340 likes | 3.36k Vues
The Tamil-Sinhala Conflict in Sri Lanka. Part One. Table of Contents. Images of the conflict (slide 3) Summary of events since 2002 (slides Current state of the problem (slides 4-7) Basic data (slides 8-9) What the conflict is all about (slides 10-14) Chronology of the conflict (slide 15)
E N D
Table of Contents • Images of the conflict (slide 3) • Summary of events since 2002 (slides • Current state of the problem (slides 4-7) • Basic data (slides 8-9) • What the conflict is all about (slides 10-14) • Chronology of the conflict (slide 15) • Historical antecedents (slides 16-17) • Beginning of the conflict (slides 18-20) • Escalation of the conflict (slide 20-23) • Ceasefire and its aftermath (slides 24-26)
Images of the Conflict • Price of war for women • Future without hope • Fighting for rights or adventure? • Displacement • Culture of fear • Suicide bombers • Is there any hope?
Summary of Events since 2002 • Ceasefire agreement since December 2002 • Reduced tensions • Ushered a degree of peace and normalcy • Violations of ceasefire, mostly by the LTTE, since the ceasefire • Tensions have increased since Mahinda Rajapakse became the president in November 2005 • Several major provocations by the LTTE • August 2005: Lakshman Kadiragamar was assassinated • April 2006: a suicide bomber attack the main military compound in Colombo. The military launched air strikes on Tamil Tiger targets • May 2006: Tamil Tiger attack a naval convoy near Jaffna, a “gross violation” of the ceasefire agreement • May 2006: the LTTE is declared a terrorist organization by the EU • June 2006: Oviliamadu massacre 'firing practice' for child cadres
Current State of the Game: Different Views • War in all but name • Imperium in imperio • Tales from the front line • After the bomb – fuel of fear and hate • Axe falls • Curbing the support of diaspora? • Sabre rattling • The spectre of Sinhala nationalist terrorism • Bin Laden, George Washington and V. Prabhakaran • Solutions • Death of a Thousand Cuts • Devolution of power
The Problem • The LTTE is engaged in an armed conflict with the government of Sri Lanka to gain a separate state for the Tamils since 1971 • An issue of minority rights involving the Sinhalese vs. the Tamils since independence (1948) • Mass violence against the Tamils in areas outside the northern and eastern parts of the island (1956, 1977 and 1983) • Ethnic cleansing in the northern and eastern parts of the island by the LTTE as a means to achieve its goal • Regular acts of violence committed by the LTTE • Acts of oppression and intimidation of Tamils in the northern and eastern parts of the island committed or condoned by the state • Strong opposition to separatism on the part of some extremist groups among the Sinhalese (JVP) • A marked reluctance to arrive at a compromise solution by both parties
Mea Culpa • The present state of the conflict is the cumulative outcome of • Perceived rights and prejudices • Political greed and irresponsibility • Desire for greater political power • Intolerance of any other political view • Making use of any ideological weapon at hand to acquire and strengthen political power • Action-reaction syndrome • Effects of globalization • Diaspora and the conflict • Funding the LTTE • Technology comes to the aid • NGO’s and the conflict • International invention – for what purpose?
Some Basic Data • Administrative divisions of Sri Lanka • Distribution of the Tamil Population in the Eastern Province • Distribution of the Sinhala and Muslim populations in the Eastern province • Country profile in statistics • Population growth
A Profile of Sri Lanka • Total population: 18.9 million (1999) • Population by ethnicity • Sinhala 74% • Sri Lankan Tamil 13% • Indian Tamil 5% • Muslim 7% • Other 1% • Population by religion • Buddhist 69% • Hindu 15% • Islam 8% • Christian 7% • Other 1% • National languages • Sinhala • Tamil • English
A Conflict of Cultures? • Is it a conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils with entrenched cultural identities? • There are cultural differences • They are not insurmountable • There is no open conflict involving people at large from both communities • Both communities lived in peace before and since 1956 • Periodic mass violence or the conflict in the north-eastern provinces have not prevented the Tamils and Sinhalese living together
Spectre of Sinhala Nationalism? • Is there a consolidated Sinhala-Buddhist opposition to the Tamils? • The Sinhalese and the Buddhists are not monolithic groups • The Sinhala-Buddhist identity as a political weapon is used by some Sinhala politicians and their followers • The Sinhalese (Buddhists and Christians) are divided over the issue concerning the Tamils and so are the Tamils (Hindus and Christians)
Tamils in the North vs. Sinhalese in the South? • A conflict between “Sinhalese in the south” vs. the “Tamils in the north-east”? • The Tamil population is dispersed • Tamils in Sinhala areas • 1971: 29.2% • 1981: 32.8% • 2001: 34.0% • Sinhalese in the north-east • 1971: 4.5% • 1981: 3.0% • 2001: 0.0% • There are no Sinhalese in the extreme north since 1987 • They have been removed by force by the LTTE • Tamils outside the north and east have been forced to move out temporarily in the aftermath of mass violence in 1959, 1977 and 1983 • But the majority of them moved back once order was restored
Genocide of Tamils? • The LTTE persistently claims of a genocide of Tamils since 1948 • Information has to be carefully scrutinized • More often than not information is misrepresented (example 1 and example 2) • There have been episodes of killing of Tamils, by the security forces, groups of people and, in recent years, by paramilitary groups • But a systematic elimination of Tamils has not taken place • The claims of Tamil genocide looks dubious in view of the fact that more than one-third of all Tamils and all Indian Tamils live outside the north and the east • There is clear evidence of ethnic cleansing of Muslims and Sinhalese in the north and the east (sporadically before 1983)
