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This chapter explores SSL/TLS protocols essential for securing internet communications. It covers the architecture, including handshake processes, session management, and the differences between SSL and IPsec. Key protocols like the Change Cipher Protocol, Alert Protocol, and Record Protocol are discussed in detail. It delves into the historical context of SSL's development from Netscape's SSLv2 to the more widely accepted SSLv3 and TLS, focusing on how they negotiate cryptographic parameters and maintain security. Ideal for those in network security administration.
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SSL/TLS (ch 19) IT443 – Network Security Administration Instructor: Bo Sheng
What Layer? Application Application Appl. SSL TCP TCP IPSec OS IP IP LAN layer LAN layer
History • SSLv2 proposed and deployed in Netscape 1.1 (1995) • PCT (Private Communications Technology) by Microsoft • SSLv3: most commonly used (1995) • was developed with public review • TLS proposed by the IETF based on SSLv3 but not compatible (1996) • Uses patent free DH and DSS instead of RSA which patent didn’t expire yet
SSL vs. IPsec • SSL: • Avoids modifying “TCP stack” and requires minimum changes to the application • Mostly used to authenticate servers • IPsec • Transparent to the application and requires modification of the network stack • Authenticates network nodes and establishes a secure channel between nodes • Application still needs to authenticate the users
SSL Architecture HTTP and other applications SSLHandshakeProtocol SSLChange CipherProtocol SSLAlertProtocol SSLAPI SSL Record Protocol TCP IP … Relies on TCP for reliable communication
SSL Architecture • Handshake protocol: establishment of a session key • Change Cipher protocol: start using the previously-negotiated encryption / message authentication • Alert protocol: notification (warnings or fatal exceptions) • Record protocol: protected (encrypted, authenticated) communication between client and server
Connections and Sessions • SSL Session • an association between peers • created through a handshake, negotiates security parameters, can be long-lasting • SSL Connection • a type of service (i.e., an application) between a client and a server • transient • Multiple connections can be part of a single session
Basic Protocols • Goal: application independent security • Originally for HTTP, but now used for many applications • Each application has an assigned TCP port, e.g., https (HTTP over SSL) uses port 443 • Messages • A -> B: I want to talk, ciphers I support, RA • B -> A: certificates, cipher I choose, RB • A -> B: {S}B, {keyed hash of handshake msgs} • B -> A: {keyed hash of handshake msgs} • A <-> B: data encrypted and integrity checked with keys derived from K • Keyed hashes use K = f(S, RA, RB)
Basic Protocols • How do you make sure that keyed hash in message 3 is different from B’s response? • Include a constant CLNT/client finished (in SSL/TLS) for A and SRVR/server finished for B • Keyed hash is sent encrypted and integrity protected for no real reason • Keys: derived by hashing K and RAand RB • 3 keys in each direction: encryption, integrity and IV • Write keys (to send: encrypt, integrity protect) • Read keys (to receive: decrypt, integrity check)
Session Resumption • Many secure connections can be derived from the session • Cheap: how? • Session initiation: modify message 2 • B -> A: session_id, certificate, cipher, RB • Aand B remember: (session_id, master key) • To resume a session: A presents the session_id in message 1 • A -> B: session_id, ciphers I support, RA • B -> A: session_id, cipher I choose, RB, {keyed hash of handshake msgs} • A -> B: {keyed hash of handshake msgs} • A <-> B: data encrypted and integrity checked with keys derived from K
Negotiating Cipher Suites • A cipher suite is a complete package: • (encryption algorithm, key length, integrity checksum algorithm, etc.) • Cipher suites are predefined: • Each assigned a unique value (contrast with IKE) • SSLv2: 3 bytes, SSLv3: 2 bytes => up to 65000 combinations • 30 defined, • 256 reserved for private use: FFxx (risk of non-interoperability) • Selection decision: • In v3 A proposes, B chooses • In v2 A proposes, B returns acceptable choices, and A chooses • Suite names examples: • SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA • SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5
Protocol Steps • Fragment data stream into records • each with a maximum length of 214 (=16K) bytes • Compress each record • Create message authentication code for each record • Encrypt each record
Protocol Steps Application Data Fragment Compress Add MAC Encrypt Add SSL Hdr
SSL Record Format RecordType SSL Version PayloadLength • There is, unfortunately, some version number silliness between v2 and v3; see text for (ugly) details Application Data(optionally compressed) Encrypted Optional MAC (16 or 20 bytes)
Phases of Protocol • Establish security capabilities • version of SSL to use • cipher + parameters to use • Authenticate server (optional), and perform key exchange • Authenticate client (optional), and perform key exchange • Finish up
I. Establish Security Capabilities • Messages marked with * are mandatory Client Server Client_Hello* Server_Hello*
Client_Hello Message • Transmitted in plaintext • Contents • highest SSL version understood by client • RC: a 4-byte timestamp + 28-byte random number • session ID: 0 for a new session, non-zero for a previous session • list of supported cryptographic algorithms • list of supported compression methods
Server_Hello Message • Also transmitted in plaintext • Contents • minimum of (highest version supported by server, highest version supported by client) • RS: 4-byte timestamp and 28-byte random number • session ID • a cryptographic choice selected from the client’s list • a compression method selected from the client’s list
II. Server Auth. / Key Exchange Client Server • The Server_Certificate message is optional, but almost always used in practice Server_Certificate Server_Key_Exchange Client_Certificate_Request Server_Handshake_Done*
Server_Certificate Message • Contains a certificate with server’s public key, in X.509 format • or, a chain of certificates if required • The server certificate is necessary for any key exchange method except for anonymous Diffie-Hellman
Authenticating the Server • Step #4: Domain name in certificate must match domain name of server (not part of SSL protocol, but clients should check this) source: sun.com
Client_Certificate_Request Msg. • Normally not used, because in most applications • only the server is authenticated • client is authenticated at the application layer, if needed • Two parameters • certificate type accepted, e.g., RSA/signature only, DSS/signature only, … • list of certificate authorities recognized (i.e., trusted third parties)
III. Client Auth. / Key Exchange Client Server Client_Certificate Client_Key_Exchange* Client_Certificate_Verify
Client_Certificate_Verify Msg • Proves the client is the valid owner of a certificate (i.e., knows the corresponding private key) • Only sent following any client certificate that has signing capability
IV. Finish Up Client Server Change_Cipher_Spec* Client_Finished* Change_Cipher_Spec* Server_Finished* Switch to the negotiated cipherfor all remaining (application)messages
Change_Cipher_Spec Msg • Confirms the change of the current state of the session to a newly-negotiated set of cryptographic parameters • Finished Messages • keyed hash of the previous handshake messages to prevent man-in-the-middle-attacks from succeeding
Alert Protocol Examples • Type 1: Warning • ex.: No_Certificate, Close_Notify • Type 2: Fatal_Alert • ex.: Unexpected_Message, Bad_MAC, etc. • connection is immediately terminated
Summary • SSL is the de facto authentication/encryption protocol standard for HTTP • becoming popular for many other protocols as well • Allows negotiation of cryptographic methods and parameters