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Cognitive Abilities and Household Financial Decision Making. Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bhashkar Mazumder Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Background. Emerging literature documenting suboptimal financial decision-making by households
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Cognitive Abilities and Household Financial Decision Making SumitAgarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago BhashkarMazumder Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Background • Emerging literature documenting suboptimal financial decision-making by households • Payday loans: Agarwal et al. (2009a), Bertrand and Morse (2009) • Credit Cards: Agarwal et al. (2006) • Financial Markets: Korniotis and Kumar (2009a, 2009b) • Costs to individuals and society may be very large • Financial crisis had its roots in housing and mortgage defaults, and its plausible that poor financial decision making played a role. Crisis has focused attention on the societal costs of poor consumer decisions. • A wide range of potential effects on individual welfare: • Human Capital Investment in Children • Retirement • Consumer Debt, Bankruptcy, Foreclosure
Background • Financial decision-making requires ability to process and retain information, computational ability • Growing literature linking cognitive abilities to various aspects of financial behavior. (e.g. Frederick, 2005; Benjamin et al, 2006; Stango and Zinman, 2009; Grinblatt et al, 2009, McArdle et al. 2009, Gerardi et al, 2010) • Literature focuses on: • 1) aspects of information access or processing • 2) various forms of subjective biases
Related literature • “Household finance” (Campbell 2006) • “Shrouded Attributes” (Gabaix and Laibson 2006) • Personal finance: Bernatzi and Thaler (2002,7) • Korniotis and Kumar (2006): older adults manage their stock portfolio less well. Also, Zinman (2006) • Lusardi and Mitchell (2006,7): decline in knowledge of basic financial concepts • Differences in rationality / IQ across people: Frederick (2005), Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2006), Massoud, Saunders and Sholnick (2006) • Credit cards: Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu and Souleles (2007, 2009) • Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2009, 2010) • Mortgages: Agarwal, Driscoll, Laibson (2007) • Consumer Credit: Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2009, 2010)
Our Contributions • We directly link measures of cognitive ability to real-world examples of suboptimal behavior. • We use two very tightly defined examples of suboptimal behavior: • Balance Transfer Mistakes on Credit Cards • Home Price Estimation Mistakes on Home Equity Loans • Use ASVAB test scores from US Military • Extensively used and well validated
Preview of Results • We find that a 1 s.d. increase in cognitive ability is associated with: • A 24 pp. increase in implementing the optimal strategy after making a credit card balance transfer. • An 11 pp. reduction in mistakes on home equity applications • Virtually all of the effect operates through math ability and almost none through verbal ability. • Few other demographic or financial controls matter. • We show a similar pattern of results when using a measure of “patience” in NLSY. • We find math abilities matter for financial outcomes and non-math abilities matter for non-financial outcomes using HRS
Balance Transfer Mistakes • Customers are offered an opportunity to transfer existing balances from a previous credit card (card A) to a new card (card B), with a low teaser rate.
Balance Transfer Mistakes • The Catch: It is optimal to make new purchases only on card A (and NOT on card B), if: • You have transferred the entire balance from Card A • You only make “convenience” transactions going forward(i.e. you pay off the full amount of new purchases within the grace period) • Under these conditions there are no interest charges with purchases made on card A but there are interest charges on purchases made with card B
Balance Transfer Mistakes • A third of customers recognize this immediately, about a third learn this within 6 months. • We call this a “Eureka moment” (Agarwal et al 2009) • Construct a dependent variable, eureka = 0 if you never learn the optimal behavior, eureka = 1 if you learn within 6 months. • We also run models on: • learning this immediately • the time it takes to reach the Eureka moment.
Home Price Estimation • On home equity loans and lines of credit applications you are asked to estimate the value of your home.
