ISAF CONTRACTOR / NGO COORDINATION MEETING

ISAF CONTRACTOR / NGO COORDINATION MEETING Wednesday, 4 MAR at 1500 (Movie Room) AGENDA Introductions CJ4 – Improved Freedom of Movement CJ2 – Intelligence Briefing CJ3 – Counter IED Information CJ9 – Civil Assistance Projects CJ8 – ISAF Contracting

AFGHANISTAN’S RING ROAD – JULY / AUGUST 2008

AFGHANISTAN’S RING ROAD International Media Coverage (Afghan-related) Ring Road considered to dangerous for aid agencies in Wardak, Ghazni and Logar TIME / July 28, 2008 Taliban Checkpoint in Ghazni Province along the Ring Road NEWSWEEK / September 15, 2008 A Small Force of U.S. Troops Holds the line in Two Dangerous Provinces U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT / December 15, 2008

Highway 6 Highway 5 Highway 1 RR NORTH Highway 3 Highway 8 Highway 7 Highway 2 Highway 1 RR EAST Highway 1 RR WEST Highway 7 Highway 1 RR SOUTH Highway 4

0000 AFGHANISTAN ROAD PICTURE RC (N) NGOs Civilians CSTC-A 0000 ISAF Contractors Road Picture RC (E) RC (W) IOs UN RC (S) RC (C) ANA / ANP

IMPROVED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT • As a result of OP TOOL BOX - HQ ISAF FRAGO 289 – 2008 (13 SEP 08) which states " to fulfill the moral obligation to assist International Aid Organizations, NGOs and contractors. • COMISAF #1 Priority Freedom of Movement • 12 NOV – First Contractor / NGO Coordination Meeting • Improved Coordination / Control and Building Confidence • Regular meetings / communication with Contractors / NGOs • Increased ISAF Forces, ANA / ANP Checkpoints • Herioc actions by ANA & ANP Forces identifying IED’s • Improved ISAF Contractor Security Tactics • Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Training attended by ISAF Contractors NGO • Assistance to Humanitarian Convoys -22 Convoys, over 700 Trucks with no injury to drivers, no trucks or cargo destroyed or stolen. Improved ANP Performance.

PARTNERING WITH THE ANA / ANP

COMISAF TACTICAL DIRECTIVE

JAN CONTRACTOR CONVOY USING WAY POINTS • STORY BOARD 1145 – CONTRACTOR Operations Center sends Unclassified e-mail to the HQ ISAF TMCC stating that 15-20 insurgents fired 2 RPG’s and Small Arms fire at the 16 Truck Convoy with (Containers) 3KM North East of WAY POINT FT09. 1150 – HQ ISAF TMCC confirms that WAY POINT FT09 is Grid 42S UB 87844 34303 in the Moqor District of Ghazni Province. 1155 – RC(E) CJOC LNO, HQ ISAF CHOPS, CJOC Director and ACE are informed. 1200 – HQ ISAF Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) coordinates for ISAF Air Show of Force for CONTRACTOR Convoy. 1230 – CONTRACTOR provides update on Convoy location 42S UB 71524 21136 1300 – ASOC reports that the Convoy has been over-flown by (2 F-15E’s) and no residual threat in the Area. 1345 – CONTRACTOR reports no injuries or damage to equipment, & thanks ISAF for its immediate assistance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The WAY POINT system is designed to improve situational awareness, build Coordination, Control and Confidence to facilitate ISAF response to on-going incidents involving ISAF Contractors, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Afghanistan National Support Forces (ANSF) convoys who don’t normally use the military grid reference system.

Highway 6 Highway 5 Highway 1 RR NORTH Highway 3 Highway 8 Highway 7 Highway 2 Highway 1 RR EAST Highway 1 RR WEST Highway 7 Highway 1 RR SOUTH Highway 4

THEATER MOVEMENT COORDINATION CELL (TMCC) Coordination Links HQ ISAF TMCC (CJOC) RC C J4 JMCC RC E J4 MCB RC S J4 JMCC RC N J4 JMCC RC W J4 JMCC

RC (South) Movement Operations Statistics RATE OF ATTACKS ON CONVOYS (6 VEHICLES OR MORE) ON RC(S) MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES

