3: Animality , Rationality, and the Constitution of the Self

1. 3: Animality, Rationality, and the Constitution of the Self

2. Testing moral theories • 1) phenomenology of morality • Duty versus desire • 2) theories about morality • How do they hold up against this phenomenology of duty versus desire?

3. The moral experience: an alien will • When we relate external things to our need, we cannot do so without at the same time feeling ourselves bound and limited by a certain sensation; this sensation draws our attention to the fact that an alien will [einfremderWille] so to speak, is operative within ourselves, and that our own inclination needs external assent as its condition.

4. A secret power forces us to direct our will towards the well-being of others or regulate it in accordance with the will of another [nachfremderWillkűr], although this often happens contrary to our will [ungern] and in strong opposition to our selfish inclination. The focal point at which the lines which indicate the direction of our drives converge, is therefore not merely to be found within us; there are, in addition, other forces which move us and which are to be found in the will of others [in demWollenanderer] outside ourselves.

5. This is the source from which the moral impulses take their rise. These impulses often incline us to act against the dictates of self-interest. I refer to the strong law of obligation and the weaker law of benevolence. Each of these laws extort from us many a sacrifice, and although self-interested inclinations from time to time overrule them both, these two laws, nonetheless, never fail to assert their reality in human nature.

6. As a result, we recognise that, in our most secret motives, we are dependent upon the rule of the general will. It is this rule which confers upon the world of all thinking beings its moral unity and invests it with a systematic constitution, drawn up in accordance with purely spiritual laws.

7. Phenomenon and Noumenon • How explain this experience? • 1) our own will as sensuous individuals seeking to realize our own inclinations, desires, and interests • Here we see ourselves as separate individuals • 2) another will within us, connecting us to others • Here we see ourselves as connected to others • The first will: • phenomenal appearance, how things seem • He second will: • noumenal, how things really are

8. Knowing and believing • Recall Kant’s theory of knowledge • In science, we impose subjective categories on reality • And so we cannot know reality • But we can entertain beliefs that do not contradict science • Two beliefs of practical/moral life • We are free, not determined • We are connected to one another, despite our apparent separateness as individuals

9. Outline • 1 Other ethical theories: 3-24 • 2 Animality and rationality: 25-40 • 3 Maxims of action and moral law: 41-79

10. 1 Other Ethical Theories Aristotelian Natural Law Theory Social Contract Theory Utilitarian Theory

11. Feeling or Reason? • Hume’s argument that morality is a certain kind of disinterested feeling • Because cold (theoretical) reason does not move us • But morality does move us • Therefore morality must not be a matter of reasoning (as Hobbes argues), but of feeling

12. Kant’s response to Hume • But feelings (e.g., benevolence) are • 1) unreliable: • consider example of the benevolent person who helps others because of feelings • She then becomes preoccupied by her own problems • 2) produced by external causes outside our control. • It’s her nature that is causing the action. • If not feeling, then reason …

13. Reason-based ethical theories • 1) reason in pursuit of happiness • 1) Aristotle: natural law theory • 2) Hobbes/Rawls: social contract theory • 3) Bentham/Mill: utilitarian theory • 2) reason as pure reflection on the individual’s own will: Kant

14. Aristotle’s communitarian natural law theory • Morality is based on natural drives and inclinations of human beings for happiness • People are naturally social/political individuals, naturally cooperative • Individuals find their happiness in cooperative social-political activity • Including slaves and women whose natures require subordinate positions in society

15. Simulacrum of duty • Goal: (true) happiness • Short-term egotistical activity is counter to one’s inherent social nature: false happiness • Hence: One ought to subordinate illusory short-term desires to true long-term desires of one’s essential nature • This is not duty but a theory of rational self-interest (of a socially inclined self)

16. Two teleologies of nature • Aristotle: morality is based on natural teleology • Hence: “contraception is immoral” • Kant: teleology of nature presupposes morality • Nature aims to produce a being who is not dependent on nature • Morality first, and then nature: • what must nature be like to support morality? • Not: what must morality be given nature’s laws

17. Nature wants us to have the credit • “…just as if she [Nature] had willed that, if man ever did advance from the lowest barbarity to the highest skill and mental perfection and thereby worked himself up to happiness (so far as it is possible on earth), he alone should have the credit and should have only himself to thank—exactly as if she aimed more at his rational self-esteem than at his well-being.”

