November 30, 2012

1. Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Assessment: State of the Practice HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings November 30, 2012

2. Overview • The goal of HM-12 is to document the current state of the practice for hazardous materials transportation risk assessment and lay out a path for future efforts. • Specific project objectives are: • To identify existing tools, methodologies, approaches, and key sources of data for assessing hazardous materials transportation risks in the public and private sectors • To characterize the capabilities and limitations of each • To identify significant gaps and needs in the available tools and approaches • To recommend paths forward HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

3. Methodology • Investigate the current state of the practice of hazmat risk assessment involved the following three steps: • Literature review • Focused on documents published since 2005 • Included review of TRIS, TRB RIP, TLCat, NTIS, and ITRD • Stakeholder interviews • Identified potential participants through recommendations of HM-10 and HM-12 project panels and participant suggestions • Contacted 110 organizations, including carriers, shippers, federal and state agencies, international agencies, consulting firms, professional associations, insurers, and research organizations • Stakeholder surveys • Dispersed invitations through TRB Hazmat Committee and stakeholder associations HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

4. General Results • Investigation results indicated that hazmat transportation risk assessment is primarily employed to address one of nine general decision types. • Models for which enough information was available to allow characterization of model data, components, and applications are presented in the HM-12 Final Report according to the decisions they support. • Slide 5 lists the decision types and the models that can support them. Slides 6-9 list some basic information about each model. HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

5. Results: Decisions & Supporting Models HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

6. Results: Models HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

7. Results: Models (cont.) HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

8. Results: Models (cont.) HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

9. Results: Models (cont.) HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

10. Results: Models (cont.) • The HM-12 Final Report presents the following information for each of the 22 identified models: • Applicable modes and decisions supported • Central methodology or approach • Key sources of data for each model component • Model assumptions, limitations, and biases • Outputs • Frequency of and triggers for updates • How and to whom results are communicated • Strengths, weaknesses, and desired improvements • Model availability and potential barriers to implementation HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

11. Selected Observations • Industry analyses are generally very focused and have short time frames; the opposite tends to be true for public-sector analyses. • Though quantitative analyses are required in some in-depth analyses or high-risk cases, qualitative analyses may be sufficient to produce actionable results. • Security-focused analyses tend to employ subject matter elicitations or “black box” methods / data to account for a lack of historical likelihood information. • Qualitative models tend to present results in the form of general categories (e.g., high, medium, low) or as risk matrices. HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

12. Selected Observations (cont.) • The majority of quantitative analyses estimate relative, rather than absolute, risk values. • Quantitative models generally present results as risk indices, either as scores for individual locations or as a device (such as an F-N curve) that communicates indices for each possible outcome and location. • Uncertainty is rarely explicitly quantified or qualified. • The most common approaches to addressing uncertainty are to select conservative model parameters or to employ conservative operational procedures or equipment. HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

13. Gaps: Models for Decisions • Multi-Modal/Intermodal Risk Analyses • Most risk assessments focus on a single mode. • Validation of Prior Assessments • When hazmat risk analyses utilize the results of previous analyses, that information is rarely subject to any type of validation. • Comparability of Model Results • Disparate methodologies and metrics make results from different models incomparable. • Uncertainty • While uncertainty is often acknowledged, it is rarely quantified or qualified. • Route Analysis Tools • A lack of tools exists for finding alternate highway routes and for analyzing barge shipment routes. HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

14. Gaps: Data for Models • Inadequate Highway Exposure Data and Accident Rates • There is a lack of detailed exposure data on hazmat transportation shipments by material, packaging type, and operational parameters. • Conditional Probability Data • There are a limited number of current sources for hazmat release probabilities. • Disparate Data Quality across Modes • The degree of data accuracy and precision of available risk metric data tend to be dissimilar across modes. • Security Assessment Credibility and Transparency • Security models often rely on subjective judgments and proprietary information or processes, reducing model credibility to external parties. • Lack of Public Vulnerability and Threat Data • Insufficient data is a common obstacle in hazmat transportation risk assessment. • Validation of Supporting Data • Available data, particularly GIS data, are often used with little or no validation. HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

15. Gaps: Model, Data, or Results Availability • Formal Risk Management Process • Anecdotal evidence suggests that many hazmat shippers and carriers do not follow a formal risk assessment process. • Data Building Blocks for Assessments • No single standard source of supporting spatial data, or implementation guidelines for their use, exist for hazmat transportation risk analysis. • Lack of Awareness of Available Data, Tools, and Methods • Hazmat transportation stakeholders are commonly unaware of the full range of available models and datasets. • Lack of Public Disclosure of Datasets • The perceived need to withhold data for reasons of safety, security, or business completion presents a barrier to comprehensive risk analyses. HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

16. Recommendations: Model Development • Develop a single, common hazmat transportation risk assessment approach, using a standard architecture, across all modes. • Develop a highway hazmat route risk assessment tool that considers the FMCSA Hazardous Materials Route Registry and other state and local truck restrictions to suggest candidate routes. • Develop a waterway hazmat route risk assessment tool that includes consideration of dam and lock infrastructure restrictions. • Develop an approach for addressing low-probability, high-consequence events in hazmat transportation risk models. HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

17. Recommendations: Data Development • Enhance the BTS’ Commodity Flow Survey and the FHWA’s Freight Analysis Framework to provide national-level hazmat flow data and support improved hazmat-specific highway accident rates. • Expand the results of HMCRP project HM-07, to develop conditional release probabilities for different packaging types, with the emphasis on bulk packages. • Research the behavior of commercial-scale explosives to enhance modeling for fixed facilities and eliminate the use of less-appropriate military explosives data. • Develop a system for calibrating the differences in similar data across modes or other categories. • Produce a guidebook describing different types of expert elicitation methods and their applicability to the issues typically addressed in hazmat transportation risk analyses. • Research the potential methods, risks, and benefits of governmental sharing of security-sensitive threat and vulnerability data with private sector risk assessors. HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings

18. Recommendations: Communication and Data / Model Sharing • Create a framework document with specific checklists to encourage greater adoption of risk management principles and decision making, including the best practices from both the private and public sectors. • Develop a single data repository for transportation network data that have the requisite data elements to support hazmat transportation risk assessment. HM-12 Final Project Summary and Findings