1 / 22

Insider Threats in Database Security

Insider Threats in Database Security. Ram Gopal (with Robert Garfinkel, Daniel Rice) University of Connecticut. Security Mechanism. Database Security Objectives. Maximize the utility of information provided to users while maintaining the security of confidential information. Original

severino-trejo
Télécharger la présentation

Insider Threats in Database Security

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Insider Threats in Database Security Ram Gopal (with Robert Garfinkel, Daniel Rice) University of Connecticut

  2. Security Mechanism Database Security Objectives Maximize the utility of information provided to users while maintaining the security of confidential information. Original Database Secure Database User Query Query Answer

  3. Security Mechanism Insider Threats Original Database Secure Database User Query Query Answer Insider Process Knowledge Insider Data Knowledge

  4. Confidentiality-Related Identity-Related Confidential • Security Considerations • Disclosure of Confidential Information • Identity Disclosure

  5. Protection of Confidential Information • Perturbation • Camouflage

  6. 87.89 52.07 134.60 101.95 71.15 24.76 46.81 94.79 74.24 49.57 Perturbation 82.32 -19.68 • Data Swapping/Shuffling • Binning

  7. Perturbation

  8. Camouflage • Interval Answers • Answer Guarantee • Interval Protection • Storage Efficiency • Computational Efficiency • “Good” Query Answers Record 2 Record 1

  9. u2 Record 2 l2 Record 1 l1 u1 Camouflage: Polytope Query: q = f(a) Query Answer: interval[q-, q +] Answer Computation

  10. Camouflage - Polytope

  11. Insider Threats - Data Camouflage - Polytope u2 Record 2 l2 Record 1 l1 u1

  12. Insider Threats - Data u2 Record 2 l2 Record 1 l1 u1

  13. Perturbation Insider Threats - Data

  14. Threat Analysis • Perturbation • Camouflage Insider Information Process Information (knows the technique) Data Information (has some data) Safe Safe

  15. Perturbation Camouflage Threat Analysis Insider Information Process Information (knows the technique) Data Information (has some data) NA STAR Approach

  16. Actual Value of Record 2 Actual value of record 1 Camouflage - STAR u2 Record 2 l2 Record 1 l1 u1

  17. Threat Analysis • Perturbation • Camouflage Insider Information Process Information (knows the technique) Data Information (has partial information) Unsafe Modified STAR U Polytope

  18. Protection Against Process/Partial Data Threats Camouflage - Modified STAR U Polytope u2 Record 2 l2 Record 1 l1 u1

  19. Protection Against Process/Partial Data Threats u2 Record 2 l2 Record 1 l1 u1

  20. Threat Analysis- Extreme Case • Perturbation • Camouflage Insider Information Process Information (knows the technique) Data Information (has all but 1 piece of data) Unsafe Hyper-rectangle

  21. Camouflage: Hyper-rectangle Query: q = f(a) u2 Query Answer: interval[q-, q +] Answer Computation Record 2 l2 Record 1 l1 u1

  22. Computational Results & Concluding Remarks • STAR performs extremely well • Useful answers can be provided even in the presence of insider information • Current techniques fail against insider threats • Response must depend upon nature and level of threat

More Related