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Verification Modulo Versions T owards usable verification

Verification Modulo Versions T owards usable verification. F. Logozzo , S. K. Lahiri, Microsoft Research, Redmond M. Fahndrich, now at Google S. Blackshear, Univ. Colorado, Boulder. Background. CodeContracts in VS. Compile-time verification 100% Abstract interpretation.

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Verification Modulo Versions T owards usable verification

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  1. Verification Modulo VersionsTowards usable verification F. Logozzo, S. K. Lahiri, Microsoft Research, Redmond M. Fahndrich, now at Google S. Blackshear, Univ. Colorado, Boulder

  2. Background

  3. CodeContracts inVS Compile-time verification 100% Abstract interpretation Used internally at MSFT > 120K external downloads Failed precondition

  4. Too many warnings

  5. Too many warnings: Now what? • False myth: Analysis too imprecise, let’s improve the analysis • In practice, the analysis is precise enough • Problem: It lacks information on external libraries, environment, physical world … • Academic solution: Address each warning • Add assumes, out-of-bands contracts … • Practice: No one is going to do it • Too expensive • Pragmatic: Syntactic baseline • Unsound and unreliable

  6. Disclaimer: over-simplified schema Syntactic baseline New version (k Renamed) Base version /// Get temperature in Kelvin doubleGetCurrTemperature() { // In Celsius 1:varc = ReadTemperature(); 2:var k = c + 273.15; 3:Contract.Assert(k >= 0); 4: returnk; } /// Get temperature in Kelvin doubleGetCurrTemperature() { // In Celsius 1:varc = ReadTemperature(); 2:varkelv = c + 273.15; 3:Contract.Assert(kelv>= 0); 4: returnkelv; } “mask assertion at line 3” Valid, but can’t prove assertion Masked: No alarm

  7. Syntactic baseline: Fail to spot regression New version (wrong constant) Base version /// Get temperature in Kelvin doubleGetCurrTemperature() { // In Celsius 1:varc = ReadTemperature(); 2:var k = c + 273.15; 3:Contract.Assert(k >= 0); 4: returnk; } /// Get temperature in Kelvin doubleGetCurrTemperature() { // In Celsius 1:varc = ReadTemperature(); 2:var k = c + 273.0; 3:Contract.Assert(k >= 0); 4: returnk; } “mask assertion at line 3” Masked regression!

  8. Syntactic baseline: Resurrect alarm New version (value rounded) Base version /// Get temperature in Kelvin doubleGetCurrTemperature() { // In Celsius 1:varc = ReadTemperature(); 2:var k = c + 273.15; 3:Contract.Assert(k >= 0); 4: returnk; } /// Get temperature in Kelvin doubleGetCurrTemperature() { // In Celsius 1:varc = ReadTemperature(); 2:vark = c + 273.15; 3: var round = Math.Round(k, 2); 4:Contract.Assert(round >= 0); 5: return round; } “mask assertion at line 3” Alarm Resurrected

  9. Straw man? • Of course, we can refine the former syntactic baseline technique • Add the assertion name, have a window instead of line number… • However, they are always brittle, and provide no guarantee • Suppress too little • Is the alarm resurrected from the old one? • Suppress too much • Is the masked alarm a new alarm?

  10. Verification Modulo Versions Intuition

  11. VMV: Verification modulo versions P’ New version P Base version P’+C Instrumented Analyze Instrument Analyze Analyzer is a black box Reduce alarms up to 70% With semantic guarantees!!! Extract semantic conditions C

  12. VMV(S): Finding regressions Base version Instrumented new version /// Get temperature in Kelvin doubleGetCurrTemperature() { // In Celsius 1:varc = ReadTemperature(); 2:var k = c + 273.15; 3:Contract.Assert(k >= 0); 4: returnk; } /// Get temperature in Kelvin doubleGetCurrTemperature() { // In Celsius 1:varc = ReadTemperature(); Contract.Assume(c >= -273.15); 2:var k = c + 273.0; 3:Contract.Assert(k >= 0); 4: returnk; } Result(ReadTemperature) ≥ -273.15 Correct ⇔ c≥ -273.15 Report regression!

  13. VMV(N): Relative proofs Base version Instrumented new version /// Get temperature in Kelvin doubleGetCurrTemperature() { // In Celsius 1:varc = ReadTemperature(); 2:var k = c + 273.15; 3:Contract.Assert(k >= 0); 4: returnk; } /// Get temperature in Kelvin doubleGetCurrTemperature() { // In Celsius 1:varc = ReadTemperature(); Contract.Assume(c >= -273.15); 2:vark = c + 273.15; 3: var round = Math.Round(k, 2); 4:Contract.Assert(round >= 0); 5: return round; } Result(ReadTemperature) ≥ -273.15 Correct ⇔ c≥ -273.15 Relative correctness

  14. Questions 2. How do we inject them? P’ New version P Base version P’+C Instrumented Analyze Instrument Analyze 3. What guarantees? Extract semantic conditions C 1. What conditions?

