1 / 70

Cold War

Cold War. George Kennan and “The Long Telegram” Charge d'affaires Moscow 1944-46 22 February 1946 Response to State Department Foundation of US Government “Containment” policy. Cold War. War’s End Immediate Soviet expansion Poland Czechoslovakia Rumania Yugoslavia* Albania Bulgaria

anila
Télécharger la présentation

Cold War

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Cold War • George Kennan and “The Long Telegram” • Charge d'affaires Moscow 1944-46 22 February 1946 • Response to State Department • Foundation of US Government “Containment” policy

  2. Cold War • War’s End • Immediate Soviet expansion • Poland • Czechoslovakia • Rumania • Yugoslavia* • Albania • Bulgaria • Hungary • East Germany • “Warsaw Pact”

  3. Cold War

  4. Cold War • FDR vision of post-war peace • Four global policemen • US • Britain • USSR • People’s Republic of China • Untenable • US leadership • Must resist Soviet expansion • Justification • Traditional “Balance of Power”

  5. Cold War • To set a US policy visa-vis the USSR • Root causes of soviet behavior • Had US adequately communicated pacific intent? • Was USSR rejecting postwar cooperation? • Was US/USSR friendship impossible? • Kennan’s “Long Telegram” provided an intellectual framework for US/Soviet policy

  6. Cold War • Kennan’s analysis • US not culpable for Soviet behavior • Cause deeply rooted in • Russian tradition • Soviet ideology • From time immemorial Russia under the Tzars sought • Poland • Bulgaria • Warm water port • Historic sense of insecurity

  7. Cold War • Stalin a “true believer” • Capitalist west irrevocably hostile • “In this [communist] dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of the outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand.... Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced [their] country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes.…”

  8. Cold War • America must prepare for a long fight • Goals/philosophies of US-USSR irreconcilable • Clark Clifford • Truman advisor • General agreement • "The main deterrent to Soviet attack on the United States, or to attack on areas of the world which are vital to our security, will be the military power of this country."

  9. Cold War • Global US security mission • Includes “all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endangered by the U.S.S.R.“ • Interpretation of “democratic countries” • Western Europe only? • Mideast? • Southeast Asia? • Clifford: Containment nontraditional policy • Soviet-US conflict not due to differing national interests • Negotiable • Due to moral failings of Soviet system/leadership

  10. Cold War • Clifford: small ruling clique in USSR to blame • Significant Soviet change of heart + • New Soviet leadership= • US friendship • At some point the “new leadership in USSR "work out with us a fair and equitable settlement when they realize that we are too strong to be beaten and too determined to be frightened."

  11. Cold War • No provision for general negotiation process • No “end game” • So long as the Soviet Union maintained its ideology, negotiations were treated as pointless • Bottom line: America now held the conceptual framework to justify political cal and military resistance to Soviet expansionism

  12. Cold War • Truman “containment” • Greece • Beset w/ communist guerillas aided through Yugoslavia/Bulgaria • USSR made territorial demands against Turkey, along with a request for Soviet bases in the Straits • Britain protected but in late 1946 could no longer do so • Atlee request US to take over • Truman willing but had to convince Republican house

  13. Cold War • Sec. State Dean Acheson • " Acheson boldly presented the group with visions of a bleak future in which the forces of communism stood to gain the upper hand: "Only two great powers remained in the world . . . [the] United States and the Soviet Union. We had arrived at a situation unparalleled since ancient times. Not since Rome and Carthage had there been such a polarization of power on this earth. . . . For the United States to take steps to strengthen countries threatened with Soviet aggression or communist subversion . . . was to protect the security of the United States - it was to protect freedom itself "

  14. Cold War • Greek-Turkish aid program portrayed as part of the global struggle between democracy and dictatorship • 12 March 1947 Truman Doctrine • “…to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation, by armed minorities or by outside pressures." • Traditional Wilsonian terms of a struggle between two ways of life • America had thrown down the moral gauntlet • the kind of realpoliltik Stalin understood would be forever at an end • Bargaining over reciprocal concessions would be out of the question