Home Price Estimation • This is used to calculate an estimated loan to value ratio (LTV). e.g. LTV =.80 for a loan of $80K on a home value estimated at $100K. • The bank independently estimates the value of your home. You are penalized for “mis-estimating” your home value if it puts you in a different LTV bin.Example 1: your estimate is $120K, the bank estimate is $100K. The bank LTV is 0.80 but your estimate is 0.67 => The bank goes off the schedule and charges you an even higher APR than the 0.80 Example 2: your estimate is $80,000, the bank estimate is $100K. The bank LTV is 0.80 but your estimate is 1 => The bank charges you based on your estimated LTV of 1.
Home Price Estimation • We construct an outcome called “Rate Changing Mistake” or RCM if you are penalized for mis-estimation. • Approximately 13 percent have an RCM.
Data We combine data from three large samples: • All 1993 Active Duty Military Personnel • Demographics and Armed Services and Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores • Start with 1.4 million individuals • Credit Card data from a large retail financial institution • 14,000 given balance transfer offers • Home Equity Loan/Lines data from a large retail financial institution • 1.4 million contracts
Data Merge Military Data to Each Financial Dataset to form 2 subsamples: • Credit Card Sample • Individuals with non-missing and valid scores and who fit “eureka” requirements (e.g. make only convenience purchases during a 6 month window) • N=540 • Home Equity Borrower Sample • Individuals with non-missing and valid scores and non missing borrower data • N = 1393
ASVAB Scores • Used by military as screening tool and to assess trainability and assign occupations • Widely used and extensively validatede.g. National Academy of Sciences study (Wigdor and Green, 1991) • Predicts many economic outcomes e.g. schooling, college enrollment, wages, risky/illegal behavior, financial market participation, discount rates • Contains composite score “AFQT”, and 10 subtests(numerical oper., word knowledge, arith. reasoning, math knowledge, electronics info., mechanical comp., general science, paragraph comp., coding speed and automotive and shop) • We convert into standard deviation units
Credit Card Results Summary • Large and consistent effect of composite AFQT score, 1 s.d. increase associated with a 24% increase in eureka moments • Only math components matter! Verbal has zero effect suggesting limited scope for omitted variable bias. • Of financial controls, only “behavior” score matters. This is expected since it captures usage and payment behavior • Of demographic controls, black is insignificant. Those married (during military service) less likely to optimize behavior. Effect not significant when we enter subtests separately. • Two thirds of effects is due to immediate adoption (0.18). Monotonic decline in AFQT scores by months to adoption.
Home Equity Results Summary • A one s.d. increase in AFQT associated with a 10% decrease in rate changing mistakes (RCM). About 70% effect size. • Math components are dominant . Here “word knowledge” matters but much less than math.. • RCMs are more common in loans than lines of credit. Higher APRs and debt/income ratios also associated with RCMs. • Blacks are less likely to have RCMS conditional on AFQT, women slightly more likely.
Robustness Checks • Effects are unchanged when we include the other 6 subtests of the ASVAB (Table 3) • Coding speed, a test of numerical pattern recognition affects balance transfer mistakes but not RCM. • Numerical operations matter for RCM but not “Eureka” • Results are unaffected if sample is limited to whites or use state or zipcode fixed effects
Is Cognitive Ability Related to Patience? • One possible mechanism is through greater patience • Warner and Pleater (AER, 2001) found higher AFQT associated with lower discount ratesThey exploit a real-world experiment where US military personnel were offered either a lump-sum payment at separation or an annuity • We explore using NLSY survey question • NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample tracking 14-21 year olds in 1979. Was used to norm the AFQT. Can use family fixed effects. • In 2006 respondents asked how much they’d need to be compensated in a month in order to forego a $1000 prize today.“Suppose you have won a prize of $1000, which you can claim immediately. However, you can choose to wait one month to claim the prize. If you do wait, you will receive more than $1000. What is the smallest amount of money in addition to the $1000 you would have to receive one month from now to convince you to wait rather than claim the prize now?
