GLOBAL COVERAGE Looking Back – Looking Ahead

1. GLOBAL COVERAGELooking Back – Looking Ahead Boyd Sutton

2. Outline • A Look Back • What we were asked to do and how we did it • What we found • What we recommended • What happened • Some Thoughts for the Future • Recommendations • Pitfalls

3. What We Were Asked to Do • Define “Global Coverage” and related terms • Define a process for accomplishing “adequate” Global Coverage • Table options for: • Alternative strategies • Collection and analysis objectives • What “baseline” knowledge we need to maintain • Approach to “surge” • Measuring progress and performance

4. Cartoon • Robert’s scanner broke • Caption is: • “Remember when we had just one big problem? • Today we see hundreds of destabilizing situations in what we can now call • THE NEW WORLD DISORDER

5. How We Went About It • Interviewed more than 70 people • Senior policy and military customers • NSC, State, Defense, Treasury, USTR • JCS, Commands • Senior intelligence managers and workers • Production agencies • Collectors and reporters • Reviewed lots of documentation

6. Customers’ Needs • Fairly simple: can be listed on one page • Vast majority can be substantially met with open sources of information • But this demands precision collection, expert knowledge, and processing

7. Basic Requirements • Political—who is in, who is out • Economic • Diplomatic • Military • Societal • Infrastructure • Geospatial • US Interests

8. Selected Key Findings • Consensus in GC’s importance • But few at lower levels aware of DCI’s strong support • Poor communication from DCI downwards • Customer believed appropriate balance of effort should be 70/30 • Intelligence managers believed it should be 90/10 • Poor communications with customers

9. Selected Key Findings • Broad consensus among customers regarding needs • But none among intelligence managers • Poor communication • Turf issues • Divergent views of what intelligence program resources should be included • Strong military position that all “their” resources “off limits” • Turf trumps common interest

10. Selected Key Findings • Widespread concern regarding open sources • How viewed by senior managers • How used by analysts • Current and projected resources • Need to look seriously at “commercial industry of open source providers” • Acquire processed “knowledge” not just information

11. Framework • Effective program requires clear, universal understanding on three key points: • Strategic intent: what do you want to achieve? • Definition of “global coverage” – what should it mean to everyone? • Community framework: overall concept

12. Strategic Intent • Three options: • Global Intelligence • “Full service” but on a limited scale • Enough coverage so there are few surprises • Focused Attention • Avoid defined categories of “major” surprises. Accept others, respond well • Quick Reaction • Accept many surprises, and focus on efficient response.

13. Definition • What is “Global Coverage?” Two options. • UNIVERSAL meaning of GC: • General information for all countries, everything that is not a hard target issue • RESTRICTED meaning of GC: • Intelligence for a defined set of countries • Which countries? • What substance?

14. Framework • What are the pillars of Global Coverage? ONE OPTION. No other came close. • Minimum baseline • Knowledge, expertise, resources routinely applied • Watch • Focus of routine attention to meet warning objectives • Surge • Focused increase in resources to address a developing situation • Routine Services • Servicing customers’ routine (non-crisis) needs

15. Conclusions/Recommendations • If everything is a priority, nothing is…. • First, decide on strategic intent • Second, focus on what is essential • Requirements versus “desirements” • Difficult but explicit decisions about which risks are acceptable and which are not • Develop a common language • Consistent definitions—common understanding

16. Conclusions/Recommendations • Establish a common framework—the pillars • Minimum baseline—what to “know” all the time • Watch—what to watch all the time • Surge—how to get better fast, when needed • Routine services—juggling customers’ non-crisis needs • MAKE EXPLICIT CHOICES ABOUT HOW YOU ARE GOING TO HANDLE EACH • If you cannot measure it, you cannot manage it. • Regular program of evaluation • “Trust but verify”—the Achilles’ heel of management

17. What Happened? • NOTHING! • DCI said “thanks” and shelved the study • Only “decision” was to decide nothing • Several senior managers praised report • Only copies disseminated were those I circulated for comment.