  15. Cold War • Criticism at both ends of political spectrum • America was defending countries that, however important, were morally unworthy • America was committing itself to the defense of societies that, whether free or not, were not vital to American security • 5 June 1947 Marshall Plan • committed America to the task of eradicating the social and economic conditions that tempted aggression • America would aid European recovery • Restore the world economy and to nurture free institutions • Persuasive policy

  16. Cold War • George Kennan "The Sources of Soviet Conduct“ Political Affairs July 1947 “X” • Expanded version of “Long Telegram” • Hostility to the democracies was inherent in the Soviet domestic structure • Would prove impervious to conciliatory Western policies • Tension with the outside world was inherent in the very nature of communist philosophy and in the way the Soviet system was being run domestically

  17. Cold War • Main concern of Soviet policy was "to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power." • The way to defeat Soviet strategy was by "a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."

  18. Cold War • Soviet Russia lacked legitimacy in its transfer of power • Sooner or later counter claims would emerge • "For the membership at large has been exercised only in the practices of iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation.... lf, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest arid most pitiable of national societies."

  19. Cold War • The mechanism: Containment • he had charged America with combating Soviet pressures for the indefinite future all around a vast periphery that embraced the widely differing circumstances of Asia, the middle East and Europe. The Kremlin was, moreover, free to select its point of attack, presumably only where it calculated it would have the greatest advantage. Henry Kissinger

  20. Cold War • INGREDIENTS OF CONTAINMENT • Committed US to seemingly endless struggle • Initiative USSR’s • Sphere of influence • No negotiations • Critical time • Atomic monopoly • Premise of Containment - positions of strength had yet to be built • Cold War became both militarized and imbued with an inaccurate impression of the West's relative weakness.

  21. Cold War • Redemption of the Soviet Union became the ultimate goal of policy • Stability could emerge only after redemption • Issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations • “The thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.”Kissinger

  22. Cold War • Task of containment so complex that America would nearly tear itself apart trying to fulfill it • Essentially passive with respect to diplomacy with the Soviet Union • Evoked creativity when it came to building "positions of strength" in the military and economic realms

  23. Cold War • In containment were merged lessons derived from the two most important American experiences of the previous generation • From the New Deal came the belief that threats to political stability arise primarily from gaps between economic and social expectations and reality (Marshall Plan) • From WWII America learned that the best protection against aggression is having overwhelming power and the willingness to use it (NATO)

  24. Cold War • Critiques • Walter Lippmann: containment policy led to psychological and geopolitical overextension while draining American resources. Result: economic exhaustion • Winston Churchill: objected to the postponement of negotiations until after positions of strength had been achieved

  25. Cold War • Critiques of Containment • Henry Wallace: who denied America the moral right to undertake the policy of containment in the first place • “Wallace argued that the Soviet sphere of influence in Central Europe was legitimate and that America's resistance to it only intensified tension. He urged a return to what he viewed as Roosevelt's policy: to end the Cold War by American conciliation.” Henry Kissinger

  26. Cold War • Lippman=realist • Churchill=balance of power • Wallace=radical • Lippan/Curchill: accept USSR expansionism represented a serious challenge contested the strategy for resisting it • Wallace: rejected every aspect of containment

  27. Cold War • Wallace • Like most American liberals since Jefferson insisted that "the same moral principles which governed in private life also should govern in international affairs.“ • United States had no moral right to intervene abroad until it had its own society of prejudice, hatred and fear • Postulating the moral equivalence of American and Soviet actions became a characteristic of the radical critique throughout the Cold War

  28. Cold War • Containment’s 1st challenge • Berlin • June 1948, the Soviet Union attempted to control all of Berlin by cutting surface traffic to and from the city of West Berlin • The Truman administration reacted with a continual daily airlift which brought food and supplies into the city of West Berlin • This Airbridge to Berlin lasted until the end of September of 1949---although on May 12, 1949, the Soviet government yielded and lifted the blockade

  29. Cold War

  30. Cold War • Korea • 1947 “loss” of China • July 24, 1945 Potsdam Conference, President Truman asked USSR help against Japan • Sept 9, 1945 US accepts Japanese surrender in Korea, South of 38th parallel • Nov 14, 1947 U.N. Resolution to remove troops from Korea after national elections. • April 8, 1948 President Truman orders withdrawal of US troops from Korea • Aug 15, 1948 Republic of Korea proclaimed. Syngman Rhee elected first president, Cold War

