The Problem of the Criterion

1. The Problem of the Criterion Chisholm: Particularists and Methodists.

2. Roderick Chisholm, 1916-1999 • Long-time Professor at Brown University. • Specialized in epistemology. • A foundationalist. • A libertarian. • A rationalist.

3. Epistemology • The study of knowledge (Greek: episteme) • What is it to know something, what do we know, how do we know it, etc. • Knowing that vs. knowing how vs. knowing: • Traditionally, the focus has been on knowing that P, where P is some declarative sentence.

4. Knowing that P S knows that P only if some conditions are met: • P is a declarative sentence. • P is true. • S believes that P. • S is fully and non-defectively justified in this belief.

5. The problem • An apparently innocent question: How do we know what’s true? • An obvious answer: There’s some feature or other (a criterion) by which we identify the truths. • A more worrisome question: How do we know this criterion is a good one, i.e. that it really does pick out the truths?

6. Cardinal Mercier Requirements for a criterion that solves the puzzle: • Internal: the mind must find reason to trust the criterion within itself. • Objective: cannot be a subjective feeling, must be ‘adequate to reason’. • Immediate: to cut off an infinite regress.

7. Chisholm’s version A) What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge? B) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge? (p. 153) • The question is, can we settle A without knowing the answer to B or B without knowing the answer to A?

8. Skeptics, Methodists and Particularists Given the problem, Chisholm sees 3 responses: • The skeptic says we just can’t– we’re stuck in a circle, and no knowledge claim is justified. • The methodist thinks there’s an answer to B, which gets us started. • The particularist thinks there’s an answer to A, which gets us started.

9. Empiricism • John Locke (1632-1704) was an empiricist: he thought that experience is the source of knowledge, so that we can use some method based on experience (sensations) to come up with particular bits of knowledge. • So Locke begins with an answer to B, and uses it to arrive at answers to A.

10. Thomas Reid (1710-1796) • An influential figure who responded to Hume’s skepticism with a kind of ‘common-sense’ approach. • Emphasized confidence in certain particular beliefs, regardless of the details of the epistemic justification of those beliefs. • So Reid was a particularist.

11. Chisholm’s view • “(T)o find out whether you know such a thing as that this is a hand, you don’t have to apply any test or criterion… There are many things that quite obviously, we do know to be true.” (p. 155) • With these ‘good apples’ in hand, we can examine them and try to figure out what makes them good apples. • So Chisholm uses an answer to A to arrive at ideas (eventually an answer?) to B: he’s a particularist.

12. Another view • Starting either with particular beliefs or a choice of method seems arbitrary; we can’t give any justification for either–the foundation of any resulting commitments looks shaky! • Is any other approach possible? • What about starting with both beliefs that we take to be (very probably) true and methods that we take to be (very probably) reliable? • Then we can test each against the other. This is coherentism (with a touch of holism).

13. On Starting Points • But this isn’t an answer to how we get knowledge started: we’re assuming we have a lot of knowledge already, both about particular facts and about methods. • In fact, all the solutions to the puzzle assume we have some knowledge either of particulars or of methods. • So the solutions essentially reject the puzzle’s terms: there is no starting point for knowledge outside of or independent of knowledge.

14. The advantage of holism • Without a good method, particular claims seem arbitrary. • Without particular claims, any proposed method seems arbitrary. • Only if we start out with both can we avoid this kind of arbitrariness. • And we do actually have, when we start to think philosophically, real ideas about both.

15. Cleaning up • Of course we could be (and sometimes are) wrong about any particulars we find ourselves believing. • And we could have some bad ideas about methods too (sloppy, at least, and sometimes perhaps just wrong). • Starting from where we are doesn’t require that we assume our beliefs and methods are uniformly good. We need to clean up a little!

16. A Modest Beginning • How do we clean up? • Start with our current beliefs and methods, apply them and test them against each other: If a belief conflicts with other beliefs, or with our best ideas of methods for testing beliefs, that belief becomes dubious. If a method conflicts with other important methods, or if it leads to conflicting beliefs, then it becomes dubious. Rinse and Repeat!