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This seminar from Purdue University explores a novel method for tracking attack provenance in execution environments. Titled "High Accuracy Attack Provenance via Binary-based Execution Partition," it presents the implementation and evaluation of a framework aimed at uncovering the origins of security breaches. Through detailed case studies, including user behavior analysis during an attack and potential information theft scenarios, the seminar highlights both the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the proposed approach, emphasizing the necessity of user involvement and the challenges posed by obfuscated binaries.
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20th NDSS (February, 2013) High Accuracy Attack Provenance via Binary-based Execution Partition KyuHyung Lee XiangyuZhang DongyanXu Department of Computer Science and CERIAS, Purdue University
See Author Slide for Some Pages • Author Slide • http://www.internetsociety.org/doc/high-accuracy-attack-provenance-binary-based-execution-partition A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Outline • Introduction • Discovery Units and Unit Dependences • Implementation and Evaluation • Case Study • Discussion A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Introduction • Author slide: page 1-32 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
11 Web sites and 14 Emails in 29 Minutes Linux Audit Log BEEP A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Discovery Units and Unit Dependences • Author slide: page 33-59 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
An Experiment A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Implementation and Evaluation • Author slide: page 60-71 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Evaluation (cont.) • Training Overhead: 10x-200x • The average causal graph of 100 files (a user for 24 hours) A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Training Coverage • #1: the universal training set • #2: 30%-50% of #1 • #3: 30%-50% of #2 • Result: the training run coverage has little effect on BEEP A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Case Study: Attack Ramifications • A user used a system for 24 hours • At 13th hour, an attacker did something: • He used port scanning and find a ftp service, Proftpd • He compromised Proftpdand create a root shell • He used the shell to install a backdoor and to modify .bash_history • After 24 hours, user find the backdoor • Using the causal graph, he finds the root shell is the source • User wants to find what the root shell did. A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Case Study: Attack Ramifications (cont.) A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Case Study: Information Theft • An employee executes vim editor and opens three secret files (secret_1, secret_2and secret_3) and two other html files(index.html and secret.html) on a server in his company. • He copies secret information from secret_1 file and pastes it to secret.html file. • He modifies the index.htmlfile to generate a link to the secret.html file. • Now, company found some information is leaked. • We want to know what is leaked. A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Case Study: Information Theft (cont.) A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Discussion • BEEP is vulnerable to kernel level attacks. • A remote attacker may intrude the system via some non-kernel level attacks and acquire the privileges to tamper with the binaries instrumented by BEEP. • A legal user of the system with BEEP installed may try to confuse BEEP. • BEEP still requires user involvement. • BEEP is not capable of processing obfuscated binaries due to the difficulty of binary instrumentation. A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab
Q & A A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab