QUALITY ASSURANCE OFFICE Initial Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned Operation Iraqi Freedom EXSUM Table of Content: 1)C2 of Patriot Forces 1-1 Patriot Defense Design Considerations 1-2 Table VIII Qualifications Insufficiently Prepare Units for Combat assigned missions 2)Patriot Engagement Operations 2-1 Patriot Engagement Operations 2-2 Patriot System Knowledge 3)Communications (AMD) 3-1 Force XXI Battle Command Requirements 3-2 Software Compatibility of AMDWS with the Other ATCCS 3-3 Division Command via TACSAT 3-4 Long-haul communication equipment shortfall 3-5 Integration PATRIOT into the Joint Data Network in KU 4)Personnel and Logistical Support 4-1 FAADC3I Contractor Support and Class IX Availability 5)Joint Air Operations 5-1 Tactical Ballistic Missile Early Warning 5-2 Information Flow Regarding Anomalies Experienced 6) Information on CID Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned 1-1 Issue: Integration/Defense Design with other PATRIOT BNs (US and Allied) and other weapon systems was done on the fly. Discussion: No information, documentation, or test results were available to the war fighter on how to successfully integrate multiple PATRIOT BNs or other endospheric weapon systems. Units within Israel and Kuwait (KU) have been operating with Host Nation PATRIOT and other weapons systems for a number of years. However, no data on the impact of operating in this manner was available prior to the start of OIF. Two critical areas that need closer review: - Having two units in separate BNs linked via PATRIOT Automated Data Information Link (PADIL) providing coverage of the same asset resulted in the inefficient use of FUs in maximizing coverage of additional assets - Impact of having two separate endospheric weapon systems sharing the same battle and space covering the same assets Recommendation: The Lower Tier Project Office (LTPO) should assess the impact of employing the system the way it was used during OIF and publish the results. USAADASCH branch must analyze results and determine how to best employ the weapon system to maximize effective coverage of multiple assetsbased on these results and produce the appropriate updates to TTP. Lead: TSM-LT/DOTD
Lessons Learned 1-2 Issue: PATRIOT units’ focus on Table VIII qualifications limits their ability to execute assigned missions Discussion: For the majority of PATRIOT units table eight gunnery certification is viewed as an end point in the unit training cycle. Table eight focuses on only 5 mission essential tasks: march order the FU/BN fire distribution section (FDS), emplace the FU/BN FDS, conduct air defense operations, conduct missile reload operations, and conduct Reconnaissance, Selection and Occupation of Position (RSOP). These tasks are for the most part conducted in a controlled environment with no other distractions. This narrow focus on a limited number of tasks fails to train units on how to operate in a war time environment. The fixed site TBM only mentality has led PATRIOT units to believe that if they are successful at Table VIIIs they will be successful at war. Operation OIF highlighted some of the problems this approach has caused. PATRIOT units are not assessed on their ability to fight as part of an integrated task force. Units are not evaluated on their ability to provide highly qualified ADAFCOs to higher echelon units. Units are not assessed on their ability to develop and execute complex defense designs. Units are not assessed on their ability to receive a mission and execute it. Table VIII certification is only one part of a unit’s training as it prepares for its annual external evaluation. At some point, a PATRIOT battery/ BN needs to be assessed on its ability to execute its mission and fight as part of a BN Task Force and / or higher echelon integrated task force. Recommendation: USAADASCH relook what it takes to be “qualified”. For a unit to be considered qualified, it should not only be trained in the key Air Defense Tasks, but it should also be trained and qualified to operate as part of a larger, integrated and most likely joint task force.This approach may lead to a totally new training model. Review, update, and change current battery / BN requirements and establish measurable tasks, conditions, and standards for PATRIOT Gunnery Tables. Key to raising the level of expertise across the PATRIOT force is the use of external evaluations that will be used to assess the ability of unit to successfully execute Air Defense missions under a variety of conditions. USAADASCH establish policies and standards for conducting external evaluations that require they beconducted by a team of certified experts that have been assembled and trained for this purpose. Lead: DOTD
