SAFETY AND LICENSING OF SPENT FUEL STORAGE AND TRANSPORT -Safety issues within spent fuel transport by AREVA

2. SAFETY AND LICENSING OF SPENT FUEL STORAGE AND TRANSPORT-Safety issues within spent fuel transport by AREVA Stéphane BRUT François DERLOT Laurent MILET 31 May- 4 June 2010 TN INTERNATIONAL

3. INTRODUCTION • Some of the main Safety issues raised during last years within French spent fuel transport: • Leaking fuel assembly transport: How to transport and demonstrate safety of package loaded with fuel assemblies with suspicion of water trapped in the cladding? • Double Barriers design for spent fuel packages: what kind of design to comply with the regulation? • Double Operations& controls associated to the water exclusion assumption: how to fulfilled requirement regarding leakage of water as a result of error? 31 May - 4 June 2010 - p.3

4. Leaking fuel assembly transport • What is the problem ? • Cladding rupture on irradiated fuels involve: • Loss of containment with loss of internal pressure • Potentially allow water to penetrate inside the claddings • Water + radiation hydrogen generation Accumulation of hydrogen in a sealed cavity may reached limits of inflammability non acceptable from a safety point of view 31 May - 4 June 2010 - p.4

5. Leaking fuel assembly transport • French history with leaking fuel assembly transports • December 2007: Request by French competent Authority for a systematic measurement of hydrogen rates for packages transporting at least one non-sealed fuel rod • From this request systematic measurement of rates of hydrogen upon arrival at recycling facility (LA HAGUE) for packages transporting fuel identified as ruptured. • Measurements gave a hydrogen rate far below safety limits of inflammability (around 3%) • Beginning 2009 upon French Authority request , TN International carried out linear extrapolation of hydrogen generation to include real periods of transport + margin depending of the status of transport (national, continental transport, intercontinental) • Results according this approach: some transports that were checked as conform at the recycling site arrival would be determined as non conform regarding safety criteria • French competent authority requested a new procedure for new transport: • Measuring of hydrogen rate before transport and at least two days after closing the cavity • Carrying out linear extrapolation taking into account real period transport and safety margin New procedure extremely restrictive for transport 31 May - 4 June 2010 - p.5

6. Leaking fuel assembly transport • TN International action plan to improve leaking fuel assembly transport • 3 ways in progress • Using a neutral gas to increase inflammability threshold. • Helium atmosphere increase in the same condition the inflammability level from 3% to 5% • An application in under progress with French Competent Authority • To characterize a hydrogen generation law less penalizing as linear extrapolation. • To develop solution such as catalytic recombiner. • Such a solution experimented on a TN17T package for the wet transport of spent fuel at TIHANGE (Belgium) showed a stabilization of hydrogen rates about 0.6% • Aim of TN INTERNATIONAL is to implement this technology on a first dry transport of spent leaking fuel in France before long. 31 May - 4 June 2010 - p.6

7. Double barriers design for packages • 2005 IAEA regulation request regarding sub-criticality • Sub-criticality of a package may be demonstrated assuming water exclusion from the containment system, if and only if the design is based on a multiple high standard water barriers. • Nevertheless it is widely agreed by competent authorities that a double watertight high quality standard is enough to comply with this requirement. • Application to spent fuel cask of such a requirement • Usually spent fuel casks are constituted of a thick vessel made of steel or cast iron regarding radiation level that may involve 2 types of design: • Double-lid design • Double-vessel design 31 May - 4 June 2010 - p.7

8. Double barriers design for packages • Double-lid design Thick shell in steel or iron cast 31 May - 4 June 2010 - p.8

9. Double barriers design for packages • Double-vessel design 31 May - 4 June 2010 - p.9

10. Double operations & Controls associated to the water exclusion assumption • 2005 IAEA regulation request regarding sub-criticality • According §677 sub-criticality shall be demonstrated assuming water flooding within all spaces of the packaging, except if the design incorporates special features to prevent such leakage of water into or out of certain void spaces, even as a result of error. • Such features than can prevent inleakage : • May be either a single barrier design licensed according 1985 IAEA regulation and submitted to multilateral approval or a multiple barrier design licensed according 2005 IAEA regulation • Are based on design components (leaktight sealing,…) that we can call “Confinement Components" by analogy to regulatory Confinement system regarding criticality safety. And confinement operation may be defined as any operation that may result in reducing the efficiency of a confinement components as a result of error, standing for a human or a tool failure. • To prevent error resulting in leakage of water, French competent Authority require that confinement operation need to be performed twice independently (different operators and tool). 31 May - 4 June 2010 - p.10

11. Double operations & Controls associated to the water exclusion assumption • Application of double controls system to drying operations by AREVA • For packages loaded in pools, water is removed by draining then vacuum drying of the cavity . To prevent ice formation, vacuum pressure shall be maintained over 6mbar abs. Drying criteria is usually a pressure rise limit during a short time Control of the pressure is the key operation • Double control is then implemented • by measuring continuously the pressure though a double recording measuring device • Then a different operator from the one performing the test check the pressure level and the pressure rise on the second device 31 May - 4 June 2010 - p.11

12. Double operations & Controls associated to the water exclusion assumption • Usually designs confinement components are • Shell (s) and welded bottom • Lid (s) equipped with seals and secured by bolts • Orifice covers equipped with seals and secured by bolts • Application of double control by AREVA • Draining and drying of the cavity: see previous slide • Fastening of bolts to the required torque 2 operators with a different tool for a single barrier or one different operator and tool for each barrier in case of double barriers • Check of the leak tightness of the lid and orifices 2 operators for pressure measurement for a single barrier or one different operator for each barrier in case of double barriers 31 May - 4 June 2010 - p.12

13. Double operations & Controls associated to the water exclusion assumption • To be noticed • That in case of sub-criticality demonstration based on a complete flooding of all of the void space of the cavity , double controls system are not required • That multiplying operations and controls has significant effect on the radiation dose of operators. Such a program should not be extended. 31 May - 4 June 2010 - p.13