How Stereotypes Shape the Dynamics of U.S.-Middle East Dispute Resolution

1. How Stereotypes Shape the Dynamics of U.S.-Middle East Dispute Resolution Dr. Catherine H. Tinsley Dr. Robin L. Dillon Georgetown University and Dr. Laurie Weingart Nazli Turan Carnegie Mellon University

2. Virtual Humans USC RESEARCH PRODUCTS Implementation CMU Computational Models CMU, USC Validated Theories Models Modeling Tools Briefing Materials Scenarios Training Simulations validation Identify Cultural Factors CUNY, Georgetown, CMU validation Theory Formation validation Surveys & Interviews CUNY, CMU, U Mich, Georgetown Data Analysis CUNY, Georgetown, U Pitt, CMU Cross-Cultural Interactions U Pitt, CMU Common task Subgroup task

3. Modified Game Theoretic Model

4. Modified Game Theoretic Model Of self of B of A Of self

5. Theoretical Background Negotiations/ dispute resolution marked by ambiguity and uncertainty About the other party: motives, interests, BATNA About the situation: linkage effects, other parties, history When uncertainty is high, any information about counterparts and the situation can exert a powerful influence (regardless of veracity) Schemata/ stereotypes of other will influence negotiator interactions

6. Research Questions What are negotiators’ schemas about each other vis-à-vis Goals= WHAT each party is trying to accomplish Economic goals Relational goals Strategies= HOW each party will reach their desired end state Ways of communicating Ways of persuading Ways of moving the negotiation forward How are these schema influenced by History of Interaction of Countries (friendly/ hostile)

7. Research Design Participants read a description of a dispute and are asked to Characterize each party in the dispute Take the perspective of each party in dispute and imagine what their goals and strategies might be Respond to questions about their country’s cultural values Independent variables History of interaction of disputant countries Friendly vs. Hostile Country of respondent (U.S., Turkey, Egypt)

8. Pre-test Efforts • Worked with ARO provided information regarding actual scenarios experienced by returning officers • Created two scenarios: Hospital and Oil • Worked with expatriates from Middle East (Lebannon, Iran, etc.) to refine scenarios, names, items • Pre-tested with US sample • Revised scenarios to reduce sensitivity of scenarios (described as “too hot”) and improve generalizability • Revised items for comprehension

9. Scenario Introduction Thank you for helping us to understand more about conflict resolution. Your participation is voluntary. On the next screen you will read about a dispute between two merchants, one from a Western country and another from the Middle East. The two countries have [friendly/hostile] relations with each other. [Both countries consider each other to be reliable. /Both counties consider the other to be unreliable.] You will be asked to take the perspective of each party and describe what you think the goals and strategies of each party might be.

10. Scenario A Middle Eastern merchant, named Ahmed owns a textile mill and produces clothing for both domestic and foreign markets. A Western merchant, named Steven, buys clothing from different parts of the world to sell to department stores that operate in his home country. During Ahmed and Steven’s first transaction, the negotiation over the price, quantity and quality (thread-count and quality of materials) of product proceeded quite smoothly. A problem has arisen, however, in that Steven claims that the initial product he was shipped (25% of the total ordered) was of inferior quality than he thinks they agreed to. Ahmed, however, rejects as Steven’s claim stating that the textiles are exactly the quality in their contract. Unfortunately the contract, as written, is vague and says “quality textiles will be shipped.” Steven has paid 50% up front for these textiles and has suggested that if Ahmed does not improve the quality of the textiles he will withhold further payment. Ahmed has countered that he will only ship 25% more of the total product unless Steven agrees that the quality is not a problem. Both are hoping to resolve this issue as a future long term relationship could be mutually financially beneficial.

11. Data Collection • US Student pre-test data (267 participants) • US Student data (162 participants) • Turkey data (127 participants) • Egypt data (57 participants)

12. Relational Goals

13. Relational Goals

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17. Relational Goals 17

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19. US/ Turkish differences on Economic Goals

20. Economic Goals: Projection ? 20

21. US/Turkish differences on Relational Goals 21

22. Relational Goals: Projection ? Learned Stereotype 22

23. US/Turkish differences on Strategies to Communicate

24. US/Turkish differences on Strategies to Communicate “We” are more direct than “they” are

25. US/ Turkish Differences on Strategies to Persuade

26. Strategies to Persuade: Projection? “We are more Factual Learned Stereotype

27. US/ Turkish differences on Strategies to Move Forward Learned Stereotype Qualified by Interaction

28. Interactions: Participant X Country Relationship

29. Interactions: Participant X Country Relationship Recall: Main effect for country on Max Joint gain, such that Turkish (more than US) believe ME will have goal of Max Joint Gain

30. Interactions: Participant X Country Relationship Recall: Main effect for country on Yield to other, such that US (less than Turkish) believe ME will have goal of Yield

31. Interactions: Participant X Country Relationship Recall: Main effect for country on Max Own Gain, such that US (more than Turkish) believe ME will have goal of Max Own

32. Interactions: Participant X Country Relationship Recall: Main effect for country on Yield to other, such that US (less than Turkish) believe Western will have goal of Yield

33. Interactions: Participant X Country Relationship Recall: Main effect for country on Max Own Gain, such that US (more than Turkish) believe Western will have goal of Max Own

34. Tentative Conclusions • Results show little evidence of ego-centric biases • Direct communication • Use of facts/ logic • Results show little evidence of stereotyping • Goal to embed solution in the past tradition • Use of God • Knowledge set of respondents

35. Tentative Conclusions • Results show participants largely projecting normative differences onto both targets • Suggesting cultural differences in Conflict Resolution approach (both goals and strategies) for this type of dispute

36. Tentative Conclusions • Turkish participants adopt a softer approach • More max joint for economic goals • More focus on other and relationship goals • More focus on interests based persuasion • US participants adopt a harder approach • Less yielding and more Max own goals • More self interested goals • More use of threats & status to persuade 36

37. Tentative Conclusions • US/ Turkish normative differences in CR approach are exacerbated in hostile environment: • Turkish see protagonists as even more soft in hostile vs. friendly environment • US see protagonists as even more hard-line in hostile vs. friendly environment • U.S. also has more faith in using outside institutions in a hostile environment 37

38. Next Steps • Deeper analysis of current data • SME’s on factor structures • General stereotype measures • Country values measures • Broader data collection on current scenarios • Begin designing and pre-testing interactive scenario 38