CJ2 ROUTE THREAT ASSESSMENT HOW ROUTE THREAT ASSESSMENTS ARE MADE • Overall route threat assessment is based on the number of direct attacks (SAF, IDF, rocket), IED attacks and IEDs found within 1 km of the MSRs HIGH 8+ attacks in 14 DAYS *Threat is Imminent* MODERATE 4-7 attacks in 14 Days *Threat is present but not Imminent* LOW 3 or less attacks in 14 days * Threat is not imminent*

RC-CAPITAL MONTHLY ROUTE THREAT ASSESSMENT Overall Route Threat Assessment: Low Events from 01 FEB – 28 FEB 2009 • Outlook/Assessment: • INS will continue with small scale high profile attacks along MSRs in the Capital Region • INS will continue to target GIRoA, ISAF Security, along MSRs • We do not expect any significant increase of attacks as transfer of security it being passed to ANSF MILITARY CONVOY WAS TARGETTED BY SVBIED. RCIED FOUND COMMAND IED FOUND MILITARY CONVOY WAS TARGETTED BY SVBIED.

RC-NORTH MONTHLY ROUTE THREAT ASSESSMENT Overall Route Threat Assessment: Low Events from 01 FEB – 28 FEB 2009 • Outlook/Assessment: • Events will continue to be concentrated IVO main smuggling routes and cities along MSRs especially the KONDOZ/BAGHLAN CORRIDOR • Increased threat reporting about IED and SIED along the LOCs in FARYAB, JAWZJAN, BALKH, KONDOZ and BAGHLAN provinces • ‘Soft Targets’ and targets of opportunity will continue to be attacked • Attacks will cover asymmetric activities to ensure FOM on MSRs LNs STEALING EXPLOSIVES SET OFF IED CWIED RCIED VOIED COMPASS CONVOY ATTACKED. NO BDA ANP CP ATTACKED LASHKAR GAH

RC-WEST MONTHLY ROUTE THREAT ASSESSMENT Overall Route Threat Assessment: LOW Events from 01 FEB – 28 FEB 2009 • Outlook/Assessment: • INS actions will be related to ISAF/ANSF activity • Peak of events in SE FARAH (Route 515) will continue to be a result of ongoing operations with PPIEDs presenting the greatest threat • Threat reporting indicates that (S)VBIEDs are possible IVO HERAT city • Threat reports also indicate possible (S)IEDs on MSR’s between HERAT and SHINDAND ANP CP ATTACKED ANA CONVOY ATTACKED WITH RPGs UNAMA CONVOY RECEIVED SAF COMPASS CONVOY ATTACKED. NO BDA MILITARY LOGISTICS CONVOY TARGETED BY SVBIED EVENTS A RESULT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS LASHKAR GAH

RC-SOUTH ROUTES MONTHLY ROUTE THREAT ASSESSMENT Overall Route Threat Assessment: High Events from 01 FEB – 28 FEB 2009 • Outlook/Assessment: • INS will continue to restrict ISAF/ANSF FoM • IEDs will continue to be the INS tactic of choice along HWY 1 • Attacks IVO safe havens against patrols/convoys and targets of opportunity will continue • MILITARY CONVOY SUFFERS MULTIPLE IED STRIKES • COMPASS SUFFERS TWO SEPARATE IED STRIKES 2x CWIEDs 1x VOIED VOIED STRIKE AGAINST AN NGO RRS KANDAHAR DC ZHARI 3x VOIEDs FOUND MAYWAND VOIED FOUND 3x TOIEDs 3x CWIEDs 2x VBIEDs 3x FALSE IEDs 8x UNK IEDs 2x VOIED 2x UNK IEDs 1x CWIED 1x UNK IEDs

RC-EAST ROUTES MONTHLY ROUTE THREAT ASSESSMENT Overall Route Threat Assessment: High Events from 01 FEB – 28 FEB 2009 • Outlook/Assessment: • In the near term, HWY 1 (RRE) will continue to provide targeting opportunities to INS elements • INS maintain significant FoM in NE KUNAR and can easily strike along MSR California • Winter weather reduced INS capabilities in the region, but DF attacks are increasing at a significant rate along these LoCs and will continue to increase as weather improves. CWIED ATTACK AGAINST ISAF VBIED ATTACK AGAINST ANP VOIED FOUND EVENTS ARE CONCENTRATED NEAR LKG DC UNK IED ATTACK TARGETING ROAD CONTRUCTION VOIED FOUND LASHKAR GAH RCIED ATTACK TARGETING ROAD CONTRUCTION SVBIED ATTACK TARGETING ISAF SVBIED ATTACK AGAINST ISAF

ISAF COUNTER IED BRANCH BRIEF TO CONTRACTORS AND NGOS LTC ITA A ALESSANDRO ORTOLANI

OBJECTIVE To brief you on the insurgent use of improvised explosive devices, and to suggest some countermeasures.

