1. Civitas Michael ClarksonCornell Stephen ChongHarvard Andrew MyersCornell IACR Board Meeting / CRYPTO August 19, 2008 Coin (ca. 63 B.C.) commemorating introduction of secret ballot in 137 B.C.

2. Civitas Features: • Designed for remote voting, coercion resistance, verifiability • Supports plurality, approval, Condorcet methods Status: • Paper in Oakland 2008 • Publicly available: 21,000 LOC (Jif, Java, and C) • Prototype …Suitable for IACR? Clarkson: Civitas

3. Civitas Security Requirements

4. Security Model No trusted supervision of polling places • Including voters, procedures, hardware, software • Voting could take place anywhere • Remote voting Generalization of “Internet voting” and “postal voting” Interesting problem to solve! IACR  Clarkson: Civitas

5. Adversary Always: • May perform any polynomial time computation • May corrupt all but one of each type of election authority • Distributed trust Almost always: • May control network • May coerce voters, demanding secrets or behavior, remotely or physically Security properties: Confidentiality, integrity, availability Clarkson: Civitas

6. Integrity Verifiability: Including: • Voter verifiability: Voters can check that their own vote is included • Universal verifiability: Anyone can check that only authorized votes are counted, no votes are changed during tallying [Sako and Killian 1995] The final tally is correct and verifiable. IACR  Clarkson: Civitas

7. Confidentiality Voter coercion: • Employer, spouse, etc. • Coercer can demand any behavior (vote buying) • Coercer can observe and interact with voter during remote voting • Must prevent coercers from trusting their own observations Clarkson: Civitas

8. Confidentiality > receipt-freeness> anonymity Hierarchy: [Delaune, Kremer, and Ryan, CSFW 2006] Coercion resistance: The adversary cannot learn how voters vote, even if voters collude and interact with the adversary. too weak for remote voting IACR ? Clarkson: Civitas

9. Availability • We assume that this holds • To guarantee, would need to make system components highly available Tally availability: The final tally of the election is produced. IACR ? Clarkson: Civitas

10. Civitas Design and Implementation

11. JCJ Scheme [Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson, WPES 2005] • Formally defined coercion resistance and verifiability • Constructed voting scheme • Proved scheme satisfies coercion resistance and verifiability [Backes, Hritcu, and Maffei, CSF 2008] • Verified simplification in ProVerif Clarkson: Civitas

12. Civitas Architecture registration teller registration teller registration teller tabulation teller ballot box bulletinboard ballot box tabulation teller ballot box voterclient tabulation teller Clarkson: Civitas

13. tabulation teller ballot box bulletinboard ballot box tabulation teller ballot box tabulation teller Registration registration teller registration teller registration teller voterclient Voter retrieves credential share from each registration teller;combines to form credential Clarkson: Civitas

14. registration teller registration teller registration teller tabulation teller bulletinboard tabulation teller tabulation teller Voting ballot box ballot box ballot box voterclient Voter submits copy of encrypted choice and credential (+ ZK proofs) to each ballot box Clarkson: Civitas

15. Resisting Coercion Voters invent fake credentials • To adversary, fake  real • Votes with fake credentials removed during tabulation Clarkson: Civitas

16. Resisting Coercion Clarkson: Civitas

17. registration teller registration teller registration teller voterclient Tabulation tabulation teller ballot box bulletinboard ballot box tabulation teller ballot box tabulation teller Tellers retrieve votes from ballot boxes Clarkson: Civitas

18. registration teller registration teller registration teller ballot box ballot box ballot box voterclient Tabulation tabulation teller bulletinboard tabulation teller tabulation teller Tabulation tellers anonymize votes with mix network;eliminate unauthorized credentials; decrypt remaining choices; post ZK proofs Clarkson: Civitas

19. Verifiability:Tellers post zero-knowledge proofs during tabulation Coercion resistance:Voters can undetectably fake credentials Civitas Architecture registration teller registration teller registration teller tabulation teller ballot box bulletinboard ballot box tabulation teller ballot box voterclient tabulation teller Clarkson: Civitas

