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Red Teaming and Peace Gaming Competitive Analysis at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Red Teaming and Peace Gaming Competitive Analysis at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Alex Ihde Tel (USA): 443-778-4122 E-mail: alex.ihde@jhuapl.edu. Twenty Eighth International Symposium on Military Operational Research (28 ISMOR). Competitive Analysis.

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Red Teaming and Peace Gaming Competitive Analysis at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

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  1. Red Teaming and Peace GamingCompetitive Analysis at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Alex Ihde Tel (USA): 443-778-4122 E-mail: alex.ihde@jhuapl.edu Twenty Eighth International Symposium on Military Operational Research (28 ISMOR)

  2. Competitive Analysis • What is Competitive Analysis? • Assessment through placing subject matter experts in a game with conflicting objectives, such as in simulation or seminar wargaming • Excellent for initial survey of a topic, concept exploration, scenario and course of action development • Poor for system comparison, course of action analysis • What sort of answers does it produce? • Innovation • Identification of strengths and weaknesses • Likely patterns of behavior • How is it accomplished? • Analytical tools are somewhat different from traditional operations research: prescribed courses of action, assembled comments, survey responses • Difficult to reproduce

  3. Green Country ModelDynamic, stochastic, multi-sided turn-based competitive influence computer game • Scenario– gives background and objectives • Actors - Players represent international actors: U.S. Joint Task Force, Sinaloa or Zetas drug cartels, Governments of Mexico, Central America • Non-playeractors (NPAs): local (regional) leaders and populations • Resources- (DIMEFIL) points spent to take actions • Characteristics - Hubris & Influence affect cooperation from NPAs • Regions– Game map represents distinct areas, which have scores for their Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information & Infrastructure • Facilities - ‘improvements’ on map: enablers, resource bonuses • Affinity - Represent how NPAs feel about all actors (+3 to -3 score) • Economics - Represents level of trade between actors (0 to 10) • Actions • Exercise instruments of national power • Choose location, target • Influenced by local conditions, actor/target, NPAs • Affect changes: regions, resources, affinities

  4. Green Country Model - Main Screen

  5. Game Decisions • What kind of decisions are made? • Which actions to take, to what degree, and in what manner • With whom to ally, cooperate • Where to take actions • What drives the decisions? • Availability of resources • Strategy, projected efficacy of actions • Cooperation of local/regional actors • What is learned from the outcomes? • Stochastic element varies results • Unintended consequences • Potential second-order effects

  6. Competitive Influence GameUnited States Northern Command • U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group • Provides observation, analysis, training and advisory support to Army and Joint force units in order to enhance their abilities to predict, mitigate, counter and defeat asymmetric threats and methods. • Examined U.S. Northern Command’s strategy against the influence of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), or Mexican drug cartels • Players • Subject matter experts invited to play Governments, Cartels • USNORTHCOM staff • Facilitated by AWG and Johns Hopkins staff • Challenges within the game • Players look after their own interests • Unconstrained approaches • Limited intelligence • Local resistance • Other challenges • Planning cycle • Interpretation of player intent • Game responses

  7. NORTHCOM Competitive Influence GameTransnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) Scenario • Scenario Outline • Drug cartels (TCOs) end the drug war in Mexico, but allow it to continue in areas of Central America (territory, supply routes) • Violent inter-cartel warfare in the Central American States (CAS) causes social breakdown • Government of CAS is dominated by the Sinaloa Cartel. Laws favor cartel operations • CAS economy is in disarray. With foreign investment waning, CAS president reaches out to Venezuela for economic cooperation • Due to a change in national law, Mexican government must now obtain local permission to act in its own borders. This makes local governments the focus of pressure from the cartels. • Overview of Game Conduct • US strategy focuses on engagement with local governments • Encourages Mexico to act against cartels Supports with intelligence & training • Humanitarian assistance and training in CAS • Cartels seek maximum profits. Secure own territory and fight for CAS • Seeking to reduce violence at all costs, Mexico negotiates with TCOs • CAS seeks economic stimulus through cooperation with other actors

  8. Objective 1 Support USG efforts by providing training, materiel, and operational support to Mexican security forces to enable their efforts to disrupt TCOs through their conduct of Intel-driven operations that target the full range of TCO vulnerabilities while respecting human rights and the rule of law • Assessment Rationale: • TCO’s operated with freedom of movement • US provided limited training for both military and law enforcement in Mexico and Central American States • Primary US focus in Regions 4 & 5 Baseline

  9. Objective 2 Provide security capabilities to assist efforts to reduce illicit trafficking and disrupt the ability of TCOs to operate in the US-Mexico border region • Assessment Rationale: • No significant effort undertaken or required to maintain Region 1 law enforcement capability (no change over campaign) • Zeta’s focused effort on maintaining their own territory and damaging Sinaloa interests in CAS • Sinaloa maintained control of regions allowing freedom of movement across Mexico toward US-Mexico border • CAS overtly approached TCOs to trade freedom of movement in exchange for reduction in violence

  10. Objective 3 Disrupted, degraded, defeated TCOs • Assessment Rationale: • No real impact on TCO military capability (no change over time) • No action by US to influence Government of Mexico to take kinetic action against TCO military • Central American States was unwilling to seek or receive help against the TCO military early. Later US was unwilling to provide direct kinetic action • Avoidance of violence lead to improved economic and social measures

