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Trust Mechanisms in Ad Hoc Networks

Trust Mechanisms in Ad Hoc Networks. Azar Rahimi Dehaghani Lei Hu Trust and Security Case Study 2. Outline. Introduction to ad hoc networks Security issues in ad hoc networks Existing Security Solutions Trust models Summary. Ad Hoc Networks. Characteristics: Temporarily formed

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Trust Mechanisms in Ad Hoc Networks

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  1. Trust Mechanisms inAd Hoc Networks Azar Rahimi Dehaghani Lei Hu Trust and Security Case Study 2

  2. Outline Introduction to ad hoc networks Security issues in ad hoc networks Existing Security Solutions Trust models Summary

  3. Ad Hoc Networks Characteristics: Temporarily formed Nodes act as routers Infrastructure-less Limited resources Shared wireless medium Applications: Military battlefield networks Personal Area Networks Disaster and rescue operation Peer to peer networks

  4. Ad Hoc Networks Routing protocols types: Reactive routing protocols Proactive routing protocols Leading protocols: DSR: Dynamic Source Routing AODV: Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing

  5. Challenges in Ad Hoc Network • The nodes are constantly mobile • The protocols implemented are co-operative in nature • There is a lack of a fixed infrastructure to collect audit data • No clear distinction between normalcy and anomaly in ad hoc networks

  6. Attacks on Ad Hoc Networks Passive attacks Do not change the routing information Listen to get valuable information Active attacks Use its energy to manipulate the routing information

  7. Active Attacks Modification: Malicious node can modify routing information Fabrication: Generating false routing message Impersonation: Initiate attack by masquerading as another node

  8. Existing Security Solutions • Intrusion prevention • Encryption, authentication • Nodes are required to have pre-shared keys or digital certificates • Central trust authority or pre configuration is not practical for ad-hoc networks

  9. Trust Model 1 Computes situational trust in agents based upon the general trust in the trustor and the importance of the situation Trust derivation: the information that one node can gather about the other nodes in passive mode Quantification: model represents trust in a continual range -1 to 1 signifying a continuous range from complete distrust to complete trust Computation: involves an assignment of weights to the events that were monitored and quantified

  10. DSR Protocol • On demand protocol: route information discovered only as needed • Source routing: entire path to destination supplied by source in packet header • Procedure: • Route discovery • Route maintenance • Routing

  11. Route Discovery • Route Request: • Source broadcasts Route Request message for specified destination • Intermediate node adds itself to path in message and forwards message toward destination

  12. Route Discovery • Route Reply: • Destination unicasts Route Reply message to source

  13. Route Maintenance • Used when link breakage occurs • Link breakage may be detected using link-layer ACKs, “passive ACKs”, DSR ACK request • Route Error message sent to source of message being forwarded when break detected • Intermediate nodes “eavesdrop”, adjust cached routes • Source deletes route; tries another if one cached, or issues new Route Request

  14. DSR Based on Model 1 Trust derivation: Acknowledgements Packet precision Salvaging Black lists Trust quantification: Quantizes the events and assigns weights to them Trust computation: Determines aggregate trust level for a particular node

  15. Trust Model 2 Build trust manager on each node in the network Two components: Monitoring module Reputation handling module

  16. Monitoring Module Each node independently monitors its neighboring nodes packet forwarding activities It is related to the proportion of correctly forwarded packets to the total number of packets

  17. Reputation Handling Module • Reputation information collecting • Sensing • Recommendations • Reputation information template • Reputation information maintenance • Reputation rating

  18. Reputation Handling Module • Reputation information collecting • Reputation information template • Reputation information maintenance • Reputation rating

  19. Reputation Handling Module Reputation information collecting Reputation information template Reputation information maintenance Reputation rating

  20. Reputation Handling Module • Reputation information collecting • Reputation information template • Reputation information maintenance • Reputation rating • Proportion of correctly forwarded packets with respect to the total number of packets to be forwarded during a fixed time window

  21. Trust Model 3 Trust is defined based on the following factors: Experience statistics Data value Intrusion black list Reference Personal preference

  22. Secure Routing Based on Model 3

  23. Summary Trust in ad hoc networks can not be treated as a property of trusted systems but rather it is an assessment based on experience that is shared through networks of people Hard-security cryptographic or certification mechanisms are not feasible Confidence measures should be built dynamically based on effort/return mechanism

  24. References Asad Amir Pirzada, Chris McDonald: Establishing Trust In Pure Ad-hoc Networks. ACSC 2004, pp. 47-54, 2004. Patrick Albers, Olivier Camp, Jean-Marc Percher, Bernard Jouga, Ludovic Mé, Ricardo Staciarini Puttini: Security in Ad Hoc Networks: a General Intrusion Detection Architecture Enhancing Trust Based Approaches. Wireless Information Systems , pp. 1-12, 2002. Yacine Rebahi, Vicente E. Mujica V, Dorgham Sisalem: A Reputation-Based Trust Mechanism for Ad Hoc Networks. ISCC 2005, pp. 37-42, 2005. Yan Sun, Wei Yu, Zhu Han, K. J. Ray Liu: Trust Modeling and Evaluation in Ad Hoc Networks. Global Telecommunication Conference 2005. Zheng Yan , Peng Zhang , Teemupekka Virtanen: Trust Evaluation Based Security Solution in Ad Hoc Networks. Proceedings of the Seventh Nordic Workshop on Secure IT Systems, 2003.

  25. Questions???

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