In this lecture, we explore the cognitive abilities of a trained sea lion named Rocky, who demonstrates understanding of gesture language akin to dolphins. Schusterman's work compares sea lion and dolphin intelligence, emphasizing the use of relational terms like 'bigger/smaller' and 'lighter/darker.' The discussion highlights the nuances of grammar in animal communication and introduces concepts like functional equivalence and conditional discriminations. Ultimately, we shed light on Rocky's ability to understand contextual commands, showcasing the complexity of non-human cognitive skills.
01 / 144Insights Into Sea Lion Cognition: Parsing Language and Understanding of Relational Terms
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Insights Into Sea Lion Cognition: Parsing Language and Understanding of Relational Terms
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Relational terms are really important because they are totally context dependent As we talked about in earlier lectures, what is bigger on trial 1 can be smaller on trial 2 so the subject cannot answer with respect to absolutes;
They got into quite a battle about ‘grammar’… Herman insisted that what his dolphins were doing was grammar… In fact, one of the reasons he started the research was to show that a nonhuman could learn grammar
is engaging in a primitive grammar: A standardized rule-governed behavior that enables efficient transmission of information They then continued to “duke” it out, arguing over what is or is not grammar in their subjects, Using “anomalous” commands
Now, we talked about the anomalous commands for dolphins awhile back and mentioned that Lana would ‘erase’ anomalous sentences from her computer and we saw that Kanzi would carry out semantically stupid actions that were grammatical…
Only Schusterman tried to make sense of all this in terms of conditional discriminations and something called equivalence class formation The latter is, according to some researchers, the basis for human linguistic competence
Now, we’ll get back to equivalence when we discuss the results of Schusterman’s experiments But now is probably a good time to introduce the concepts BRIEFLY and why it is thought to be important And, as usual, a source of controversy!
Which suggests that any animal that can do TI should very easily be able to understand equivalence Of course, as with TI, a lot has to do with how the subject is trained or exposed to the stimuli And, of course, there are fancy terms for the various relationships
We’ll get to all that later…for now all we need is to understand what Schusterman means by “functional equivalence”… Which is basically that Rocky understood that some signs related to objects, some to actions and some to attributes
And, an aside…at one point, Schusterman used two-handed actions for one type of sign and one-handed actions for another… I’m not sure that he kept to this, but at least in the beginning it would have been an important cue simplifying what the animal had to learn…
So, in the paper on anomalous sentences, the issue was how Rocky would respond If the sign from one functional class was placed in the spot normally reserved for another functional class or if something was missing in the sentences she was given
And, of course, as noted by Schusterman, all that Rocky did was to enable her to get the most fish per session So, were these actions that she performed meaningful in any real sense? Or just actions to be performed in particular ways for food?
Now, such arguments were, in one sense, very good and important Because a field can’t grow and we can’t learn from our mistakes if the mistakes aren’t found The issue is whether there should be a chance to fix the mistakes and continue
I didn’t choose to assign the papers where Herman and Schusterman go after each other They are referenced in the papers that have been assigned for those who are interested I’ll just briefly go over the bit we did read…
While I don’t see either set of experiments as really telling us all that much about the actual ways in which the animals process information… I do see that there isn’t too much basis for a pure linguistic interpretation
Just like the starling-recursion discussion … IF you argue that failure on a task demonstrates lack of linguistic knowledge Then you have to accept that success does demonstrate linguistic ability…
So, we start with reflexivity, A=A Which is just another fancy term for identity match-to-sample And, we have seen, most animals are pretty good a learning that and transferring it to totally novel stimuli
The animals’ abilities may have had more to do with the way they were trained than with their innate abilities But you can see why the issue of equivalence is so critical to language A subtle point that is not addressed except by Premack, however,
But let’s go on to transitivity that is the equivalence form of TI… So that the subject, trained on A=B and B=C can, without training, understand that A=C But, again, are we talking about real symbolization or not?