports, seaports to search for smuggled items Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) inspects containers, questions travelers about exposures

17. US Department of Agriculture Quarantine Stations 4 facilities for import quarantine of livestock and poultry 6 facilities for personally owned birds 14 facilities for plants All livestock and poultry (except for those from Canada and Mexico) must be accompanied by an official health certificate and must undergo quarantine at one of the four quarantine facilities in the US. Plant and plant materials must also be quarantined prior to distribution in the US. Importation of dogs, cats, turtles and monkeys is overseen by the CDC-P�s Division of Global Migration and Quarantine. Regulations regarding movement of animals are strict, but borders are very porous. All livestock and poultry (except for those from Canada and Mexico) must be accompanied by an official health certificate and must undergo quarantine at one of the four quarantine facilities in the US. Plant and plant materials must also be quarantined prior to distribution in the US. Importation of dogs, cats, turtles and monkeys is overseen by the CDC-P�s Division of Global Migration and Quarantine. Regulations regarding movement of animals are strict, but borders are very porous.

18. Who are the �first-responders�? Local and state veterinarians USDA-APHIS Cooperative extension service FBI Local, state, federal health agencies Emergency management division The local veterinarian is likely to be the first responder when called to the farm or other site to determine the cause of an animal illness or death. The American Veterinary Medical Association has taken the lead in encouraging the further development of expertise among their membership in the area of foreign animal disease recognition and reporting. These animal disease diagnosticians will likely be the ones to activate the other professionals on this list beginning with the state veterinarian and the USDA-APHIS Area Veterinarian in Charge. The local veterinarian is likely to be the first responder when called to the farm or other site to determine the cause of an animal illness or death. The American Veterinary Medical Association has taken the lead in encouraging the further development of expertise among their membership in the area of foreign animal disease recognition and reporting. These animal disease diagnosticians will likely be the ones to activate the other professionals on this list beginning with the state veterinarian and the USDA-APHIS Area Veterinarian in Charge.

19. And the big picture? World Organization for Animal Health or (OIE)-Office International des Epizooties Intergovernmental organization formed by International Agreement in 1924 (28countries), now 164 member nations

20. OIE-WOAH Missions Guarantee transparency of animal disease status world-wide Collect, analyze and disseminate veterinary scientific information Provide expertise and promote international solidarity for control of animal diseases Guarantee sanitary safety of world trade by developing rules for trade in animals/products

21. OIE Classification of DiseasesList A Transmissible diseases that have Potential for very serious disease Rapid spread Irrespective of national borders Serious socio-economic or public health consequence Major importance in the international trade of animals and animal products.

22. OIE List A Foot and mouth disease Swine vesicular disease Peste des petits ruminants Lumpy skin disease Blue tongue African Horse sickness Classical swine fever Newcastle disease Vesicular stomatitis Rinderpest Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia Rift Valley fever Sheep and goat pox African swine fever Highly pathogenic avian influenza Many of these diseases are not even familiar names to us. Most, except for foot and mouth disease and Newcastle disease are truly exotic, but as occurred with FMD in the UK and Newcastle disease here in the US, major animal and sometimes human health effects are possible. Time does not permit discussion of all of these potential threats. A handout will be provided with specific details about all of the above diseases.Many of these diseases are not even familiar names to us. Most, except for foot and mouth disease and Newcastle disease are truly exotic, but as occurred with FMD in the UK and Newcastle disease here in the US, major animal and sometimes human health effects are possible. Time does not permit discussion of all of these potential threats. A handout will be provided with specific details about all of the above diseases.

23. Are these diseases important to us? FMD (Foot and Mouth Disease) Considered the most important livestock disease in the world Not in the US since 1929 Vesicular disease of cloven-hoofed animals Spread by aerosol and fomites FMD is a picornavirus. Highly contagious. Fomites may include shoes carrying soil from infected farms. It has also been shown that humans may carry the FMD virus in respiratory secretions for two days after exposure, posing the possibility of transmitting the disease to uninfected animals by a cough or sneeze. FMD is a picornavirus. Highly contagious. Fomites may include shoes carrying soil from infected farms. It has also been shown that humans may carry the FMD virus in respiratory secretions for two days after exposure, posing the possibility of transmitting the disease to uninfected animals by a cough or sneeze.

