How Rational is Ahmadinejad?

1. How Rational is Ahmadinejad? Alex Mintz Dean Lauder School of Government IDC Presented at the Herzliya Conference, January 2008

2. The Research Project • In this project, our team analyzes every decision taken by the Iranian leadership. • The goal is to try find a cognitive “finger print”, or a pattern of decision making. • This will enable us to attempt predict decisions, responses and counter-responses by the Iranian leadership.

3. Decision Making by the Iranian Leadership Due to the number of actors involved in making decisions in Iran it is a difficult, yet fascinating project as the dynamics of decision making in Iran are indeed complicated.

4. Types of Decisions Analyzed • Nuclear Program Decisions • Military Decisions • Rhetorical Decisions • Domestic Decisions • International Decisions

5. The Decision Making of the Adversary Project at the Lauder School at IDC The project is being conducted at the Program on Applied Decision Analysis (PADA) at the IDC with Alex Fiedler, Ronit Liberman, and Eduadro Missri serving as research assistants.

6. Project (cont’d) • The project utilizes the Applied Decision Analysis procedure which I have developed while teaching at Yale University. • We try to uncover a pattern of decision making via an analysis of multiple (30-40) decisions, by examining specific Decision Rules—mathematically derived rules imported into a decision software.

7. The problem • Some scholars treat the Iranian leadership as a rational actor claiming that it will adhere to deterrence principles based on rationality. • Others (notably Princeton Middle East expert, Bernard Lewis) claim that the Iranian leadership has accopolictic views that do not fit assumptions which guided the MAD strategy during the cold war.

8. The Problem (Cont’d) • The main problem is the high uncertainty which surrounds Iranian’s counter-response. This project’s goal is to reduce this uncertainty.

9. Existing Analysis Existing work is too speculative. It does not rely on systematic, empirical analysis of a large number of decisions.

10. The Methodology: Applied Decision Analysis • ADA goes into the mind of the decision maker The ADA steps are: • Reverse engineer each decision • Identify the decision rule for each decision • Identify the decision “code” of the leader based on multiple decisions.

11. ADA steps • Define the decision problem (what is this decision about?) • What are the alternative courses of action? • Which decision criteria could influence the decision? • How are these criteria prioritized? • What are the potential implications for each alternative on each criteria?

12. ADA (cont’d) Examples of decision rules include: expected utility, Lexicographic rule, elimination by aspect rule, Poliheuristic rule, and so on.

13. Appendix: Dimensions of Iranian Decisions

14. Findings • The findings based on the analysis of Iranian decisions show that contrary to popular belief, Iranian decisions are rational (when one analyzes them from the Iranian’s point of view). • The pattern is strong and clear: On a scale of 1-10, I would rate them as 8.5 or even 9 on some issues.

15. Findings (cont’d) • However, stating that the Iranian decision pattern is rational is not enough. We need to go into the decision details of the Iranian leadership. • In decision science parlance, Iran’s calculus of decision consists of multi-attribute, additive decision rule.

16. The Logic of Political Survival Leaders are concerned about the survival of their regime. Top priority for many leaders is staying in power. In the case of Iran, the Iranian leadership views the defeat of its regime as the defeat of Islam as a civilization. This should be exploited as it is the “red line” for the Iranian leadership.

17. Collapse of the Islamic Nation Because the Iranian leadership equates the defeat of their regime, with the collapse of the Islamic nation, they are very vulnerable to actions that may lead to such a collapse as it will be devastating to Islam.

18. Iran’s Calculus of Decision A cost-benefit analysis of Iran’s decisions should also include such intangible factors as honor, dignity, respect, and national pride.

19. Comparison to Hezbolla’s D-M • The Iranian decision making rule is very different than Nasrallah’s. • For Hezbollah, which is not in power, the support of its constituencies in Lebanon, domestic political aspirations and Iranian and Syrian opinion influence its decisions. • For Iran, the intra-organizational rivalry greatly influences decisions. For example, decisions were taken (despite being unpopular) when conservatives advocated them.

20. Diversionary Tactics • Iran is excellent at using diversionary tactics: military, political, rhetoric. • The awful rhetoric of holocaust denial serves the Iranians to mobilize the masses in the Arab world to support the Iranian leadership’s goals of regional (and eventually global) hegemony. • They also help them divert attention from Iranian’s economic and internal problems

21. In contrast to other findings… • Iran will not use the bomb if it will be clear to its leadership that it will result in a direct threat to its regime’s survival • It may use the bomb if this threat is not clear enough to the regime • The threat of bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities does not concern the Iranian leadership as much as a direct threat to their regime. And Iran is not afraid of mass casualties.

22. Indirect Measures Indirect measures such as putting pressure on the population may not be effective unless these measures threaten the regime’s survival. It represent the West’s “wishful thinking” bias that they will help.

23. Iranian Calculus of Decision Making (cont’d) The Iranians are less influenced by domestic public opinion. Our empirical analysis shows that there are multiple cases of decisions that were taken against popular support

24. The non-Nuclear Threat of Iranian Nuclear Program • Iran does not necessarily need to use its nuclear bomb. It is enough that it will posses it, to change the landscape of the ME and the world. • It can threaten to use it against Israel or the Gulf states and lead to flood of population from Israel • It can use proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas • It can provide others with a dirty bomb to detonate in Tel Aviv.

25. More Problems… • There is also an uncertainty about who will replace Kahemeni if and when Iran will have nuclear weapons. • The rising price of oil reduces the effectiveness of economic pressures. They need to be targeted to a very specific sector to be effective (Bar 2008).

26. Because of “information gatekeepers”, Israel’s second strike capability may not be as clear to the Iranians who make the critical decisions.

27. Conclusions • Understanding the extent of the Iranian leadership’s rationality is at the core of the deterrence issue and should guide Israel and West’s counter-response to Iranian’s nuclear plans • Assessing Iran’s potential response to each of Israel & the U.S. strategic options is extremely important. • Any counter-measure taken by Israel and the West should be aimed at the Iranian regime using a ”counter-regime strategy”.

28. Appendix: Examples of Decisions Analyzed by Type of Decision