20. Protocols Leverage the literature: • El Gamal; distributed [Brandt]; non-malleable [Schnorr and Jakobsson] • Proof of knowledge of discrete log [Schnorr] • Proof of equality of discrete logarithms [Chaum & Pederson] • Authentication and key establishment [Needham-Schroeder-Lowe] • Designated-verifier reencryption proof [Hirt & Sako] • 1-out-of-L reencryption proof [Hirt & Sako] • Signature of knowledge of discrete logarithms [Camenisch & Stadler] • Reencryption mix network with randomized partial checking [Jakobsson, Juels & Rivest] • Plaintext equivalence test [Jakobsson & Juels] Clarkson: Civitas

21. Secure Implementation In Jif [Myers 1999, Chong and Myers 2005, 2008] • Security-typed language • Types contain information-flow policies • Confidentiality, integrity, declassification, erasure If policies in code express correct requirements… • (And Jif compiler is correct…) • Then code is secure w.r.t. requirements Clarkson: Civitas

22. CivitasSecurity Evaluation

23. Civitas Trust Assumptions • DDH, RSA, random oracle model. • The adversary cannot masquerade as a voter during registration. • Voters trust their voting client. • At least one of each type of authority is honest. • The channels from the voter to the ballot boxes are anonymous. • Each voter has an untappable channel to a trusted registration teller. Clarkson: Civitas

24. Civitas Trust Assumptions • DDH, RSA, random oracle model. • The adversary cannot masquerade as a voter during registration. • Voters trust their voting client. • At least one of each type of authority is honest. • The channels from the voter to the ballot boxes are anonymous. • Each voter has an untappable channel to a trusted registration teller. Verifiability andCoercion resistance Coercion resistance Clarkson: Civitas

25. Civitas Trust Assumptions • DDH, RSA, random oracle model. • The adversary cannot masquerade as a voter during registration. • Voters trust their voting client. • At least one of each type of authority is honest. • The channels from the voter to the ballot boxes are anonymous. • Each voter has an untappable channel to a trusted registration teller. VER + CR CR Clarkson: Civitas

26. Civitas Trust Assumptions • DDH, RSA, random oracle model. • The adversary cannot masquerade as a voter during registration. • Voters trust their voting client. • At least one of each type of authority is honest. • The channels from the voter to the ballot boxes are anonymous. • Each voter has an untappable channel to a trusted registration teller. VER + CR CR Clarkson: Civitas

27. Civitas Trust Assumptions • DDH, RSA, random oracle model. • The adversary cannot masquerade as a voter during registration. • Voters trust their voting client. • At least one of each type of authority is honest. • The channels from the voter to the ballot boxes are anonymous. • Each voter has an untappable channel to a trusted registration teller. VER + CR CR Clarkson: Civitas

28. Civitas Trust Assumptions • DDH, RSA, random oracle model. • The adversary cannot masquerade as a voter during registration. • Voters trust their voting client. • At least one of each type of authority is honest. • The channels from the voter to the ballot boxes are anonymous. • Each voter has an untappable channel to a trusted registration teller. VER + CR CR Clarkson: Civitas

29. Civitas Trust Assumptions • DDH, RSA, random oracle model. • The adversary cannot masquerade as a voter during registration. • Voters trust their voting client. • At least one of each type of authority is honest. • The channels from the voter to the ballot boxes are anonymous. • Each voter has an untappable channel to a trusted registration teller. VER + CR CR Clarkson: Civitas

30. Civitas Trust Assumptions • DDH, RSA, random oracle model. • The adversary cannot masquerade as a voter during registration. • Voters trust their voting client. • At least one of each type of authority is honest. • The channels from the voter to the ballot boxes are anonymous. • Each voter has an untappable channel to a trusted registration teller. VER + CR CR Clarkson: Civitas

31. Civitas Trust Assumptions • DDH, RSA, random oracle model. • The adversary cannot masquerade as a voter during registration. • Voters trust their voting client. • At least one of each type of authority is honest. • The channels from the voter to the ballot boxes are anonymous. • Each voter has an untappable channel to a trusted registration teller. VER + CR CR Clarkson: Civitas

32. CivitasCost Evaluation

33. Real-World Cost Society makes a tradeoff on: • Cost of election, vs. • Security, usability, … Current totalcosts are $1-$3 / voter [International Foundation for Election Systems] We don’t know the total cost for Civitas. Cost of cryptography? Clarkson: Civitas