Lessons Learned 2-1 Issue: Patriot Engagement operations (D)(T) Discussion: Bridging the gap between MDMP (doctrinal and situational templates) and Patriot tactics, tabular entries, and firing doctrine Reduce target identification uncertainty with engagement criteria tied to threat and friendly platforms Increase friendly protect; procedurally and technically Remote Launch Operations – capture technical and tactical requirements Autonomous operations – “TBM Only” is no longer an option Redundant Coverage – advantages and disadvantages Based upon EMI, how far apart should Patriot Batteries be placed defending an asset Incorporate tactical reasoning/decision making: Counter-TBM is not automatic; WCS “Free” for TBMs presents risk in the SRBM fight Airspace Control and deconfliction remains a Joint problem METT-TC relationship with tabular settings Combat operations routine – verification of Mode IV; updating OPTASKLINK, radar registration Recommendation: Include in new Patriot TTPs, doctrine during Joint Training Exercises and MRE standards Lead: DOTD
Lessons Learned 2-2 • Issue: General knowledge of PATRIOT Initialization tabular data and its origin/impact on how the air battle is fought is minimal. • Discussion: PATRIOT operators did not understand how the values for the systems initialization tabular entries were established. During discussion with soldiers in the area of responsibility (AOR) prior to and during OIF, it became clear that the operators did not understand the various tabular entries required for their system as outlined in the Tactical Standing Operating Procedure (TSOP), Area Air Defense Plan (AADP), and Special Instructions (SPINS). Operators did not know the purpose of the parameters, where it came from or why it was needed. When asked why a tabular entry was set to a specific value, the soldiers normally responded because the TSOP or the PATRIOT Information and Coordination Central (ICC) told us to set it to that number. The operators did not know why it was a particular number, who had established the value or what the setting would accomplish. Lack of expertise in this area limited the PATRIOT unit’s ability to modify/change the weapon system parameters as the threat changes and provide accurate and timely input for the AADP and SPINS. Operators did not know what their system can and cannot do. • Recommendation: USAADASCH develop a formal training program to provide the PATRIOT operator with intermediate and advance level weapons system training. Recommend development of exportable training packages or courses that can be conducted via distance learning. Prior to assuming the duties of a PATRIOT TCO, TD, TCA, or TDA; soldiers should be required to complete these courses. These courses should be annotated in their training record. • Lead: DOTD
Lessons Learned 3-1 • Issue: The Patriot battalion does not have a Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) required for battle tracking. (MO) • Discussion: The division fielded FBCB2 as the standard for blue force tracking. The ADA battalion was not included in the fielding. During combat operations, the battalion had to locate an FBCB2 on the battlefield to get situational awareness. Even this was limited since none of the air defense assets were displayed on the FBCB2 screen. Not only did the lack of FBCB2 systems in the battalion hinder situational awareness, all division fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and graphics were issued over FBCB2 , making it difficult for the battalion to track the battle and conduct simultaneous planning in support of the division. • Recommendation: At a minimum, issue one FBCB2 terminal to each battery, the battalion TOC, and the battalion commander; also ensure that each air defense weapon and radar system is displayed on the FBCB2 screen. • Lead: TSM-LT C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment 3-1 PAT was/is not organic to DIV & therefore did not receive FBCB2. Avail. of FBCB2s and addit. EPLRs will be a real problem at this pt.
Lessons Learned 3-2 • Issue: Software compatibility of AMDWS with the other ATCCS. (M) • Discussion: During operational planning and execution, the battalion is required to provide the division a current air picture superimposed over the current airspace control measures (ACMs). On demand, the division’s leadership may also request that maneuver graphics be projected so that they can see where aircraft are in relation to the ground forces. Currently, these products are manually input into AMDWS by either the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) or air battle management operations center (ABMOC) operators, a slow and tedious process. These operators are duplicating the efforts of other operators who are entering the same graphic control measures into the Maneuver Control System (MCS), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and the other ATCCSs. • Recommendation: Make the required software and hardware upgrades so AMDWS can communicate with the other ATCCSs so all the different graphic control measures can be uploaded via floppy disk or through the local area network (LAN). • Lead: TSM-LT C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment 3-2 This is about making ABCS work....several systems still lack integration sw.
