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Comparing Remote Electronic Voting and Postal Voting: Challenges and Innovations

This study analyzes the shared problems and risks associated with remote electronic voting (e-voting) compared to traditional postal voting. It explores various aspects, including vote casting in private environments, security concerns, family voting risks, and the implications of voter identification. The research includes a case study of a multiple-channel election, comparing e-voting and postal methods while assessing technology, outcomes, and security criteria. The findings emphasize the importance of maintaining equal security levels across voting channels and offer a criteria catalogue for evaluating e-voting projects.

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Comparing Remote Electronic Voting and Postal Voting: Challenges and Innovations

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  1. Bits or Paper? eGov 2005, Dexa Robert Krimmer Melanie Volkamer Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien DFKI Saarbrücken Comparing Remote Electronic Voting to Postal Voting

  2. Overview • Comparing Remote Electronic Voting to Postal Voting • Shared Problems and Risks of Remote Voting • Criteria Catalogue • Case Study of an election with multiple channels • Project Overview • Technology • Conclusion

  3. Forms of Voting

  4. Shared Problems and Risksof Remote Voting • Vote casting in a private surrounding • no control of a local election committee • voter is in charge to guarantee these principles. • Vote casting process can be under surveillance • secret vote in danger • Family voting (vote coercion) and vote buying • free vote in danger • Anyone in possess of the identification material can vote instead of the voter • personal vote in danger

  5. Our Model • Comparative studies of e-Participation and e-Voting efforts found that context matters: • Braun, Prosser & Krimmer 2003 • Leenes & Svensson 2003 • Macintosh 2003 • Kersting 2004 • Four dimensions framethe e-Voting deployment Technology Law Society Politics

  6. Criteria Catalogue • The development of the criteria catalogue to make e-voting projects comparable • Three parts: (1) Project Overview, (2) Project Technology (3) Project Outcome (1) Project Overview (2) Project Technology (3) Project Outcome

  7. Case Study – Project Overview • The GI’s chairman election 2004(Gesellschaft für Informatik) • Multiple channel approach: e-Voting / postal voting • Legally binding (articles for voting allows e-voting) • Requirement: Same level of security for each channel • 20.395 eligible voters (4.845 e-vote, 81 postal vote) • Used System: POLYAS from Micromata • Election letter (information, covered TAN code)

  8. Technology – Postal Voting • General election • Additional request for postal voting material • Mail delivery rate 97,1 - 99% • Secret election • Two different envelops • Free/secret vote casting • Personal signature • Equal vote casting • Only one election letter is sent to each voter • Voter ID is transmitted with the ballot

  9. Technology – e-Voting • Web application • All common browsers are supported • Identification: PIN/TAN • Two-Server-Architecture • System examination • By security and elections experts • Source code, specification, and documentation (partially) electoral server box server token, ballot token PIN/ TAN ACK

  10. e-Voting Security • General mechanisms • 4-eyes-principal (of Micromata), system log • Secure data processing service center • Equal vote casting • Continuous hash codes for incoming ballots • General vote casting • Redundant servers • Long voting period • Secret vote casting • Usage of pseudonyms/tokens • Encrypted Communication Problem: Client Security

  11. Conclusion • Criteria catalogue for multi-channel election • Both channels share common problems  Secret / free / personal vote casting • Different problems • Postal voting: Mail delivery rate • E-Voting Client Security Different Channels, Different Problems

  12. Mag. Robert Krimmer Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien robert@krimmer.at www.robert.krimmer.at Dipl. Inf. Melanie Volkamer DFKI Saarbrücken volkamer@dfki.de www.dfki.de Contact

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