  11. Overall AssessmentPerformance vs U.S. Objectives 31 2 6 6

  12. Command InsightsSome lessons learned from the game’s outcome The US Northern Command staff members came away with the following insights as a result of interacting with the model • Violence as a metric drove strategic decisions for the US, Mexico and Central American States cells. • Multiple factors came into play that challenged their strategic assumption of Govt. of Mexico (GoM) resolve: TCO compromises resulting in reduced violence and GoM desire to focus on economic recovery that was facilitated by a reduction in violence.  • The introduction of outside players (China, Venezuela and non-state actors) created an additional layer of complexity that was not considered during initial analysis. • Partner nation economic interests became a key friendly vulnerability exploited by state and non-state actors that marginalized US strategic interests within the region. • Divergent national interests between US and GoM may require strategic reassessment. Command branch plan possibility: potential shift of security priorities from MEX to US/MEX Border. FY08 IR&D

  13. Red Teaming at APLIntroduction • What is Red Teaming? Examining something for its vulnerabilities through a structured, competitive, stressful environment • Application: how can it be used? • Initial survey, concept exploration, scenario and course of action development • First step in Zwicky / General Morphological Analysis: identify and populate categories for later examination • Why are we doing it? • Rapid Reaction Technology Office mission • Examination of new technology, quick-turn identification • Vulnerabilities • Likely countermeasures • Counter-countermeasures • Alternate uses

  14. APL Red Teaming Concept • Model and plan for adversary reactions to rapid acquisitions • Competitive analysis places subject matter experts in opposition to one another in order to counter advances made by their opponents. Decisions are then analyzed for applicability and utility according to predetermined metrics • Traditional (Threat) Red Teaming examines likely responses by enemy forces to emerging Blue capabilities, doctrines, or courses of action • Technical Red Teaming examines challenges related to technology and explores the possible adaptations made to technical limitations related to a new system or adaptation • Within all Red Teaming, the initial response is only the beginning. Counter-countermeasures may mitigate initial challenges and should be explored, though this may produce many potential ‘branches.’ The structure of the problem lends itself well to wargaming. Lookouts ISR CONOPS CONOPS Shaped charge Larger Bombs D freq Under belly CWIED ISR +power Armor CREW RCIED

  15. Red-Teaming WorkshopMethod of evaluating an airborne sensor • Three scenarios • Challenging operating environments • Potential system targets and missions • Progressive release of information • Begin in beak-out groups • Red teams presented with mission • Initially sequestered • Charged with developing course of action based on locally available information only. Courses adjudicated, appropriate feedback provided. “Break the system!” • Follow-on scenarios allow building of knowledge • Plenary session: Complete system brief provided • Collaborative approach to development of countermeasures • Open discussion of potential system weaknesses with design team, other technical experts. Group brainstorms alternative applications.. • Surveys administered

  16. StaffingExperts Supporting the Event BLUE CELL Seminar leadership Technical experts Operational Experts • Red Cell • Operational experts – familiar with threat (e.g., narcotics traffickers, insurgent groups) CONOPS and capabilities • Early career staff – scientists and engineers with a reputation for thinking “outside the box” • Recorder/Analysts – capture Red cell deliberations for analysis • Blue Cell • Operational experts – familiar with U.S. CONOPS • Appropriate system employment • Appropriate reaction by U.S. forces in scenario • Technology experts • System design and capabilities • Environmental impacts • Applications of technology RED CELL Threat Behavior Experienced operators with understanding of threat / target behavior patterns RED CELL Innovation Bright, young staff. Fresh perspective, out-of-the-box thinkers. Each Red cell will be supported by threat and technical experts, and a recorder / analyst.

  17. First and Second ScenariosPhilippine Jungle Camp; Afghan Mountain Village • Abu Sayyaf group • Foliage cover hides from overhead imagery • Protect campsite, maintain hostages and equipment • Taliban • Use of caves and caches • Manufacture explosives for use in IEDs • Both scenarios • Limited information • Rumors, reports from nearby insurgent groups • No hints given to enhanced Blue capability • Low technology and resources • Emphasis on concealment methods • High threat area for Red • Frequent overflight of Blue aircraft • Increased patrols by Blue forces • Word of imminent Blue attack

  18. Third ScenarioConcealed Narcotics Processing Laboratory • Central Mexico • Mountain facility • High technology, abundant resources • Technological countermeasures encouraged • Offensive strategies • Concealment methods • Manufacture of narcotics for shipment • Warfare environment for red players • Infrequent contact with authorities • Local authorities bribed. Tipoff provided that attack is imminent. • Liberal information • Detailed information on schedule, deployment of U.S. sensor • Missions • Survival • Preservation of explosives manufacturing capability

  19. Final Plenary SessionMethods of Analysis and Data Collection • Discussion of system capabilities and limitations • Recorder / analyst captures oral discussion • Group Systems software employed to capture written comments • Permits shy or junior members to have their comments recorded • Both files reviewed to ensure all points are represented • For identified countermeasures: counter-countermeasures or other mitigation strategies are discussed • Example: IED technology war diagram • Brainstorming • Alternate Usage Discussion • Led by technology expert • Captured oral commentary • How else may the system be employed? • Final survey administered • Demographics information: experience, background of attendees • Opinions regarding identified vulnerabilities. Free comments.

  20. Results • Attendee opinions captured in exit survey • Demographics identify respondent experience • Survey asked “to what degree is this limitation important to the military utility of the system?” • In the graph at right, more experienced members considered it of higher importance than junior members • No attendees considered the vulnerability critical • Sample alternate uses • Search and rescue • Identification of narcotics caches • Member opinions captured • Countermeasures identified during Course of Action development • Counter-countermeasures discussed • Other potential system vulnerabilities discussed

  21. Questions

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