Nuclear Security Culture

1. Insert image here Insert image here Insert image here Nuclear Security Culture Presented by: (Simphiwe Xaso) Eskom Security Division Date: 16 May 2018 Insert image here

2. Content • Background • International Support • Legislation and Regulations • IAEA Security Culture Model • Nuclear Security Culture Elements • Preparation and Conducting Surveys • Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant • Koeberg Fitness For Duty (FFD) Programme • Koeberg Security Measures – Layout – Barriers – Boundaries – FAR

3. Background • International Treaties • South Africa is a member state of the International Atomic Energy Agency and are signatory to many international treaties and have accepted resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that support the physical protection of nuclear materials. • Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) • The “Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials” was adopted by South Africa in terms of the UNSCres. 1373, that provides general requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage, transport, and also protection of nuclear material and facilities against theft and sabotage.

4. International Support • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) • The IAEA has developed a series of nuclear security publications that deals with the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material and other radioactive substances and their associated facilities. These publications are consistent with, and complement, international nuclear security instruments such as the “Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material”. • The IAEA provides “International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS)” missions to member states and nuclear facilities to assist them with strengthening the effectiveness of their physical protection systems.

5. International Support • World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) • The “World Institute for Nuclear Security” was established in 2008 to provide an international forum for those accountable for nuclear security and to establish a series of best practices publications. Koeberg Security uses these publications to support operations • Legislative and Regulatory Framework • National Energy Act (Act of 1999) • The Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999 makes provision for the Department of Energy (DoE) to initiate the implementation and execution of liaise with the IAEA regarding the physical protection of nuclear material.

6. Legislation and Regulations • National Nuclear Regulatory Act (Act 47 of 1999) • The National Nuclear Regulatory Act 47 of 1999 was promulgated to provide for the establishment of a National Nuclear Regulator (NNR)in order to regulatenuclear activities, for its objectives and functions, for the manner in which it is to be managed. • National Key Point Act (Act 102 of 1980) • The National Key Point Act 102 of 1980 was promulgated to provide for the National Key Points (NKP), the safeguarding thereof and for matters connected therewith. • The Minister for Safety and Security will appoint an “owner” usually the Power Station Manager (PSM), who will be responsible for the security arrangements of the National Key Point.

7. Legislation and Regulations • National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 • The National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 was promulgated to: • To gather intelligence about any threat or potential threat to national security and stability of the republic which falls within the function of a department of state; • Firearm Control Act ( Act 60 of 2000) • Governs and regulates the use and control of firearms • Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) (Act 56 of 2001) • Governs and regulates the registration and training of security officers

8. Legislation and Regulations • South African Police Services Act 68 of 1996 • The Government Security Regulator was established in terms of section 16 of the SAPS Act 68 of 1995 to: • Issue physical security directives and regulations to the NKP Act. • Conduct physical security evaluations and audits. • Assess contingency plans and audit contingency exercises. • Develop and issue security training standards. • Manage and monitor security breaches and incidents. • Provide technical support and specifications on physical security.

9. IAEA Security Culture Model • The IAEA security culture model is based on Schein’s model of organizational culture, which was successfully used during the 1990s to develop nuclear safety culture. • The 1986 accident at Chernobyl revealed the need for such a culture, demonstrating the results of poor human performance. • There are many synergies between safety and security, two domains that overlap within the overall organizational culture. • Accordingly, the safety culture model provides a ready made analytical framework for exploring and promoting nuclear security culture.

10. IAEA Security Culture Model Cont. • Cultures stem from a first layer of underlying assumptions about reality. • In practical terms, this means that an organization displays observable behaviours that relate to what its members assume about a variety of phenomena, such as vulnerability to security risks. • These assumptions or beliefs ultimately manifest themselves in tangible or observable forms, for example as documents and actions. Leaders and managers imprint these patterns of assumptions and beliefs on their subordinates, but they are often held unconsciously, never discussed and taken for granted.

11. Modelling organisational culture (Schein) • Proposed a 3-level model for analyzing culture: • LEVEL THREE • Behavior = Visible: Procedure, documented priorities, greeting rituals, dress, forms of address. • LEVEL TWO • Values = Intangible: Strategies, goals, principles, values. • LEVEL ONE • Basic Assumptions = Unconsciously felt: Beliefs, perceptions.