  15. Verification Modulo Versions Formalization

  16. Q1. What conditions? • Critical to distinguish between sufficient and necessary conditions • A sufficient condition S implies the program correctness • S ⟹ “program has no bad runs” • S can be under-approximated • At worst false • A necessary condition N holds in all correct runs • If R is a good program run, then R ⟹ N • N can be over-approximated • At worst true

  17. Example: Sufficient vs. Necessary publicvoid Foo() { int ret, x; if(*) { ret = API(); x = ret + 1; } else { ret = API(); x = ret - 1; } Contract.Assert(x > 100); } Property of good runs Strongest Necessary for API ret > 99 ∨ ret >101 = ret > 99 ret > 99 Removes all bad runs Weakest Sufficient for API ret > 99 ∧ret >101 = ret > 101 ret > 101

  18. Q2: Matching and injection publicvoid Foo() { int ret, x; if(*) { ret = API(); x = ret + 1; } else { ret = API(); x = ret - 1; } Contract.Assert(x > 100); } Match method calls publicvoidFoo() { intx; x = API(); Contract.Assert(…); } • Other matching solutions: • Program points, Sequences of method calls, … • See paper • In general • More refined matching ⟹ more precision • More refined matching ⟹ more brittle

  19. Q3: What semantic guarantees for P’? • Using sufficient conditions • Short VMV(S) • Theorem: All warnings in P’+ S are new alarms • S was sufficient to shut off all alarms in P • Each new alarm in P’+S is either • 1. in new code or • 2. S is not strong enough • Nothing can be said on the “verified” assertions • E.g., S can be too strong • VMV(S) useful for bug finding

  20. Example of VMV(S) publicvoid Foo() { int ret, x; if(*) { ret = API(); x = ret + 1; } else { ret = API(); x = ret - 1; } Contract.Assert(x > 100); } publicvoidFoo() { intx; x = SomeAPI(); Contract.Assume(x > 101); Contract.Assert(x > 105); } Recall Suff. condition: Result(API) > 101 Regression: Ask more to API

  21. Q3: What semantic guarantees for P’? • Using necessary conditions • Short VMV(N) • Theorem: All proven assertions in P’+ N are correct w.r.t. P • N holds in all good runs of P • Each proven assertion in P’+ N is either • 1. because of an assume from N, or • 2. absolute, i.e., without assumptions from P • Alarms may be new or old ones • E.g. N can be too weak • VMV(N) is useful for relative verification

  22. Example of VMV(N) publicvoid Foo() { int ret, x; if(*) { ret = API(); x = ret + 1; } else { ret = API(); x = ret - 1; } Contract.Assert(x > 100); } publicvoidFoo() { intx; x = SomeAPI(); Contract.Assume(x > 99); Contract.Assert(x > 0); } RecallNec. condition: Result(API) > 99 Relative verification: Holds for good runs of P

  23. Experiments

  24. Experimental setting Match method calls P’ New version P Base version P’+N Instrumented cccheck.exe Instrument Necessary ⟹ relative verification cccheck.exe Extract necessary conditions N Cccheck.exe checks safety properties Contracts and runtime exceptions null-pointers, division by zero, buffer overruns, arithmetic overflow, enums …

  25. Windows Azure ActorFX framework • Three months between P and P’ • VMV(N) dramatically reduces the number of alarms (roughly by 70%) • Eliminated great majority of the warnings from external non-annotated API • Added annotations to P’+ N to go to 0 warnings, i.e., relative correct • Less than 3 hours overall • Found bugs, reported to the developers

  26. Conclusions

  27. More in the paper • Abstraction of necessary/sufficient • Role of imprecision in the analyzer • Abstract regressions in VMV(S) • Impact of non-monotonic analyzers • i.e., all tools out there… • Self application • Analyze P+N • Related work • … Scenarios Greek letters Numbers

  28. Conclusions Match method calls P’ New version P Base version P’+C Instrumented Analyze Instrument Sufficient ⟹ bug finding Analyze Extract semantic conditions C Necessary ⟹ relative verification Sufficient or Necessary

  29. Backup slides

  30. Comparison with syntactic baseline • Our starting point: Syntactic baseline in cccheck.exe • Problems: • Suppresses too much • No semantic guarantee • VMV addresses those problems • In practice: Both options available to users

  31. Related work • Industrial tools: Coverity, Polyspace, Abductor… • They: Tool-specific syntactic matching and/or hashing • VMV: General, rigorous framework, semantic-based • Differential Assertion Checking [Lahiri et al. FSE’13] • They: Construct and analyze product program • VMV: Framework for augmenting any static analysis, lightweight(pre+post processing) Differential symbolic execution methods [Person et al. FSE’08, Ramos et al. CAV’11] • They: Special analyzers for finding differences, no semantic relative guarantees

  32. Related work • Enhanced Diff tools: Smart strategies to find syntactic changes among versions • Orthogonal to our work, can only enhance VMV • Annotation inference: • Our framework is independent of the inference technique • We consider both sufficient and necessary

  33. Experimental setting • Implemented VMV(N) in Clousot/cccheck • Developed for 7+ years at Microsoft Research • Used by .NET programmers, free download, VS integration • Internal and external adoption • Abstract interpretation-based • Analyze program to infer invariants at each program point • Use invariants to discharge proof obligations • Contracts, null-pointers, division by zero, buffer overruns, arithmetic overflow, enums …. • Infer necessary conditions • Run on very large code bases • Internal and open source

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