NLSY Patience Results Summary • Results imply that a 1 s.d. increase in AFQT is associated with a 4 to 5 percent decline in the one month discount rate • Effect of education is much smaller – 4 years of schooling reduces discount rate by only 0.8 percent. • Effect mostly due to arithmetic reasoning. • Results are robust to controls for earnings, family background, and family fixed effects. • Reassuring that a similar pattern of results to our credit card/home equity results are obtained with a nationally representative sample
What About Non-Financial Outcomes? • What if math scores simply capture unobservable characteristics associated with sub-optimal behavior even outside of financial decision making? • We use data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to estimate the effects of mathematical and non-mathematical aspects of cognitive ability on other forms of suboptimal behavior. • Data on wealth, income, and many other demographics on 50+ year olds • Cognitive ability measures include word recall, mental status, number series, retrieval fluency and numeracy. • Other measures of suboptimal behavior include difficulties with: reading a map; buying groceries; taking medication; making a phone call; preparing a meal and managing money.
What About Non-Financial Outcomes? • We follow McArdle et al (2009) who use these cognitive measures to estimate effects on wealth, financial wealth and stock market participation • We first replicate their results and then compare the results to those using non-financial outcomes
Summary of Results from HRS • Each additional math question (out of 3) answered correctly is associated with an increase in total wealth of $100,000 and financial wealth of $66,000. • For outcomes that require the least amount of mathematical aptitude, numeracy is never statistically significant and in some cases the point estimates are 0 or negative. • We do find that numeracy has a huge effect on “managing money”. • Numeracy also has a significant effect on reading a map, which arguably requires some quantitative skills.
Concluding Thoughts • We make an important empirical contribution by directly linking cognitive ability to very tightly defined examples of suboptimal financial behavior. • Our effect sizes are very large but one may question their larger policy significance • We deliberately chose outcomes that are narrowly defined to make stronger causal claims • We think our results are just the tip of the iceberg. Effects are likely on a range of outcomes like defaults, foreclosures and bankruptcy • Gerardi et al (2010) link cognitive ability to foreclosures. Our HRS results find large effects on wealth
Concluding Thoughts • Results are highly relevant for efforts to improve financial literacy • ASVAB scores are not measuring just “innate ability” • Growing evidence that military test scores are be influenced by other factors --education, experience, early life health, school quality.(Neal and Johnson 1996; Hansen, Heckman and Mullen, 2004; Cascio and Lewis 2006; Chay, Guryan and Mazumder, 2009; Aaronson and Mazumder, 2010)
(1,2) Home Equity Loans and Home Equity Credit Lines • Proprietary data from large financial institutions • 75,000 contracts for home equity loans and lines of credit, from March-December 2002 • We observe: • Contract terms: APR and loan amount • Borrower demographic information: age, employment status, years on the job, home tenure, home state location • Borrower financial information: income, debt-to-income ratio • Borrower risk characteristics: FICO (credit) score, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
Home Equity Regressions • We regress APRs for home equity loans and credit lines on: • Risk controls: FICO score and Loan to Value (LTV) • Financial controls: Income and debt-to-income ratio • Demographic controls: state dummies, home tenure, employment status • Age spline: piecewise linear function of borrower age with knots at age 30, 40, 50, 60 and 70. • Next slide plots fitted values on age splines
What is the Channel for the Age Effect? • Banks offer different APRs when the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is: • less than 80 percent • between 80 and 90 percent • over 90 percent • Borrowers estimate their LTV by estimating their house value • Banks form their own LTV estimates • “Rate-Changing Mistake”: when borrower and bank LTVs straddle two of these categories • for example, borrower LTV<80, bank LTV >90.
Rate Changing Mistakes generate two sources of disadvantage for the customer: • If I underestimate my LTV (Loan-to-Value ratio), the bank can penalize me by deviating from its normal offer sheet. • If I overestimate my LTV (i.e., underestimate the value of my house), the bank will penalize me by not correcting my mistake and allowing me to borrow at too high a rate.
A Rate-Changing Mistake costs 125 to 150 basis points. • Next slides plot: • Probability of making a Rate-Changing Mistake by age • APRs for borrowers who do NOT make a Rate-Changing Mistake