34. CPU Cost for Tabulation For reasonable security parameters, CPU time is 39 sec / voter / authority. If CPUs are bought, used (for 5 hours), then thrown away: $1500 / machine ) $12 / voter If CPUs are rented: $1 / CPU / hr ) 4¢ / voter Increased cost…Increased security IACR ? Clarkson: Civitas

35. Conclusion

36. Summary Civitas provides security: • Remote voting • Verifiability • Coercion resistance (strongest?) Civitas provides assurance: • Security proofs • Explicit trust assumptions • Information-flow analysis of implementation (first?) IACR  Clarkson: Civitas

37. Technical Issues • Web interfaces • Testing • BFT bulletin board • Threshold cryptography • Anonymous channel integration IACR  Clarkson: Civitas

38. Research Issues • Distribute trust in voter client • Eliminate in-person registration • Credential management • Application-level DoS Clarkson: Civitas

39. Web Site http://www.cs.cornell.edu/projects/civitas • Technical report with concrete protocols • Source code of our prototype Clarkson: Civitas

40. http://www.cs.cornell.edu/projects/civitas

41. Extra Slides Clarkson: Civitas

42. Paper • What paper does: • Convince voter that his vote was captured correctly • What paper does next: • Gets dropped in a ballot box • Immediately becomes insecure • Chain-of-custody, stuffing, loss, recount attacks… • Hacking paper elections has a long and (in)glorious tradition [Steal this Vote, Andrew Gumbel, 2005] • 20% of paper trails are missing or illegible [Michael Shamos, 2008] • What paper doesn’t: • Guarantee that a vote will be counted • Guarantee that a vote will be counted correctly Clarkson: Civitas

43. Cryptography “The public won’t trust cryptography.” • It already does… • Because experts already do “I don’t trust cryptography.” • You don’t trust the proofs, or • You reject the hardness assumptions Clarkson: Civitas

44. Selling Votes Requires selling credential… • Which requires: • Adversary tapped the untappable channel, or • Adversary authenticated in place of voter… • Which then requires: • Voter transferred ability to authenticate to adversary; something voter… • Has: too easy • Knows: need incentive not to transfer • Is: hardest to transfer Clarkson: Civitas

45. Civitas LOC Clarkson: Civitas

46. Civitas Policy Examples • Confidentiality: • Information: Voter’s credential share • Policy: “RT permits only this voter to learn this information” • Jif syntax: RT  Voter • Confidentiality: • Information: Teller’s private key • Policy: “TT permits no one else to learn this information” • Jif syntax: TT  TT • Integrity: • Information: Random nonces used by tellers • Policy: “TT permits only itself to influence this information” • Jif syntax: TT  TT Clarkson: Civitas

47. Civitas Policy Examples • Declassification: • Information: Bits that are committed to then revealed • Policy: “TT permits no one to read this information until all commitments become available, then TT declassifies it to allow everyone to read.” • Jif syntax: TT  [TT commAvail ] • Erasure: • Information: Voter’s credential shares • Policy: “Voter requires, after all shares are received and full credential is constructed, that shares must be erased.” • Jif syntax: Voter  [Voter credConstT ] Clarkson: Civitas

48. Registration Trust Assumptions One way to discharge is with in-person registration • Not an absolute requirement • Though for strong authentication, physical presence (“something you are”) is reasonable • Need not register in-person with all tellers Works like real-world voting today: • Registration teller trusted to correctly authenticate voter • Issue of credential must happen in trusted “registration booth” • But doesn’t need to happen on special day Con: System not fully remote Pro: Credential can be used remotely for many elections • Reusing real-world mechanism, can bootstrap into a system offering stronger security Clarkson: Civitas

49. Voting Client Trust Assumption Civitas voting client is not a DRE: • Voters are not required to trust a single (closed-source) implementation • Civitas allows open-source (re)implementations of the client • Voters can obtain or travel to implementation provided by organization they trust Discharge? Distribute trust in client. [Benaloh, Chaum, Joaquim and Ribeiro, Kutyłowski et al., Zúquete et al., …] Clarkson: Civitas

50. Blocks Block is a “virtual precinct” • Each voter assigned to one block • Each block tallied independently of other blocks, even in parallel Tabulation time is: • Quadratic in block size • Linear in number of voters • If using one set of machines for many blocks • Or, constant in number of voters • If using one set of machines per block Clarkson: Civitas