1 / 16

Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective

Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective. Peter Cziraki Tilburg University Luc Renneboog Tilburg University Peter G. Szilagyi University of Cambridge – Judge Business School. Motivation. Proxy proposal Empirical literature Time-variation Inconclusive

adamma
Télécharger la présentation

Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective Peter Cziraki Tilburg University Luc Renneboog Tilburg University Peter G. Szilagyi University of Cambridge – Judge Business School

  2. Motivation • Proxy proposal • Empirical literature • Time-variation • Inconclusive • Mostly on the US • Inter- and intra-continental differences • Ownership: nature, identity, concentration • Legislation: EGMs, proposals • Enforcement

  3. Research questions Q1: Importance of shareholder proposals Q2: Issues addressed Q3: Target selection Q4: Voting outcomes Q5: Short-term market reaction

  4. Data • 290 Shareholder proposals (voting outcome known) submitted at • 90 general meetings of • 63 European firms • 195 UK (1998-2008) • 95 Continental Europe (2005-2008) • Size- and industry-matched peers

  5. Q1: Use of shareholder proposals

  6. Q2: Issues addressed

  7. Q3: Targets

  8. Q4: Voting outcomes

  9. Q4 Voting success(Appendix B)

  10. Q4: Voting success(continued)

  11. Q5 Market reaction to proposals (Table 6)

  12. Q5 Market reaction to proposals (Table 10)

  13. Q5: Market reaction (continued)

  14. Summary • Shareholder proposals less frequent in Europe • Targets • Underperformers • Concentrated ownership • Voting support • UK • Management change demanded • Leverage, Tobin’s Q • Adverse stock price reaction

  15. Thank you for your attention!

More Related