12. Modelling organisational culture (Schein) • Discussion – Cultural levels • •At what level (in the Schein model) would you place the following cultural phenomena? • –Individuals are the source of ideas and innovation • –Interpersonal confrontation, arguments and conflict is common at meetings • –Employees dress informally at work • –Strive for both the highest quality and lowest cost • –Think for yourself and do the right thing

13. Modelling organisational culture (Schein) • Discussion Cultural levels • 􀂇At what level (in the Schein model) would you place the following cultural phenomena? • 􀂱Individuals are the source of ideas and innovation (Level 1 Basic Assumptions) • 􀂱Interpersonal confrontation, arguments and conflict is common at meetings (Level 3 Behaviors) • 􀂱Employees dress informally at work (Level 3 Artifacts) • 􀂱Strive for both the highest quality and lowest cost (Level 2 Values) • 􀂱Think for yourself and do the right thing (Level 2 Values)

14. Nuclear Security Culture Elements • Using Schein’s three layers of culture, the model for nuclear security culture set out in the IAEA Implementing Guide • Breaks the layer of artefacts of culture into three parts, giving a total of five elements 1. BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES • Beliefsand attitudes that affect nuclear security are formed in people’s minds over time. • An effective nuclear security culture can only be built on a strong substructure of beliefs and attitudes about threats.

15. Nuclear Security Culture Elements 2. PRINCIPLES • An effective nuclear security culture needs a set of principlesthat leaders can instil in the organization to guide policies, decision making, management systems and the behaviour of people at all levels. • Individualsshould fully understand and share these principles, and there should be clear evidence that they are being applied consistently across the organization. • The main principles of nuclear security culture include motivation, leadership, commitment and responsibility, and professionalism and competence, as well as learning and improvement.

16. Nuclear Security Culture Elements 3. LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOUR • Leaders change culture by intervening at all levels: they can introduce new and different assumptions and patterns of thinking, they can establish new patterns of behaviour and they can change the physical environment, the use of language and the guiding principles. • The culture therefore tends to reflect the intentions, specific actions and priorities of the leaders, provided that leaders understand and fulfil this function. • Because they are ultimately in charge of the security regime at an organization.

17. Nuclear Security Culture Elements 4. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS • There is a system of self-assessment that includes assessment programmes, root cause analyses, indicators, lessons learned and corrective action tracking programmes pertaining to nuclear security and security culture. • Since nuclear security typically involves regulatory and law enforcement bodies, a constructive working relationship with these institutions is therefore important to ensure that information is exchanged regarding nuclear security

18. Nuclear Security Culture Elements 5. PERSONNEL BEHAVIOUR • The ultimate objective of security culture development is a set of desired characteristics of personnel behaviour. • These include professional conduct, personal accountability, adherence to procedures, teamwork and cooperation, and vigilance. • An effective security culture will yield numerous benefits, encouraging staff to remain vigilant, question irregularities, carry out its work diligently and exhibit high standards of personal and collective accountability.

19. Preparation and Conducting Surveys • A survey is usually the first major step in the self-assessment process, and it is designed to concentrate on characteristics that are believed to be weak and vulnerable, which are identified as the ‘topic’ for the survey. • Such a focusedself-assessment is likely to result from recent risk assessments, intelligence reports, audits, observations of senior management or security personnel or records of past security events. • The selection of the topic should be made by senior management, in consultation with the security staff and in coordination with appropriate national authorities.

20. Preparation and Conducting Surveys • Staffmembers and contractors feel safe from reprisal when reporting errors and incidents. • A policy prohibiting harassment and retaliation for raising nuclear security concerns is enforced. • Staff members and contractors make decisions and take actions consistent with their responsibilities if a decision needs to be made before managers arrive on scene. • Staff members and contractors notify management of any incidents or possible incidents involving a compromise of computer security or information security.

21. Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant is owned by Eskom and is managed with a fleet of power stations by Eskom Generation Group. Koeberg is located 30km’s north of Cape Town, next to the town of Melkbosstrand. Koeberg is Eskom's only nuclear power plant and the only nuclearpower plant on the continent of Africa.

22. Koeberg Fitness For Duty Programme • FFD Activities: • Criminal Record Checks • Drug Testing – Initial & Random Assessments • Medicals – Initial & Continuous Assessments • Plant Access Training (PAT) • Radworker Training • Final Acceptance

23. Types of Access Permits • Types of Access Permits: • Permanent Staff & Long Term Contractors – RBH • Short Term Contractors – RBS • Visitors Permit Escorted Access • Delivery Vehicles Under Escort • Access Authorization Procedure

24. Commercial Aircraft Corridor Ø 2,5 Nautical miles 2000 ft - Open corridor 2000 ft - No fly zone - Eskom control Federal Aviation Regulation ACP 1 ACP 2

25. Security Organization “Pledge” We, the Eskom Security Guardians Pledge To Be the security hub for Eskom Ensuring a safe and secure Eskom for All By Providing a one-stop security service Working together to sustain a crime-free environment Keeping abreast with security trends and security technologies Respecting and strengthening our stakeholder relationships Being available to leadership, management and employees with an inspired, empowered and capable security workforce All this in the spirit of being and providing world class security services; a legacy for Eskom We proudly contribute to paving and securing Eskom’s footprint in South Africa and globally.

26. Thank you