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Challenge-Response New Authentication Scheme

Challenge-Response New Authentication Scheme. Rifaat Shekh-Yusef IETF 90, CFRG WG, Toronto, Canada July 23, 2014. Overview. Goal Define a new scheme for the challenge-response framework to replace Basic/Digest. How The proposals do not introduce any novel cryptographic algorithms .

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Challenge-Response New Authentication Scheme

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  1. Challenge-ResponseNew Authentication Scheme RifaatShekh-Yusef IETF 90, CFRG WG, Toronto, Canada July 23, 2014

  2. Overview • Goal • Define a new scheme for the challenge-response framework to replace Basic/Digest. • How • The proposals do not introduce any novel cryptographic algorithms. • The proposals use a combination of existing protocols and algorithms.

  3. Challenge-Response Framework ClientServer -------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | Initial-Request | |------------------------------------------------------------->| | | | Challenge [Scheme] | |<-------------------------------------------------------------| | | | Response[Scheme] | |------------------------------------------------------------->| | | | Confirmation| |<-------------------------------------------------------------| | | Usage This framework is used by a variety of protocols; e.g. HTTP, SIP, OAuth, STUN,…

  4. Basic/Digest Schemes Issues • Weak protection of passwords at rest. • Low entropy passwords. • Password/password-hash sent on the wire. • Optional support for mutual authentication. • Susceptible to downgrade attack. • Susceptible to replay attack (depends on qop) • And more

  5. PBKDF2-JPAKE-based Proposal • PBKDF2 • Derive a key from the shared password. • Store the key in the DB. • JPAKE • Three-pass Variant • Key Confirmation To fit the above into the challenge-response framework, the proposal: • Uses the PBKDF2 key as an input to JPAKE. • Utilizes the Initial-Request. • Combines the Key Confirmationprocedure with the Three-pass Variantprocedure.

  6. Key-Derivation Proposal • Scrypt-based scheme: • Derive a key from the shared password. • Store the key in the DB. • Use the key to establish mutual authentication. • Never send the password or the key on the wire. • Key-derived data will be sent on the wire

  7. Questions • Can the WG agree on one or more PAKE protocols to consider? • Should the Key-Derivation proposal be considered and discussed here?

  8. References • PBKDF2 • "NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendations for Password-Based Key Derivations", December 2010.http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf • SCRYPT • Percival, C., Josefsson, S., "The scrypt Password-Based Key Derivation Function", "draft-josefsson-scrypt-kdf-01" (Work In Progress), September 2012. • JPAKE • Hao, F., "J-PAKE: Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", draft-hao-jpake-01, (Work In Progress), December 2013.

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