Lessons Learned 3-3 • Issue: Division command via TACSAT. (M/O) • Discussion: From the time we destroyed the enemy’s observation posts on the international border to the division’s closure on OBJ LIONS, the battlespace was so dispersed in width and depth that FM communications between any units larger than infantry or armor battalion/task force-sized elements was unfeasible. BCTs were often more than 40 kilometers apart, forcing the division command to conduct all command and control functions via TACSAT. Though extremely effective in allowing the BCTs to communicate with each other and with the division over great distances, many of the other division assets were left in the dark because they did not have the ability to monitor the network. Though the air defense battalion commander and his tactical operations center (TOC) had one TACSAT radio each to monitor the division command network, the battalion was not able to monitor any of the other TACSAT networks, such as division operations and intelligence (O&I), fire support, etc. The battalion also experienced the same problems the division had in trying to communicate through the depth and width of the division’s battlespace. Though it has the same communication requirements in terms of distance and number of networks as the division, the battalion was not allocated any resources to improve its ability to communicate internally. Though the battalion has a number of PRC-213 HF radios by MTOE, these radios are supposed to be used to pass SEW information and are unreliable at best. Although the division did receive some PRC-150 Harris HF radios that proved to be more reliable, only one was given to the battalion, hardly enough to assist it in conducting command and control within the unit. TACSAT radios proved reliable throughout the operation for the division. The same resources need to be provided to the division’s subordinate commands that have much the same requirements, to include the Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer (ADAFCO). Additionally, this issue highlights the need to have qualified ADAFCOs at higher echelon units to serve as an interface between them and Air Defense BNs and BDEs. • Recommendation: TACSAT radios need to be provided to the battalion and each battery so all battalion-level networks can be established as per our doctrine. If TACSAT radios are not available, then PRC-150 Harris HF radios must be fielded to replace these same networks. • Lead: DCD/TSM-LT
Lessons Learned 3-4 • Issue: Long-haul communication equipment is a major shortfall in current Patriot Brigades. (M/O) • Discussion: 2-43 ADA Battalion was with the battalion responsible for coverage of assets from northern Kuwait to central Iraq, it became impossible for firing batteries of 2-43 to transmit their Patriot Air Defense Information Link (PADIL) with organic UHF/line of site radios. The ability to command and control a battery is the battalion’s primary focus and the communication tying the battery to the battalion is the single point of failure in preventing a fully mission capable ICC from controlling the fires and providing a higher level of ID engagement authority. 2-43’s MTOE authorized communication limited C2 connectivity as the maneuver piece spread firing batteries out over 340 kilometers. Because the Brigade was tasked to provide direct support to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, the Brigade S6 sought assistance from IMEF G6 to support the requirement for long-haul communications. Unfortunately, the IMEF had no AN/TRC-170 (TROPO) systems to spare. TROPO is the ideal form of long-haul communication for battery to battalion in Patriot because of the issue with time delay over SATCOM that could make the link less accurate if the information sent from the ECS isn’t received by the ICC in 0.4 seconds or less. Because of the critical nature of command and control and the commander’s intent to keep batteries from performing autonomous operations, the Brigade S6 procured a deal with 11th Signal Brigade to receive 2 manned TROPO shelters and 2 unmanned TROPO shelters. The brigade manned the unmanned shelter with personnel assigned to 108th who had experience in the past with TROPO systems. If a Patriot Battalion is given a mission to extend resources to the limits experienced, measures should be taken to ensure they have the ability to maintain C2 over the distance spanned and also provide the direct support maintenance to the equipment providing the service. • Recommendation: An MTOE and doctrinal change to ensure communication equipment is available • Lead: 32nd AAMDC/DCD/CORP Bde’s
Lessons Learned 3-5 • Issue: Integrating PATRIOT into the Joint Data Network (JDN) in KU remained a significant challenge throughout the conflict • Discussion: Integrating PATRIOT into the JDN was accomplished; however, false tracks and ghost tracks caused by PATRIOT degraded the overall air picture to a point that for safety of flight issues their tracks were dropped. Limited attempts were made at radar registration to resolve this issue. Units were not allowed to transmit on the JDN until after they crossed the LD. This issue is even more disturbing given the high probability that PATRIOT may be the only sensor to pick up SRBMs. • Recommendation: USAADASCH participate in working groups/forums to integrate ground based air defense systems into the JDN. The joint community must be made aware of its importance. Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officers (ADAFCOs) must be trained on how to integrate PATRIOT into the NET and on procedures to trouble shoot problems that may arise. • Lead: TSM-LT/DOTD C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment 3-3 Harris PRC-150 are not avail., limited qty avail. for SBCTs. TACSAT radio per btry being worked initally between TSM and DCD...initial draft "think Paper" exists...meeting of SMEs to be held next week. 3-4 Army should have and provide long haul comms...this shortcoming makes the argument for a SIG BN [with robust capab., to include long haul] organic/belonging to AMD. 3-5 This was/is a JTTP issue. If allowed, PAT could/would have participated In JDN.
