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A novel personal key distribution approach that drastically reduces communication and storage overhead compared to previous approaches, while still supporting revocation and based on polynomials.
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ITIS 6010/8010 Wireless Network Security Dr. Weichao Wang
Efficient self-healing key distribution and revocation • A novel personal key distribution approach • Drastically reduce communication and storage overhead compared to the previous approaches • Still t revocation • Still based on polynomials
A personal key distribution mechanism • For a t-degree poly f(x), we want to provide f(i) only to node i • Each legal member gets a different personal key • Revoked members cannot get their shares • Through true broadcast • Need a revocation poly and masking poly
Notations: • f(x): key share polynomial (t-degree) • g(x): revocation polynomial (up to t degree) • h(x): masking function (2t degree) • Every node gets h(i) during initiation. • Group manager broadcasts f(x) * g(x) + h(x) and the revoked nodes. • Construct g(x) based on revoked nodes
How does a legal node recover the personal key share? • Why a revoked node cannot? • It is robust against up to t colluders. • Advantages: • Communication overhead is only O(t) • Storage overhead is constant • Do not need fake IDs
Self-healing with revocation capability • Split each session key into two parts • Support self-healing property
If the network lifetime is m session • We generate m(m+1) 2t-degree masking function hi,j(x). So every session we have m+1 masking function • Each node v gets the values hi,j(v) during initiation • For the session key Ki = pi(x) + qi(x), where p and q are t-degree polys
In session j, the manager broadcasts • The revoked set Rj • gj(x) * pi(x) + hj, i(x) , i = 1 to j • gj(x) * qi(x) + hj, i(x) , i = j to m • Every non-revoked node v will recover p1(v) to pj(v), and qj(v) to qm(v) • The revoked nodes cannot
The nodes need to store m(m+1) values • The broadcast message has the size of O(mt). And the previous approach has O(mt^2) • Disadvantage • The set of revoked nodes is monotonic.
Reducing the storage overhead • The previous approach needs m(m+1) masking functions, so every node needs to store m(m+1) values • In fact, 2m masking functions are enough: m functions for the p share of the key, and m functions for the q share of the key • Can we use the same group of functions to protect both p and q??
Reducing communication overhead • For short term network partition, we do not need the node to recover a key used long time ago.