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Social Choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence

Social Choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence. Ceyhun Coban, WUSTL M. Remzi Sanver, Bilgi University. : L(A) N  CT(A) Arrow: Within the class of Pareto optimal SWFs, IIA is equivalent to dictatoriality. IIA. Given any two alternatives x, y and any two

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Social Choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence

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  1. Social Choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence Ceyhun Coban, WUSTL M. Remzi Sanver, Bilgi University

  2. : L(A)N  CT(A) • Arrow: Within the class of Pareto optimal SWFs, IIA is equivalent to dictatoriality.

  3. IIA Given any two alternatives x, y and any two preference profiles P, P’ with x Pi y  x Pi’ y we have x (P) y  x (P’) y

  4. Citizen sovereignty • For any x, y  A,  P  L(A) such that x (P) y

  5. Arrow versus Wilson • Arrow: Within the class of Pareto optimal SWFs, IIA is equivalent to dictatoriality. • Wilson: Within the class of citizen sovereign SWFs, IIA is equivalent to dictatoriality or antidictatoriality or the null rule.

  6. IIA versus weak IIA Given any two alternatives x, y and any two preference profiles P, P’ with x Pi y  x Pi’ y we have IIA: x (P) y  x (P’) y WIIA: x *(P) y  x (P’) y

  7. Arrow versus Baigent/Campbell • Arrow: Within the class of Pareto optimal SWFs, IIA is equivalent to dictatoriality. • Baigent/Campbell: Let #A  4. Within the class of Pareto optimal SWFs, weak IIA is equivalent to weak dictatoriality.

  8. Wilson versus ? • Wilson: Within the class of citizen sovereign SWFs, IIA is equivalent to dictatoriality or antidictatoriality or the null rule. • Question: Within the class of citizen sovereign SWFs, weak IIA is equivalent to ...

  9. (T)  CT(A) An aggregation rule : L(A)N  C(A)  ◦ is a social welfare correspondence  = { such that  is a selection of  ◦}  =  * = *

  10. Results Theorem:  is the class of weakly IIA SWFs Theorem: * is the class of weakly IIA and weakly PO SWFs

  11. Wilson: Within the class of citizen sovereign SWFs, IIA is equivalent to dictatoriality or antidictatoriality or the null rule. • Question: Within the class of weakly Pareto optimal SWFs, weak IIA is equivalent to *

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