AGENDA • Insurgent Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). • Identification of Vulnerable Areas and Vulnerable Points. • Useful Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). • Electronic Counter Measures.

INSURGENT TTPS : IEDS • Types of Improvised Explosive Devices used : • Projected • Timed • Vehicle Borne IED : VBIED • Person Borne IED : PBIED • Command IED • Command Wire IED • Command Pull IED • Radio Control IED, including GSM Phones • Victim Operated IED : VOIED • Pressure Plate • Trip Wire

PROJECTED IED Mosque clock timer used to fire 107 mm Rocket

TIME DELAY – MECHANICAL/ ELECTRICAL Loop Switch Timer Slide Switch Timer Mosque clock Casio F91W Timer 27

VEHICLE BORNE IED Can include Trucks, Cars, Motor bikes and Bikes.

FRONT VIEW INSIDE VIEW VIEW OF CHARGE PBIED VEST

WATER COURSE WATER COURSE COMMAND WIRE CWIED FIRING POINT 10 METERS COMPOUND WALL

RADIO CONTROLLED IED East Antenna Mod Device with battery pack

VICTIM OPERATED IEDS NORMALLY BURIED IN ROADS OR TRACKS Battery pack Pressure Switch Main Charge

INSURGENT TTPS • YOUR PATTERNS may be continuously monitored and studied. • Insurgents target any set patterns. • IEDs are emplaced months or weeks in advance. • IEDs are armed just before our vehicles approach, either by hand or by radio. • Insurgents use the same locations for emplacing IEDs and Firing Points, repeatedly. ( maximum recorded is 8 )

INSURGENT TTPS • IEDs are placed in : • Frequently used overwatch positions. • Parking areas on halts. • Dead ground that cannot be seen from FF locations.

Blast Seat Culvert (1) CULVERTS RECENTLY, IF NOT PLACED IN CULVERT, THEN 50 TO 100 METERS AWAY

(1) STREAM BEDS N Pressure plate & location Seat of blast

(2) SOFT SAND RCIED

(3) UP / DOWNHILL SLOPE IED site

Firing Point Path of Wire N Blast Seat (4) SHARP TURNS

Explosion site Second IED (5) CHOKE POINTS

(5) CHOKE POINTS RCIED Emplacement Location

INSURGENT USE OF MARKERS • To warn local nationals of the location of the IED. • To assist in aiming and detonating the IED at the best possible time.

AIMING MARKERS

WHAT TO LOOK FOR Threat Signatures • Metal Content • PPIED • Metallic mines / military ordnance items • Battery packs • Insurgents may bury stray metal on tracks to slow movements. • Disturbed Earth • Emplacers will dig devices in, soil colour may change. • Command Wires/ Trip Wires • Lines of disturbed earth, ant trails, decaying vegetation. • Glints reflected from wire. • RC Antenna • Exposed short lengths of wire, along ground or fixed to vertical poles, etc. • May be remoted from main charge.

IF A SUSPECT DEVICE IS FOUND : CARRY OUT 4 Cs • Confirm : that its an IED • Safe distance • Clear : the area • Ensure no one at risk • Cordon • Call for EOD support • Provide safe area for EOD to work • Control • Stop people entering • Find safe route around

USEFUL TTPs • Plan the route the CF will travel. • Try to avoid obvious Choke points, or when possible, search the area. • Try not to set patterns. • Use your ECM equipment. • Stay in the tracks of the vehicle in front of you. • Let the person who has the best overview also look in front of the vehicle to look for characteristic indications and markings on the ground.

USE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES (ECM) • Report to ISAF HQ your frequencies and operating areas if it is possible. • Fitting to a range of different vehicles, power requirements and antenna location. • Communications issues.

ACTION ON FINDING IED OR IED STRIKE • DON’T TOUCH DEVICE. • CALL IEDD TEAM WHO ARE TRAINED TO MAKE IT SAFE. • IF IED HAS DETONATED, IEDD TEAM WILL EXPLOIT THE SCENE IF TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS.

QUESTIONS?

ISAF CONTRACTOR / NGO COORDINATION MEETING