'Bid 1' diaporamas de présentation

CPS 590.2: Computation, Information, and Learning in Market Design

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CPS 590.4: Computational Microeconomics: Game Theory, Social Choice, and Mechanism Design

CPS 590.4: Computational Microeconomics: Game Theory, Social Choice, and Mechanism Design. Instructor: Vincent Conitzer (Sally Dalton Robinson Professor of Computer Science & Professor of Economics) conitzer@cs.duke.edu Course web page: http://www.cs.duke.edu/courses/spring14/compsci590.4/.

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CPS 590.4: Computational Microeconomics: Game Theory, Social Choice, and Mechanism Design

CPS 590.4: Computational Microeconomics: Game Theory, Social Choice, and Mechanism Design. Instructor: Vincent Conitzer (Sally Dalton Robinson Professor of Computer Science & Professor of Economics) conitzer@cs.duke.edu Course web page: http://www.cs.duke.edu/courses/spring14/compsci590.4/.

384 views • 37 slides

CPS 296.1: Computational Microeconomics: Game Theory, Social Choice, and Mechanism Design

CPS 296.1: Computational Microeconomics: Game Theory, Social Choice, and Mechanism Design. Instructor: Vincent Conitzer (Assistant Professor of Computer Science & Economics) conitzer@cs.duke.edu Course web page: http://www.cs.duke.edu/courses/fall09/cps296.1. What is Economics ?.

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CPS 296.1: Computational Microeconomics: Game Theory, Social Choice, and Mechanism Design

CPS 296.1: Computational Microeconomics: Game Theory, Social Choice, and Mechanism Design. Instructor: Vincent Conitzer (Sally Dalton Robinson Professor of Computer Science & Professor of Economics) conitzer@cs.duke.edu Course web page: http://www.cs.duke.edu/courses/fall11/cps296.1.

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COMPSCI 223: Computational Microeconomics

COMPSCI 223: Computational Microeconomics. Instructor: Vincent Conitzer (Kimberly J. Jenkins University Professor of New Technologies Professor of Computer Science , Professor of Economics , and Professor of Philosophy ) conitzer@cs.duke.edu

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Bridge for Beginners

Bridge for Beginners. Lesson 15 The Use of Doubles. Homework. ? KT87 ? QJ3 ? AT5 ? Q87. ? KQ87 ? QJ3 ? AT5 ? Q87. ? KQ87 ? QJ3 ? AT5 ? Q87. What are your bids in the sequences shown?. 1NT P 2 ? P. 1NT P 2 ? P. 1NT P 2 ? P. P 2NT P. 2 ?. ?.

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CPS 173: Computational Microeconomics

CPS 173: Computational Microeconomics. Instructor: Vincent Conitzer (Assistant Professor of Computer Science & Economics) conitzer@cs.duke.edu http://www.cs.duke.edu/courses/spring10/cps173/. What is Economics ?.

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Probabilistic Asymmetric Information and Lending Relationships

Probabilistic Asymmetric Information and Lending Relationships. Philip Ostromogolsky Yale School of Management. Background. Often banks lend to small business customers over several periods.

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CPS 296.2 Computational Game Theory and Mechanism Design

CPS 296.2 Computational Game Theory and Mechanism Design. Instructor: Vincent Conitzer Assistant Professor of Computer Science Assistant Professor of Economics conitzer@cs.duke.edu Course web page: http://www.cs.duke.edu/courses/fall06/cps296.2/. What is game theory ?.

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CPS 296.2 Computational Game Theory and Mechanism Design

CPS 296.2 Computational Game Theory and Mechanism Design. Instructor: Vincent Conitzer Assistant Professor of Computer Science Assistant Professor of Economics conitzer@cs.duke.edu Course web page: http://www.cs.duke.edu/courses/fall06/cps296.2/. What is game theory ?.

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Common value auctions

Common value auctions. The same value for everyone, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Auction a jar full of coins ( asking for an estimation) average bid will be significantly less than the value of the coins (bidders are risk averse)

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2003 Ungraded Homework P1

2003 Ungraded Homework P1. Reminder : Reserves(sid,bid,day) a. Create a table Together(sid1,sid2,day) that contains all pairs of sailors that have a reservation for the same boat on the same day. ?(Reserves1 (1 ?sid1),Reserves) ?(Reserves2 (1 ?sid2),Reserves)

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2003 Ungraded Homework P1

2003 Ungraded Homework P1. Reminder : Reserves(sid,bid,day) a. Create a table Together(sid1,sid2,day) that contains all pairs of sailors that have a reservation for the same boat on the same day. ?(Reserves1 (1 ?sid1),Reserves) ?(Reserves2 (1 ?sid2),Reserves)

180 views • 9 slides