Lessons Learned 4-1 • Issue: Inadequate FAADC3I contractor support and Class IX availability and delivery. (M) • Discussion: Because many of the FAAD/STC/Sentinel parts were under contractor control through the Contractor Logistics System (CLS), our ability to sustain combat power for Linebackers, Avengers, and Sentinels was problematic. The battalion had to rely upon telephone calls to CONUS and the use of FEDEX to secure and ship parts. Due to FAAD C3I. • Recommendation: The battalion experienced problems with the FAADC3I equipment and worked with civilian contractors to fix the problems. Some of the problems can and would have been fixed locally, if the necessary parts were available. Currently, the only contract support within theater is at Camp Doha, Kuwait, and they could not support the battalion once hostilities began. • Recommendation: Battalion needs to stock an authorized stockage list (ASL) from the Project Office for FAADC3I equipment (video cards, network cards, etc.). • Lead: TSM-LT/Units
Lessons Learned 5-1 • Issue: Failure to receive TBM early warning (EW) through LINK-16 and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network. (M/O) * • Discussion: When Iraq launched the first TBMs against Kuwait City and the 101st Air Assault division’s assembly area on G-1, the division received no TBM EW via the LINK-16 and MSE network. Though we had a great tactical digital information link (TADIL)-J/Link 16 connection throughout the battle and regularly tracked well over 100 aircraft simultaneously, we were not able to receive any TBM EW digitally. In fact, the only TBM EW we received throughout the battle was by monitoring the Air Force EW tactical satellite (TACSAT) network. There are only two ways the division can receive digital TBM EW through the Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS) system: 1) directly from an Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI) and, 2) from another AMDWS that is hooked directly into an ADSI via MSE. Both have their shortfalls. First, the MSE based system required an MSE feed that was never stable and could not provide EW to AMDWS while on the move. Second, even though a TADIL-J feed can be received on the move and does not require MSE support, the relative short flight time of the missiles the enemy used and the time it took for joint tactical ground station (JTAGS) to identify and release the information through the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) network resulted in no TBM EW information to be distributed via TADIL-J. • Recommendation: The Army must invest in additional software and hardware improvements that would shorten the time it takes to process TBM EW information and release it to the units. • Lead: DCD/TSM-LT/TSM-UT C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment 5-1 How to effect/do TBM EW is a JTTP issue. This could have gone/been done any of many ways via any/multiple means...PSC-5s, CTT/JTTs, etc. JTIDS not usual means for getting this info to non-ADA.…they don't have means to receive.