24. Foot and Mouth Disease here? Animals at risk in the US 100 million cattle 60 million swine 7 million sheep 40 million wildlife Humans rarely infected HUGE Economic Impact

25. UK-FMD Outbreak 2001 Total cost over $15 billion 6 million animals slaughtered Public perception problems in animal welfare/animal rights pollution from burning carcasses/public health risk Risk of enzootic wildlife infection Able to control the outbreak in one year, but at a huge cost. Still questions about whether the mass slaughter was justified and whether there will be any long-term health effects to the public from the large fires used to destroy slaughtered animal carcasses Able to control the outbreak in one year, but at a huge cost. Still questions about whether the mass slaughter was justified and whether there will be any long-term health effects to the public from the large fires used to destroy slaughtered animal carcasses

26. Newcastle Disease Virus affecting poultry Four pathotypes Asymptomatic Lentogenic Mesogenic Velogenic vND endemic in Asia, Middle East, Africa, Central/South America causes drop in egg production, neurological & reproductive damage, sometimes death

27. vND-US-2002-3 2600 premises depopulated 4.5million birds destroyed $ 200 million impact At height of outbreak 19000 establishments quarantined Developing countries affects quality and quantity of dietary protein significant effects on human health Outbreaks of vND usually occur due to illegal importation of exotic birds or poultry. Etiology of this most recent outbreak is still under study. vND can cause eye infection in humans, usually moderate to severe conjunctivitis, without involvement of the cornea. Does not spread human to human.Outbreaks of vND usually occur due to illegal importation of exotic birds or poultry. Etiology of this most recent outbreak is still under study. vND can cause eye infection in humans, usually moderate to severe conjunctivitis, without involvement of the cornea. Does not spread human to human.

28. Livestock Vulnerabilities High density husbandry Auctions/transport of animals Limited immunity to FAD(foreign animal diseases) Centralized feed supply/distribution Poor traceability of animals Porous borders/limited on-farm biosecurity Lack of FAD awareness

29. Food crops Wheat #1 grain export, corn #2 Soybean ~45% of the world�s crop Citrus, sugarcane Fiber cotton Timber Northwest US Crop and Plant Targets

30. Plant pathogens (one example) Karnal Bunt (Tilletia indica) Affects taste not yield Discovered in AZ, CA, TX in 1996 clean up costs thus far $45million Remains viable in the soil up to 5 years, can be carried on fomites Carries international trade restrictions

31. Biologic Agents to Contaminate Food Bacillus anthracis Clostridium Francisella tularensis Ricin Shigatoxin Staphylococcal enterotoxins

32. Animals as Reservoirs or Vectors of Disease Birds as in West Nile Virus Deer/salamanders as in Lyme disease and other tick-borne diseases Bats--rabies ?Monkeys--Ebola MULTIPLE EXAMPLES BUT NEVER USED IN WARFARE OR TERRORISM, AS FAR AS IS KNOWN

33. Plants as Vehicles for Toxins Cyanide in grapes from Chile Aldicarb in watermelons Other deliberate misuse of pesticides Common method for suicide/homicide in 3rd world

34. Animals as Early Warning Systems Canaries in coal mines Sentinel chicken flocks for West Nile Sentinel horses for West Nile Fish for various chemicals/toxins Family dogs for lead exposure

35. What can we do? Be observant, look for patterns of symptoms, signs, disease Encourage biosecurity on the farm, processing centers, distribution centers, retail outlets Encourage teamwork between health care, veterinary care and cooperative extension to prevent problems and when problems are recognized

36. SUMMARY Agroterrorism is a real threat Economic consequences could be severe Awareness education is necessary Vigilance is essential!

37. Resources Davis RG. Agroterrorism: Need for awareness. In: Scanes C, ed. Perspectives in world food and agriculture; 2003. Ames, IA: ISU press. In press, 2003 USDA-APHIS website www.aphis.usda.gov OIE-WOAH website www.oie.int

38. Resources American Veterinary Medical Associationwww.avma.org/pubhlth/biosecurity/ World Health Organizationwww.who.int/food safety The Gray Book (Foreign Animal Diseases)www.vet.uga.edu/vpp/gray_book.htm