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Anarchism and the Problem of Political Philosophy L oughborough University Anarchist Studies Seminar. Benjamin Franks University of Glasgow: Dumfries 2009. Introduction. Talk the basis of an article/chapter which should be finished by late 2010/early 2011. Mutual Suspicion
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Anarchism and the Problem of Political PhilosophyLoughborough University Anarchist Studies Seminar Benjamin Franks University of Glasgow: Dumfries 2009
Introduction • Talk the basis of an article/chapter which should be finished by late 2010/early 2011. • Mutual Suspicion • Institutional prejudice • Activist suspicion • Institutional practice • Particular forms of teaching, research and imagery (Le Doeuff) • Privileging particular audiences and thereby subjects • Disciplinary Features • Argumentation (and universal account of reason) • Necessary and sufficient conditions • Limited, straw man approach to particular subjects especially philosophy • Exclusions • Trivial definitions • Naïve essentialism
Mutual Suspicion • Institutional prejudice • Significant acceptance of popular social stereotypes of anarchism • Separate off (and construct) a separate body of ‘anarchist thought’ unconnected with contemporary anarchist theory and practice • Activist suspicion • Universities as hierarchical and elitist bodies • Intellectual colonisation of popular movements
2. Institutional Practice • Mainstream academic philosophy is a discipline – as such it has a set norms, and resources which govern the production of social good (based on Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of ‘practices’) • These institutional norms limit access • Particular types of ‘good’ • Privileges particular audiences and thereby subjects
Responses and their limits • Mutual Suspicion • Not necessarily bad if anarchists have a sceptical attitude towards academics. • Institutional practice • Some social ‘goods’ still produced in academia • Develop alternative research practices inside and outside the academy
3. Disciplinary Features • Applies largely to the Anglo-American tradition • Argumentation: based on a universal account of reason) • Identification: Necessary and sufficient conditions drawn from canonical texts • Conceptual clarity: seeking decontested terms These lead to a limited, straw man approach to particular subjects especially philosophy • Exclusions • Trivial definitions • Naïve essentialism
Strengths of the Anglo-American approach to political philosophy • Disciplinary identity • Rigour • ‘Politically-useful’ • Some degree of difference
Example of Political Philosophy • ‘I contend that philosophy is an argumentative process about anything and everything. Consequently, philosophy is not distinguished by its subject matter (though certain subjects – such as the nature of argumentation itself – are of special interest to philosophers) but by its argumentative mode of thought. This does not mean that non-philosophers do not argue in pursuit of their intellectual goals, but that argumentation does not distinguish their pursuits [….] A further distinguishing feature of the argumentative process that is philosophy is its quest for conceptual clarity. The basic components of argumentation are concepts, and philosophical argumentation can only hope to advance to the extent that such clarity is achieved (or to the extent that we know what our concepts mean, that we know what we are talking about)’ (Paul McLaughlin, 2009, see McLaughlin, 2007: 16). • Attempts to be ‘value-free’ • Uncontaminated by ‘ideology’ or power • Fundamentally based on Reason
Michael Freeden’s conceptual approach • Regards political movements or ideologies as constellations of concepts • These concepts take particular forms (structures/shapes) in particular, historical conditions • Core and peripheral concepts • These define each other • These might alter in different periods/contexts • Freeden’s examples are drawn from Liberalism, Socialism and Conservatism
Michael Freeden: Criticisms of Political Philosophy • Some of this based on his criticisms of political theory: • Liberal universalist bias of Political Philosophy. • Analysis concentrates on necessary and sufficient conditions or family resemblances • Universalist, rationalist analysis leads to distortions • Seeks conceptual clarity – and thus overlooks distinction between ambiguity and indeterminacy
Anarchism: The Philosophical Definition. • Anarchism ‘plea for the autonomy of the individual’ – contrasted with authoritarian’s claim for the power of the state (Wolff, 2). • Scepticism about the state and ‘Philosophical anarchism… the highest duty of mankind [is] to act autonomously’ (Knowles, 2002: 253). See too David Keyt (2005) • Single universal principle: Absence of coercion • Area of internal debate: does this reject or support private property rights: • Most philosophical anarchists become synonymous with anarcho-capitalism (David Friedman, Murray Rothbard) • Some either ambivalent or reject property rights (McLaughlin, 2007 and Vallentine & Steiner, 2001)
Freeden’s Analysis Applied to Philosophical Treatments of Anarchism • Philosophers look for logically rigorous texts and dismiss – out-of-hand, communicative forms that differ: • Results in highly selective canon • Analysis of texts is simplistic: • Looks for universal features – (and thus essentialisms) – and thus simplistic account • Identifies logical inconsistencies where none might be present
Main Problems of Philosophical Anarchism: • Inaccuracy due to methodological shortcomings • Decontextualises concept of coercion • Inaccurate: significant occasions where anarchists accept or support coercive behaviour • State of Nature challenge • Can only be maintained by the ‘straw man’ (or woman) of a benign essentialism
Weakness of essentialism • Benign essentialism required to support the philosophical account of anarchism – but leads to a • ‘Straw men’: • Easy to disprove: acts of selfishness; challenge of the existence of the state) • Absurd consequences: anarchism requires universal consensus – no rotten apples (Wolff; p.30-31 – see too R. Wolff, 1976) • That ‘individual conscience’ becomes the only moral guide (J. Wolff, 2006: 46-47). • Marginalisation of anarchism as a philosophical position • However • Not based on anarchist writings (indeed quotation, from Kropotkin, used by Wolff to illustrate anarchism position actually says the opposite, 29). • Unnecessary for a coherent anarchism as not based on single universal precept.
Solutions • View anarchism as a practice based movement. • Core principles (but non-universal): • Contestation of hierarchies • Prefiguration • Anti-mediation • Productive of shared, internal social goods • Which define through and across each other seeking a coherent equilibrium – like the virtues. • Also involve contesting the institutional arrangements that form philosophical practices.
Questions? If you have any queries please contact Benjamin Franks at the University of Glasgow: Dumfries b.franks@crichton.gla.ac.uk
Bibliography • Eagleton, T. (2003), After Theory, Harmondsworth: Penguin. • Freeden, M. (1996), Ideologies and Political Theory: A conceptual approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press. • _____ (2003), Ideology: A very short introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. • _____ (2005), ‘What Should the ‘Political’ in Political Theory Explore’, the Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp.113-34. • Keyt, D. (2005), ‘Aristotle and Anarchism’ in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety, eds., Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 203-22: 204. • Knowles, D. (2002), Political Philosophy, London: Routledge. • Kropotkin, P. (1992), Ethics, Montreal, Canada: Black Rose • Le Doeuff, M. (2002) [1977], ‘Long Hair, Short Ideas’ in The Philosophical Imaginary, London: Continuum. • MacIntyre, A. (2006), After Virtue, Second edition, London: Duckworth. • McLaughlin, P. (2007), Anarchism and Authority: A philosophical introduction to classical anarchism, Aldershot: Ashgate. • _____ (2009), ‘In Defence of Philosophical Anarchism’, publication forthcoming. • Nozick, R. (1988), Anarchy State and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell. • Vallentyne, P. and H. Steiner (2001), eds., Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. • Wellman, C. (1996), ‘Liberalism, Samaritanism, and Political Legitimacy’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 211-237. • Wolff, J. ((2006), An Introduction to Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. • Wolff, R. (1976), In Defence of Anarchism, London: Harper Torchbooks.