Lessons Learned 5-2 • Issue Information flow between Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (KU), and Jordan did not occur. Information regarding anomalies experienced in various PATRIOT locations throughout the theater was not shared with each other. • Discussion: Spurious TBMs injected over the JDN by the Marine TAOC was observed in Jordan for a number of months prior to the start of OIF. TF 1-7 had experienced it since their arrival. This information was not shared with PATRIOT units supporting the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in KU. When the TAOC in KU came on line the injection of spurious tracks was not expected. Had the 1-7 experience been shared throughout the AOR then the problem with spurious TBMs injected by outside sources could have been minimized. During discussions with soldiers in the AOR, ARM and TBM anomalies experienced by units in KU were not shared with units coming into theater or units in Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Bahrain. Methods for disseminating information throughout the PATRIOT force and a system to conduct theater-wide training to counter anomalies as they were observed not in place. • Recommendation: LTPO and USAADASCH establish a real time PATRIOT data collection site. Upon observing an anomaly or system failure units should be able to log on to the site and enter the information. Units would also be able to search the site for similar problems experienced by other units. LTPO and the US Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADASCH) would be responsible for reviewing the information entered on the site and recommending solutions to the unit’s problems. • Lead: DOTD/6x
TSM-LT Comments • The issue in 1-1 was simply we have never modeled the interaction between Patriot and Arrow. Therefore operators did not have sufficient information to develop TTPs. That modeling and the development of the TTPs was done just before the war. The second issue was the defense design in KU. We have never modeled, and therefore explored the dynamics, of defense design of 2-1 with KU units under them in a MICC/SICC relationship. Again, we did that modeling and analysis just before the war and discovered some possible unintended consequences with the defense design the unit had established. • 3-1 The recommendation the originator makes, may not be the appropriate solution for the problem he describes. • 2-1 We have been heavily engaged in the Army locking down the ABCS version and decided what is “Good Enough” funding and fixing and putting in the field next year. Those AMDWS issues will be fixed in our January version which will go to test at Ft Hood in April. • USAADASCH CID Insights From OIF Slide: Although implied, I would simply state that all Army AMD platforms need the same PHID technologies used by other Joint Services.
Center for Army Lessons Learned USAADASCH CID Insights From OIF • Ground to Air CID Insights: • The low reliability of positive electronic means of identification continues to mandate the upgrading of equipment, training and use of procedural methods of identification. • Exercising the Joint Identification Authority from the Area Air Defense Commander down to the lowest fight element is critical. • Every effort must be made to avoid autonomous fire units. Robust communications are key to CID. • Tactical Control Officers must continuously maintain situational awareness of all friendly and enemy activity. • Tactical Control Officers must continuously work to resolve and reportall unknown tracks on their scopes. • Joint datalink architectures must be designed to support the identification and engagement authority functions. • New technologies/techniques as well as IFF and ESM upgrades must be explored to provide positive friendly/hostile identification at the lowest command level possible. Source: USAADAC
Review of Significant Actions 19/20 March: G-Day • Two Iraqi surface-to-surface missiles fired at Coalition forces in Kuwait were reported to have been successfully intercepted by air defenses. Another missile was reported to have landed near Camp Commando in Kuwait; no casualties were suffered. The Patriot batteries successfully intercepted and destroyed two tactical ballistic missiles during an attack on Kuwait at approximately 12:24 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. (4:24 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. EST). Their guidance and control system locked onto the ballistic missiles, successfully engaging the targets with Hit to Kill PAC III and Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM). 22/23 March • An RAF GR4 Tornado aircraft from RAF Marham, which was returning from an operational mission, was engaged near the Kuwaiti border by a Patriot missile battery. Both aircrew were killed. The next of kin have been informed. 23/24 March • Also in the vicinity of An-Nasiriyah, a United States Army supply convoy was ambushed by irregular Iraqi forces. A number of American service members were wounded in that action. As a result of that action, 12 U.S. service members are reported missing.
Review of Significant Actions 24/25 March • During combat air operations at approximately 3:40 p.m. local time Monday, a U.S. F-16 fighter engaged a U.S. Patriot battery approximately 30 miles south of An-Najaf, Iraq. The F-16 pilot executed the strike against the Patriot while en-route to a mission near Baghdad. No soldiers were injured or killed by the strike. The incident is under review to ensure the future safety of the Patriot crews and aircrews. 28/29 March • USCENTCOM describes missile defense activity as follows: about 12 missiles have been fired. We believe them to be in the Ababil-100 or Al-Samoud family, and those have been launched from within Iraq toward Kuwait. We're seeing a rate of about one per day at this point, and all of the threatening launches have been intercepted by Patriot missiles. Additionally, we have established combat air patrols near the areas where most of the launches are occurring. We have been successful in destroying a number of launchers before and after they're fired, and we're actively hunting for them.” 1/2 April • US troops rescued a female soldier held prisoner by the Iraqis. US Marines captured at Al Hillah two of the Al Samoud II missiles which contravened UN resolutions.