18. Kant cannot follow ancient/medieval theory • 0) Ancient teleological science of Aristotle • 1) Sun goes around the earth • 2) Slaves naturally serve masters • 1) Sciences of nature are now thoroughly mechanistic—not teleological • 2) Hence, morality must found any teleology of nature—as a supplement to mechanism of science • Two subjective ways of organizing data of experience • 3) Ideas of happiness are ultimately personal (modern individualism) • Not the expression of species drives

19. Social Contract theory of Hobbes • Humans are naturally egotistical, self-seeking individuals pursuing happiness each in his own way (= modern individualism) • > War of all against all, and life in the state of nature is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. • Morality is the science of fulfillment of the individual’s basic interests • =“sacred duty” … to myself! • > The equal freedom of each person before the law (enforced by the State) is in the self-interest of each • =Not duty but individual self-interest is basis of morality

20. Duty to kill preemptively • 1) Main “duty” of individual: my own survival and flourishing • 2) best way to survive and flourish: Golden Rule (when universally applied) • Golden Rule of egoism: I won’t kill you (rob you, lie to you, etc.) if you don’t kill me • 3) But if by following this Rule when others do not, I jeopardize my survival, then I violate my sacred duty to myself • 4) Hence, in such a circumstance, it is my “sacred duty” to myself to violate the Golden Rule

21. Role of the State • Morality (Golden Rule) is impotent without the State to enforce it • =>“Duty” to accept the laws of the State as framework for free egos seeking happiness each in his/her own individual ways • Laws apply equally, allow maximum liberty for each compatible with freedom for all • Contradicts “natural liberty” • Hence: State is not the fulfillment of human nature but an anti-natural force (v. Aristotle)

22. Ring of Gyges • Glaucon in Republic: Basis of “duty”: one’s own interests, happiness • When short-term interests require breaking the law, and he would not get caught, why should a natural egotist follow the law? • Hobbes’ reply: this is less of a problem with the existence of the State than without it. • Recall “Ring of Power” in Tolkien's Lord of the Rings • Plato and Kant side with Frodo • They reject the ring of power because it darkens and disfigures the soul of the person • Smeagol

23. Rawls’ contemporary version • 1) Veil of ignorance instead of state of nature • =a kind of Ring of Forgetfulness and Disempowerment • 2) Libertarian and egalitarian moral principles follow • Rawls recognizes that libertarian equality (of Hobbes) is formalistic, allows for great material inequality • Hence, an equality principle as well as a liberty principle: only so much inequality as serves the well-being of the poorest people

24. Rationality of the Action • We respect the liberty and promote the equality of others because this is our duty, not because of desires • Importance of: What is the source of duty? • Rationality of the action? Doesn’t this support Glaucon? • Kant’s noumenal source of duty v. phenomenal desires: An “alien will” that replaces our ordinary egotistical will • Rawls wants to “naturalize” Kant (eliminate phenomenon/noumenon metaphysics) • Hence: rationality of action for individuals in general, not for me in particular. How establish this? • Imagine that you don’t know your advantages or disadvantages: what would be rational to will as a universal law?

