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Hem vist Decisions individuals Què prediu la teoria i com es comporta la gent Veurem

Hem vist Decisions individuals Què prediu la teoria i com es comporta la gent Veurem Decisions estratègiques El resultat ara depèn de les decisions teves i de les dels demés. Què prediu la teoria i com es comporta la gent?. Què diu la teoria?. Anem a veure si es compleix. Joc de cartes.

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Hem vist Decisions individuals Què prediu la teoria i com es comporta la gent Veurem

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  1. Hem vist Decisions individuals Què prediu la teoria i com es comporta la gent Veurem Decisions estratègiques El resultat ara depèn de les decisions teves i de les dels demés. Què prediu la teoria i com es comporta la gent?

  2. Què diu la teoria?

  3. Anem a veure si es compleix.Joc de cartes. Si jugues la vermella guanyes 2€. Si jugues la negra no guanyes res però l’altre guanya 3€.

  4. Noves instruccions Carta vermella, guanyes 2€. Carta negra, l’altre guanya 8€.

  5. Conflicte Entre incentius (socials) de cooperar i incentius (privats) de buscar l’interès propi Machiavellli stresses civic virtues. Civic traditions of cooperation and trust (exemple de Napols). Adam Smith, lucre personal com a motor de l’economia (Wealth of Nations), virtuts cíviques com a motor de l’economia (Theory of Moral Sentiments). Tocqueville (Democracy in America). Putnam “Making democracy work” (1993), “Bowling alone” (2002) (associations, credit, capital social: normes de reciprocitat i reticules de relacions civiques), Fukuyama Trust (1996) “Coopetition” Cooperació en la producció i competencia en el repartiment.

  6. Conflicte b>c>a>d THEORYIt is self-evident how an intelligent individual should behave:1) One-shotDominant strategy is the non-efficient equilibrium (c>a)2) Finite game Even with thousands of trials, not a single efficient equilibrium predicted.No convergence to infinitely-repeated game.

  7. Equilibri subóptim. One-shot: away from 0 or 100% cooperation • Què passaria si es repetís el joc entre els mateixos jugadors? • I entre jugadors diferents? • Què passa si s’anuncia el nombre de períodes que es juguen? • What is an infinite game Fixed probability of finishing; it affects results: more cooperation when probability of continuing is larger.

  8. Dilema de los presos, Andreoni, Miller, EJ 1993

  9. Three experiments Selten & Stoecker (1986) 25 supergames of 10 periods. In each supergame a pattern of cooperation, defect and defect all the way. In the experiment, the moment of defection moves earlier. In the last 5 supergames, no cooperation at all. Theory’s prediction is too extreme, but better approximation with practice.

  10. Observation leads to a theory of learning and to new theories of decision making as in:b. Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) Rational behavior when you have doubts about rationality of your opponent. c. Andreoni & Miller (1993) Building a reputation. Reciprocal altruism (cooperate until experience shows that they are taking advantage...). Pure altruism (taking pleasure in others pleasure).

  11. And one set of simulations : Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) Computer tournaments a. on a 200-play repeated PD.b. P=.99 of continuing (only the first half of entries and Tit for Tat would have been 4th after 25, 16 and 8.Variations:-Letting subjects talk to each other-Letting subjects choose their partners-Letting them know each other in a local interaction

  12. Field centipede

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