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A.K.DAS Project Director, Mumbai Monorail Project

A.K.DAS Project Director, Mumbai Monorail Project. PROFESSIONAL: Fellow Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, UK Fellow Institution of Permanent Way (Track) Engineers, Malaysia Fellow Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, India

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A.K.DAS Project Director, Mumbai Monorail Project

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  1. A.K.DAS Project Director, Mumbai Monorail Project • PROFESSIONAL: • Fellow Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, UK • Fellow Institution of Permanent Way (Track) Engineers, Malaysia • Fellow Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, India • Fellow Institution of Electronics and Telecommunication Engineers, India • Fellow Institution of Engineers, India • CAREER: • More Than 45 Years in Railway Industries including Indian Railways, Malaysian Railways, Iraq Railways, Taiwan High Speed Railways, Mumbai Metro and Mumbai Monorail Projects.

  2. Monorail Security System Safety System Operation Aspects A.K Das, Project Director, Monorail Project, Mumbai, India.

  3. Security System

  4. Not enough allocation on safety issues (till an incident occurs) • Poor judgment during awarding contracts to cheapest bidders • Going for untried systems either for low cost or in the names of upgradation. • Hurriness to meet Targets dates. Big mistakes takes place during this stage. (Deviations are accepted to some how commission the systems) • Not fixing individual responsibilities from beginning • Inadequate 3rdparty monitoring. Pressure/influence on them to compromise. • The Common Errors: • Security Systems

  5. Threat perceptions have increased many-fold in recent times in Metro cities. • Crowded transport systems have become easy targets. • It is an illusion to ensure a zero-risk system • General : Threats • Security Systems

  6. 1995 : Tokyo Metro (Sarin Gas) – 12 Killed, 1000 injured • 2004 : Madrid Metro (Train bombings) – 191 Killed, 1800 injured • 2004 : Moscow Metro (Subway bombing) – 41 Killed, many injured • 2005 : London Metro (Suicide bombing) – 52 Killed, 700 injured • 2006 : Mumbai Train Bombings – 209 Killed, 700 injured • Major Terror Attacks on some Metros • Security Systems

  7. Fire • Natural Calamities • Bomb Threats • Hazards – Unforeseen • Security System

  8. Terrorist acts, Human Bombs, Sabotage • Public Brawls, Crimes • Simple thefts • Loitering (Drugs, Pimps, Beggars, Soiling etc.) • Stampede • Normal Security Hazards • Security System

  9. Well-structured Organization • Crisp Line-of-Command • Thorough training including Fire fighting, First aid, Crowd Control, Public relations etc. • Fluid communication (Fire brigade, Hospitals, Police, Army, local First Aid etc.) • Mitigations- Human Resources Related • Security System

  10. CCTV in general: • Type, Quality, Range • Recording in extreme low-light, • Recognition of faces, • 30 days recording memory • 100% coverage • CCTV in Trains: • Must where threat perception is high • Artificial Intelligence • To identify abandoned baggage, cars etc. • Mitigations using: Technical Gadgets • Security System

  11. Live Video Transmission from Train: Wi-Fi / Wi-Max technologies • Locating incidents in 3D layouts of stations directly from OCC • Access Control: Prevent un-authorized entries, linking the incident with PTZ Cameras • Mitigations using: Technical Gadgets • Security System

  12. Intrusion Control; • Infrared coverage linked to Cameras • Shock detection at fences • Remote control locking of vital installations. • Smoke/Fire detection, (linked to CCTV with auto warning) • Video walls • Help Points in Trains and Platforms • Emergency Stop Plungers on platforms • Mitigations using: Technical Gadgets • Security System Fire Detection system Video Wall Panel

  13. Mitigations using: Technical Gadgets • Security System Hand Held Metal Detectors Doorframe Metal Detectors X-ray Baggage Scanners (including explosive detection)