Not a Simple Case • Neither the state of Sri Lanka nor the LTTE can claim moral high ground of innocent party • The conflict involves the state and the LTTE, which claims it is the sole representative for the Tamils • The LTTE has acquired the reputation of a ruthless political organization to coax the Tamils in the north and the east to its agenda for a separate state • The vast majority of people in the country do not want two separate states • The conflict has become complicated because of external factors • Intransigence on the part of both sides makes a solution difficult
Chronology of the Conflict • A short chronology of events • A detailed chronology of events of the conflict
The Tamils in Sri Lanka • Patterns of settlements of population up to the 12th century • Tamils lived in Sri Lanka from the early years of the Christian era • Periodic Tamil incursions from South India did not last long • The north-eastern part of Sri Lanka did not constitute a “Tamil land” throughout the history of the island • There was a Tamil kingdom in the north for a short period in the 14th century • The Sinhala rulers confined their rule to the area to the south of the northern province after 1500 • The north-eastern parts were administered by the Portuguese and the Dutch (1500-1795) through native intermediaries • The British colonial rule (1795-1948) consolidated an ethnic divide in politics and economy • Eurasians and Tamils were the majority of educated and state-employed elite well into the 1940s • Tamils enjoyed a proportion of education (and concomitant power) vis-à-vis the Sinhalese before 1956
Beginning of the Conflict • The Tamils enjoyed a greater degree of privileges than the Sinhalese under the British colonial rule (1795-1948) • Tamil community was uneasy with the provisions for minority groups in independent Sri Lanka (1948) • Universal suffrage and electoral system under a unitary state • The Tamil community unsuccessfully tried to retain its position to secure its place in the country (1948-1956) • The majority of Sinhalese did not benefit from political independence • Medium of education, administration and employment was English
The First Wave of Communal Violence • A major political upheaval in 1956 • The ruling UNP (pro-Western and English educated) lost power to the LSFP (pro-socialist) and supportive of rights for the Sinhala-speaking people • 1956: Sinhala became the medium of education and administration • 1957: higher education in English, Sinhala and Tamil • Tamil politicians opposed changes • 1957: Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact • Sinhalese opposition to the pact and Tamil reaction • 1958: Anti-Tamil riots • 1959: Bandaranaike was assassinated • 1959: Switch-over of administration to “Sinhala only” • Great publicity but little action in most places • But it was a weapon against the Tamils and Eurasians in public service • Tamil public servants were not sacked, but required to learn Sinhala for administrative purposes within a reasonable period of time • Sinhalese re-settlement of the north and north-central provinces gathered momentum
Development of the Conflict, 1960-1983 • 1960-1970: successive governments failed to address the legitimate grievances of Tamils • 1971: emergence of two new political power groups • The JVP (Sinhala) • The LTTE (Tamil) • 1977: second wave of mass violence after the general election (won by UNP) • 1977-1983: low level conflict in the northern part of the island • LTTE vs. the security forces • LTTE killing Sinhalese in the north and east • 1983: third wave of mass violence against the Tamils outside the north and east
Escalation of the Conflict, 1983-2002 • 1980s: both parties were uncompromising • The LTTE increased its brutal killings of civilians • The government increased its reprisals in the north and the east • 1987-1990: Abortive mediation of India • 1993-2001: War and diplomacy • 2002- : Peace of a kind • Oslo conference material • Ceasefire agreement
Ceasefire 2002 • Who agreed with whom? • The UNP-led government with the LTTE • Why ceasefire? • Both parties had been exhausted • The LTTE needs regrouping its forces • The security forces were restrained • The UNP has always been pro-concessions to the Tamils • The UNP is pro-Western and pro-capitalism (with unrestrained access to foreign capital) • A political gain for the UNP vs. SLFP (led by Chandrika Kumaratunga) • International pressure
Ceasefire in Action, 2002-2005 • Ceasefire has been useful for both parties • “Peace merchants” • The LTTE has acquired a degree of freedom of movement to gather its forces • The government has also strengthened its military forces • Ceasefire violations by both parties have increased • LTTE eliminating its opponents among the Tamils as well as Sinhalese and Muslims in the north and east • Security forces acting in retaliation • The wild card: secret killings by paramilitary groups of LTTE dissidents (Col. Karuna)
A New Regime in Power • November 2005: presidential election won by Rajapakse (SLFP) • Rajapakse won largely because of the LTTE made sure that the Tamils in the north and east will not vote for Wickramasinghe (UNP) • But why? • Is the LTTE toying with the idea of military action as the final solution? • Or, does the LTTE think that the UNP is unable to deliver a lasting settlement? • Rajapakse is restrained by coalition with the JVP • The LTTE is reluctant to sit down for negotiation
Status Quo, December 2005 – May 2006 • Open hostility of LTTE • Has become increasingly provocative and large scale • Aimed at provoking the government to retaliate • Even the slightest retaliation is exploited for publicity • Pressure to negotiate • The government is under pressure to pursue a peaceful path (aid and investment as a weapon of persuasion) • The LTTE is banned as a terrorist organization by the EU
What Sustains the Conflict? • The Sinhalese faction • Political pressure among the Sinhalese to stop carving up the island • Fear of the Sinhalese of being involved in a continuous war after separation if it is allowed • Fear of Sri Lanka coming under Indian hegemony • The simple desire to have a greater share of everything that a majority is entitled • The Tamil faction • Reluctance to admit its position as a minority • An overwhelming desire to acquire a greater share of wealth and power than allowed by its numeric strength • Ability to dupe and subjugate the Tamil population to support the cause of a nostalgic homeland • International organizations both formal and informal supporting the Tamil cause for various reasons