1 / 24

Introduction: Empirical Evidence on Politics and Development

Introduction: Empirical Evidence on Politics and Development . Paths of Political Development. Stable Democracy Western countries Unstable democracy Latin American Countries Non repressive Dictatorship Singapore, east Asian Countries Repressive dictatorship South Africa, before 1994 .

sherlock_clovis
Télécharger la présentation

Introduction: Empirical Evidence on Politics and Development

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Introduction: Empirical Evidence onPolitics and Development

  2. Paths of Political Development • Stable Democracy • Western countries • Unstable democracy • Latin American Countries • Non repressive Dictatorship • Singapore, east Asian Countries • Repressive dictatorship • South Africa, before 1994

  3. Growth and Democracy • Pros: Provide constraints for Rulers • Cons: More distortionary redistribution. • Empirical evidence: • Barro (1997) • Non linear effect • Growth initially increasing with electoral rights, then decreasing • Growth is a good predictor for democracy (Barro 1999) • Przeworski, A. and Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J. Robinson and P. Yared • No clear causality from growth to democracy

  4. Institutions and Development

  5. Institutions and Development • Are good institutions influencing the development or the contrary? • Problem or regressing growth respect an index of good institutions (enforcement property rights…) • We need a source of exogenous variations in the institutions • An element linked to the institutions but that is not directly linked to growth

  6. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development • Extractive Institutions • like Belgium in Congo • No protection of private property • Developmental Institutions • Like in New Zealand, US., Australia • High property rights protection

  7. Importance of Mortality rates Settler Mortality Settlements Early institutions Current institutions Current Performances

  8. Is the Theory Right? • Settler Mortality as an Instrumental Variable • M : settlers mortality • y: income growth

  9. An economic Success: Botswana

  10. An economic Success: Botswana • Botswana is an outlier respect to African sub-Saharian countries • Good Institutions play an important role • Why does Botswana get good institutions • Colonial origins • Original population Density • Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation

  11. Botswana vs. Ghana and Somalia • Tribal Institutions encouraged constraints on political Leaders • Limited effect of Colonization • Elites had economic Interests in the development • In Ghana no limits on the ruling class because it suppressed the opposition • Somalia is initially very similar to Botswana (no ethnic differences) and The British rule did not impact so much • Somalia structure in clans highly divisive

  12. 17th-century Britain and The Netherlands vs. France and Spain • Commercial interests where politically stronger in the Netherlands and in Britain • In Britain the Glorious revolution of 1688 limited the power of the crown • The Netherlands became independent from Spain in the 16th century • The Merchant Supported the leadership of William of Orange and gained the independence • Followed a more "capitalistic" regime ∙ • The Power of the monarchy in France and Spain blocked the development of institutions (North) • The Crown used many predatory methods to raise revenues

  13. South vs. North America in the 18th and 19th Centuries • Powerful groups in North America Favoured the enforcement of Property rights, in South America opposed the industrialization • No powerful landed Aristocracy in the United States • Essentially Poor Europeans migrated to North America, low density at the beginning • Labor shortages in NA give the landlords less power • The north America was a settler colony: They opposed institutions giving power to landed interests • In South and central America more density: African slaves and Native population: • The landed aristocracy got more power and opposed to the industrialization

  14. Korea and Taiwan vs Congo • All 3 were dictatorship • In Korea and Taiwan they pursued developmental policies • Threat of Communism (political Constraints) • In Korea and Taiwan alliance between dictator and business • Mobutu in Congo set a very Kleptocratic regime • Belgians set a very predatory colony • Mobutu continued to rule without control

  15. To Summarise • There is a general tendency toward Democracy • Paths are different • Unclear the relationship growth vs Democracy • More Inequality less Democracy • Institutions appear good for Growth

More Related