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BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENTS Lessons Learned from Fukushima

BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENTS Lessons Learned from Fukushima. David Hall Severe Accident Management Farley Nuclear Plant. Governor’s Preparedness Conference April 2014. Fukushima background. Fukushima background. Fukushima background. LESSON LEARNED. Beyond Design Basis Events can occur.

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BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENTS Lessons Learned from Fukushima

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  1. BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENTSLessons Learned from Fukushima David Hall Severe Accident Management Farley Nuclear Plant

  2. Governor’s Preparedness ConferenceApril 2014

  3. Fukushima background

  4. Fukushima background

  5. Fukushima background

  6. LESSON LEARNED Beyond Design Basis Events can occur

  7. It can happen here • Ft. Calhoun -- flooding of plant • 2011 flood inundation • North Anna -- seismic event • 2011 Loss of offsite power • Brown’s Ferry -- tornado • 2011 loss of offsite power • Surry -- tornado • 2011 tornado in switching station • Oyster Creek -- hurricane • 2012 loss of offsite power • Cooper -- flood • 2011

  8. Resulting Damage - Fukushima • Loss of emergency diesel generators • Extended loss of all AC power • Overheating of nuclear fuel • Hydrogen explosions • Ultimate loss of all six units

  9. LESSON LEARNED WE MUST BE PREPARED

  10. KEYOBJECTIVES • Keep fuel in the reactor vessel cool • Keep fuel in the spent fuel pool cool • Protect containment

  11. Regulatory Response Order to Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements For Mitigation Strategies For Beyond Design Basis External Events December 2016

  12. Industry Response to Fukushima

  13. FLEX • NEI 12-06 (Diverse and Flexible coping strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide) endorsed by the NRC Aug 2012 • Provides a diverse and flexible means to prevent fuel damage while maintaining containment function in beyond design basis external event

  14. FLEX Objective Establish an essentially indefinite coping capability by relying upon installed equipment, onsite portable equipment, and pre-staged offsite resources

  15. Three-Phase Approach • Following the event and prior to the time when portable equipment can be deployed, the plant must be able to maintain the key safety functions using installed equipment (Phase 1) • With adequate time and staffing, on-site portable equipment is deployed (Phase 2) • After 24 hours, off-site equipment can be deployed to sustain key safety functions indefinitely (Phase 3)

  16. On-Site Support • On-site resources must be sufficient to cope for the first 24 hours • Each site is required to have N+1 sets of FLEX equipment on-site to respond to the event • Other sites become a source of FLEX equipment for an effected site in such an event • Regional Response Center established to supply FLEX equipment to effected site

  17. Regional Response Centers

  18. Regional Response Center (RRC) Locations 1000 mile radius / 20 hours by truck

  19. Major Routes from Memphis SAFER NEI Meeting

  20. Regional Response Centers • The RRC will deliver the first piece of specified equipment to the effected site’s staging area within 24 hours of being notified • Delivery will be by air or ground depending on the distance of the site from the RRC • Equipment technicians will accompany the equipment to the site to assist with set up and deployment

  21. AL / FL / GA Agencies State & County EMA’spotential involvement • supporting movement of equipment • providing escorts • providing security • provide live traffic/ weather updates • provide interstate coordination and hand-offs • road clearing • assisting travel of site emergency responders Homeland Security and FEMA

  22. CLOSING THOUGHTS • Beyond Design Basis Events can and do happen! • While focus must remain strong on PREVENTION; we must implement actions to improve response capabilities and minimize challenges should an event occur! Fukushima OE - Comprehensive BDB event response guidance was not developed in advance, equipment was not pre-staged and readiness maintained, and personnel were not sufficiently trained to deal with Beyond Design Events – this significantly impacted event response

  23. BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENTSLessons Learned from Fukushima David Hall Severe Accident Management Farley Nuclear Plant

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