  14. In spite of all precautions safety and security related incidents do occur. • At that stage, what matters is calmness, well drilled procedures, orderliness of tacking the situation. • Sometimes these may be mid-station evacuations which is the riskiest. • This is the time when the efficiency of the system is determined • Incident Response • Security System Evacuation using Cherry Pickers Evacuation by Scissor Lift Train to Train Evacuation

  15. Safety System

  16. The common occurrences: • Platform Gaps • Collision • Derailment • Breakdowns • Fire • Bomb threats • Miscreant activities • Mitigations • Normally taken care at design and installation stage. • In spite of these incidents do happen. • So the aim is to bring these to minimum and act in a planned manner if it ever occurs • Safety of Passengers is Paramount: • Safety systems Platform Gap Breakdown Train

  17. Common Occurrences (Happenings both during construction and Operation Phase also) • Falling from Heights • Collisions • Short Circuits • Types of Hazards: • Safety Systems Short Circuit

  18. Depends on: • Signalling • Rolling Stock • Guideway Beam • Human Error • Each is an involved subject can not be handled in the brief time . • The First 3 are taken care during Design and Installation. • As regards Human error, it is a Continuous effort and can never be eliminated • Safety in Train Operation • Safety Systems Signalling Failure

  19. Operational System

  20. Narrow air space for ‘Right-of-Way’ • Smaller size & Light Structure • Minimize land-use & save cost • Least disruptive to road traffic • Quieter – Use of rubber wheels • Why Monorail ? • Operational Systems Sharp Radius – 50 m Steep Gradient - 6%

  21. Train with Rubber tyres on Concrete Beam. • No normal Track circuits (essential to safety) to detect train vacancy • Automatic Train Protection Systems (ATP) • Modern technology using AFO or CBTC Signalling system • Choice of Manual, Semi-Automatic or Fully Automatic Drive. • Centralized Control System with facility to go for Local Control. • Beam Switches. • Platform Screen Doors • Auto Fare Collection System • Real time Passenger Information System • Redundancy at all stages (almost) for very high reliability • Emergency Help Points and Stop Plungers. • Fool proof evacuation systems • Unique Features • Operational System

  22. Monorail Operation Includes • Train Operations • OCC Operations • Station Operations • Operation: • Operational Systems Operation Control Center (OCC)

  23. Planning of Revenue Services • Safety in Train Operations • Economy and Efficiency in train Running • Functions • Operational Systems Passive Beacon Cable Wiring Active Beacon AFO Audio Frequency Overlay (AFO) • Automatic Train Protection Systems

  24. Overall Train Control, Signalling, SCADA • Emergency situations • Monitors and directs the operation • Control Train Schedules • Monitors Traction power and other operational resources • Keeps eye on failures and emergencies • Operation Control Centre (The Nerve Center) • Operational Systems Operation Control Centre

  25. CCTV surveillance by Operation control Centre • Activation of Emergency stop plungers/Help Points at the Platform/Train • Fire Alarms and SCADA Alarms • Emergency info from Train captain and Station controllers • Emergency Response Plan • Operational Systems Help Point Emergency stop plungers

  26. Maintenance Facilities for Guideway Beam • Operational Systems • Operational System • Traversers : Work Car Rests. • Work Cars : Maintenance Vehicles Traverser Traverser Direction of Movement Work Car

  27. Maintenance Facilities in Depot • Operational Systems • Operational System Stringer Arrangement (Power Supply) Train wash Plant

  28. Curious onlookers often fall from platform edge while looking for train. The depth of fall being high in Monorail, It is risky. • As such, Platform screen doors are must where the crowds are sizeable. • It can be simple doors, can be radio-linked with the train or interlocked with signaling • The Train doors align with Platform Screen Doors before the doors can be opened • Platform Screen Doors • Operational System • Operational System

  29. Switching System for Rolling Stock on Mainline • Operational System • An Unique system where the whole structure moves for change of track Beam Switches

  30. Thank You

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