25. Circularity? • But why should oneact on the basis of the veil of ignorance? • Why the duty to submit oneself to this imaginary condition? • Circularity of argument • Rawls’ original position is supposed to found a system of duties • But it presupposes a duty to put ourselves in this state in the first place. How found that? • Also these duties are really grounded in self-interest (that of a person behind the veil of ignorance)

26. Utilitiarianism • Empiricist utilitiarianism (Bentham, Mill) v. rationalist/deductivist social contract theory • Rationally calculate the total amount of pleasure • I ought to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people • as determined by (instrumentalist) reason • calculation of pleasures

27. Duty in utilitarianism • Utilitarian theory: duty to promote the most satisfaction of desire • Re this act (act utilitarianism) • Re rule implicit in this act (rule utilitarianism: utilitarianism with a Kantian slant) • There a true duty for the individual to subordinate his own desires to satisfying the desires of others • But if duty, not desire, is primary, can the content of the duty be determined by the maximization of desire-satisfaction for the majority?

28. Utilitarian altruism • Paradox of utilitarianism: • I must do my duty, not follow my desire; • but what determines what is my duty specifically (content of duty) are the desires of others • My one vote versus 7 Billion others • = Morality is a hungry monster • = rampant altruism • We need a Bill of Rights to protect us from the possible tyranny of utilitarian democracy • These moral rights cannot be based on utilitarianism

29. Utilitarian egotism • 1) One should be willing to submit one’s desires and interests to what is right (=duty) • 2) But: What is right = action that produces the most pleasure or satisfaction for people • 3) Hence providing the maximum amount of pleasure for all individuals is basis of the “duty” of each individual • 4) Morality, what is right, approximates the statistical average of people’s desires/interests • 5) Hence, the duty for most people, most of the time, is the satisfaction of their own desires • = rampant egotism

30. Paradox of eudaimonist duty • “Duty” involves conflict between what is right and what is desired • But ultimately what is right is what is desired • 1) long term desire of social individual (Aristotle) • 2) self-interest of ego in competitive social world (Hobbes, Rawls) • 3) desires of the majority (Bentham, Mill) • Hence duty ultimately collapses into desire • Contrary to phenomenology of moral experience

31. 2 Animality and Rationality

32. Animal consciousness • Implicitly, animals act instinctively • species-specific determinations—inbuilt universals • But explicitly, “for” the animal, the motives are related to individual circumstances and desires – eat this food, chase this squirrel. • =perceptual consciousness, sensibility dominates • The world for the animal is unconsciously mediated by its species-specific structure

33. Human consciousness • “Reason” largely replaces instinctive species-specific frameworks of action with thought, ideas • =The individual consciously represents the species through universal ideas (replacing species instinct) • Rational human consciousness is explicit species consciousness for the individual • (Animal) perceptual consciousness, desire, is mediated by this rational conscious framework. • Hence “for” human consciousness there are two levels: individual-perceptual and universal-rational

34. Two levels of consciousness • 1) awareness of things as mediated by specific animal needs, desires (sensibility or perceptual consciousness) • 2) Awareness of this awareness via creation of ideal models of reality (rational consciousness) • Action on the basis of an ideal representation of the action • Practical reason represents first level desires through second level ideal (general or universal) models • The level 1 power of immediate desires is checked/overlaid by the power of level 2 rational consciousness

35. Power of reason: affirmed • All eudaimonistic theories assert that rational considerations (level 2) have practical effect in checking immediate desires (level 1) • Hence the “form” of rationality is a power over the supposed causal forces governing action • Violating determinism and phenomenal laws of the sciences • Implicit admission of noumenal status of the rational person

36. The power of reason: denied • But the “content” of reason is then said to be determined by desires, which then ultimately motivate the action • Reason is thereby reabsorbed by phenomenal forces and mechanism • Hume: reason as slave of the passions

37. Kant’s reply • Kant calls such reason impure practical reason, connected to the impure will governed ultimately by desires • But this is a pseudo-mechanism, since one must inevitably will such submission to heteronomous desires

38. Animals Live in the Now • For the individual animal, the concrete individual situation is primary (animals live “in the now”) • Animals act in the immediate situation based on specific instincts of their species • The cow looks avidly at the grass, not at the meat • The dog sniffs about for meat, not grass

39. The animals in their lair • Sleeping on full or empty stomachs • The past is essentially gone for them • It is replaced by “contingencies of reinforcement” (Skinner): a posteriori effects from the past determine present behavior • The animal acts on the basis of direct perceptions informed by • A priori species-based instincts • Contingencies of reinforcement (Skinner), “first-signal systems” (Pavlov)

40. Pavlov’s levels • 1) instinct arising out of natural selection • 2) first signal system: (Humean) associations with the above • Bell associated with food • A water hole associated with prey • 3) Human language: a “second signal system” • Mediates perception as a distinct object for consciousness, guiding action • Can be operated on consciously as an object with its own relative autonomy • e.g., substituting pizza for cream puffs

41. Hunters around the campfire • Talking about the day’s hunt • = representing past events now, in the present • Strangeness of this: what is now past is still present, what is not here, somehow nevertheless, is here • Recognizing patterns of behavior, accumulating experiences, comparing and contrasting them • Results in new patterns or models of action for the future, created by humans, operating a priori in the next hunt • Practical adjustments to experience within the dominant framework of the larger symbolic order • = human temporality (internally generated time structure of human thought and action)

42. Three ways of examining representations • 1) in terms of the feelings evoked • “amoralist” perspective of immediate (present tense) desires when this is absolutized • 2) in terms of maximizing future satisfactions based on past experience • “immoralist” perspective of rational interests, when absolutized • 3) in terms of internal structure of the representation itself (moral dimension)

43. Temporality of moral consciousness • Human action is mediated by conscious intention, representations, ideas to be realized in the future based on experiences from the past (practical rationality) • But even now, the ideas I intend to realize in the future have a general or universal nature • The concept of the action itself, expressed in language • Morality: reflect on implications of this second level, which constitutes our distinctive humanity

44. Social implications of lying • Lying requires that the individual • separate himself from the collectivity • and regard language as a personal instrument • Perhaps this is an impossible situation for individuals in intact primitive societies • But it is the common situation for modernity • Aristotle’s Greek society: in transition? • Lying is common, but “unnatural” • Hence the moral superiority of “savages” • Not because their desires are simple (Rousseau) • But because their social relations are “transparent”

45. 3 Maxims of action and morality

46. What is the intention? • 1) Desires, feelings + instrumental reasoning re means and consequences • 2) =>an intention • The intention is a consciously formulated goal with inherent universality • Between 1 and 2: a transformation from physical concreteness to abstract idea • thanks to practical human rationality

47. The deep structure of the will • 1) technical actions for the sake of realizing an end (technical-hypothetical imperatives) • 2) the end that is proposed by desire (pragmatic-hypothetical imperative)—ultimately, happiness • 3) implications of • a) the end that I will (concept of the action) and • b) the willing of that end (unity of my projects) • 4) higher level intentions from reflecting on 3): categorical imperatives

48. Pure practical reason? • 1) I want tea at 4 p.m. • why? It makes me happy. = Pragmatic Imperative • 2) I must boil water = Technical Imperative • 3) but boiling water is boring • 4) Allen Wood’s argument: So I must constrain my desire to do something else and act on the basis of pure practical reason, following the rational principle: he who wills the end, must also will the means • Like Rawls, Wood wants to naturalize Kant • And so avoid any “noumenal” dimension

49. Conflicting desires • It’s 4 p.m. so time for tea • I should boil water • But I remember: Oprah is having Sarah Palin, and if I boil water now, and forget it, I may burn my house down • 1) Wood’s position: I should constrain my desire to watch Oprah/Sarah because of a purely rational motive: he who wills the end, must, on pain of violating a law of reason, will the means • 2) I should watch Oprah because it’s more interesting than having tea.

50. Passion, not reason, motivates me • If I desire the end, that desire is what motivates me in boiling the water, not the rational principle that ends require means • Theoretical reason determines the means: having tea requires hot water • But this reason does not motivate me in boiling the water: my desire for tea is my motivation (not a principle of rationality) • Recall Hume: reason is cold