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Some Results from SV06 Seminar and EW05 War Game PowerPoint Presentation
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Some Results from SV06 Seminar and EW05 War Game

Some Results from SV06 Seminar and EW05 War Game

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Some Results from SV06 Seminar and EW05 War Game

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  1. Some Results from SV06 Seminar and EW05 War Game

  2. SV06 Seminar/Wargame 1st look by war fighters at SV06 Concept EW05 Annual USMC Title X War Game Classified Wargame looking at Operational level Distributed Operations (DO) Background

  3. SV06 Objectives • Identify 2006 MEU capability Shortfalls. • Identify potential changes to "echelons above the platoon.” • Identify issues for follow-on experimentations / study.

  4. Identify 2006 MEU capability Shortfalls. • Specialized attachments: linguists, vehicle mechanics, crew served weps, etc required depending on mission. • TTP’s for extended missions TBD • Additional Crew Served Weps needed • Attachments require more comm gear

  5. ID potential changes to "echelons above the platoon.” • No substantial changes ID’d in SV06 context. • MSSG and ACE will be stretched to support. • Broader DO Concept may need to revisit this.

  6. ID issues for follow-on experimentations / study. A wide variety of issues reported but need further examination.

  7. SV06 WG Impact on Concept • DO Forces probably can not remain undetected and must train for Overt Ops. • Positive Identification and Likely Enemy Intent (PID/LIT) require closing with potentially hostile forces. • Must also have enhanced direct fire capabilities in addition to robust indirect fires. • 14 days is a realistic time frame vice 3 days for operations. • The degree of dispersion and need for mobility need further examination.

  8. SV06 WG Impact on Concept • SOF / DO Coordination needs to be addressed. • DO in MOUT only briefly addressed, other experiments indicate minimum of Company-sized DO force for MOUT. • C2 of Squads must remain with the Platoon. • TACON determined by HQ controlling AO • MEU organic fires insufficient for 24/7 coverage. Naval and Joint fires needed to fill gaps.

  9. SV06 Overview • Revealed need to refine concept, equipment and training plan. • However game was limited by only one scenario and heavily influenced by recent Afghanistan experience limiting the examination of unique seabasing requirements.

  10. Conclusion “I don’t know what it is but I want some!” a Troop Cdr from OEF

  11. EW05 Objectives • To assess the application of DO to the Conduct of GWOT. • To assess and refine the draft USMC DO Concept • To further define the operational characteristics and dynamics, organizational innovations and impacts, and technologies and related capabilities essential to successful DO in the GWOT • To assess Joint and Interagency issues associated with planning and conducting DO in the GWOT

  12. 4 Focus Areas • Counter-proliferation • Conventional Combat • Counter-terrorism • Stability and Support Ops / Counter Insurgency

  13. Selected Results • DO generally appropriate for all 4 focus areas across the spectrum of operations • DO seems most appropriate for: SASO, COIN and CT Increased potential for actionable Intel Better match to enemy unit size • 20XX DO Squads maybe able to link allies into Blue ISR.

  14. DO Challenges • SA – ISR and Fusion • DO can improve SA but needs good SA for initial insertion • Actionable Info requires ability to rapidly collect, analyze and disseminate Intel. • Large CAS bill ($$) • Larger Joint Fires bill ($$) • Large Mobility & Sustainment bill ($$) • Training and Ed maybe biggest challenge

  15. Take-Aways • DO a better way to gain and maintain contact • DO enhances collection of actionable Intel • DO is additive capability that complements SOF freeing them up for specialized missions • BASF: “DO isn’t SOF but makes SOF better.” • DO maybe inappropriate for • Areas with large hostile civilian population • Areas where Enemy as superior mobility

  16. Questions?