  31. Cold War • Sept 9, 1948 Democratic People's Republic of Korea claims jurisdiction over all Korea • January 12 Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson confirms Korea and Taiwan are outside American Far East security cordon • January 12 Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson confirms Korea and Taiwan are outside American Far East security cordon • June 1 NK strength at 135,000, with seven assault divisions and 150 T34 tanks

  32. Col War • June 25 Korean time NK invades Republic of South Korea (ROK) without warning • June 25 UN Security Council demands NK stop its attack and return to its borders • June 29 ROK Capitol Seoul falls, bridges across Han river destroyed. Most of ROK army trapped on northern side • June 30 President Truman commits US Troops to enforce UN demand

  33. Cold War • July 5 Task Force Smith, 1st Btn, 21st Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, supported by Battery A, 52nd FA Btn, crushed by NK 4th Division • July 7 United Nations Command created, under General Douglas MacArthur • July 13 -July26 NK-6 drives unnoticed down the West Coast, capturing Chonju, begins an assault on Chinju, having outflanked the Eighth Army. NK-6 is positioned to drive to Pusan and cut off all UN forces in Korea (Pusan Perimeter)

  34. Cold War

  35. Cold War • July 29 General Walker issues 'Stand or Die' order • Sept 15 Inchon Landings • Sept 16-19 UN breaks the Pusan Perimeter cordon • Sept 27 MacArthur given permission to cross the 38th Parallel into North Korea • October 19 NK capitol Pyongyang falls • Nov 26-30 US 2nd and 25th Divisions are defeated and begin general Eighth Army retreat in the west • July 10, 1951 Truce talks begin at Kaesong • August 23 Communists break off talks

  36. Cold War • October 25 Peace talks resume at Kaesong • July 27, 1953 Cease-fire signed.

  37. Cold War • Containment tested again • Vietnam • "We are not going to bungle into war.“ JFK • 1919 Ho Chi Minh wrote to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing to seek help in freeing his people from French colonial domination after the First World War • October 17, 1945 Ho Chi Minh cabled President Harry S. Truman, seeking American support for Vietnam "to take part in the Advisory Commission for the Far East.“

  38. Cold War • “…there are 1,100,000,000 brown people. In many Eastern countries they are ruled by a handful of whites and they resent it. Our goal must be to help them achieve independence -- 1,100,000,000 potential enemies are dangerous.“ FDR • State Department bureaucracy opposed his view and favored French colonial continuation • Roosevelt died the following month

  39. Cold War • Truman’s focus was on Europe • Korea • Military aid to France vs Viet Minh • Eisenhower & France • Nuclear solution • Ike rejects

  40. Cold War • Money Guns and Lawyers • Ho Chi Minh had been strictly a nationalist until rebuffed by the Americans in 1919 • Went to Moscow and joined the newly founded Third International Conference of the Communist Party • France: Those who did not help the colonialists would be helping the Communists

  41. Cold War • Many in the U.S., in fact, were mildly sympathetic to the Viet Minh as the fighting started in 1946 • General Matthew Ridgway had succeeded in his efforts to convince Eisenhower to stay out of the Indochina war, which at various times flared in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos • Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev speech supporting "wars of national liberation" and he specifically naming Vietnam as an example

  42. Cold War • Kennedy: Maxwell Taylor Chief of General Staff • 8000 ground combat troops to Vietnam for a start • JFK refused • Moved troops around as a show of force • 2d Berlin Crisis • US economy, civil rights, labor strife, agriculture and the threat of nuclear war

  43. Cold War • May 10, 1961 JCS went on the record as favoring the use of U.S. combat troops in Vietnam • Two years of dithering and “in-fighting” • In June he told the graduating class of military officers at West Point:"This is a new kind of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin ... war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.“ • Kennedy mistook the nature of the conflict

  44. Cold War • Kennedy’s generals didn’t correct him • Best and brightest • Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Robert Kennedy, Roswell Gilpatrick, George Ball, Robert Lovett, Arthur Schlesinger, Theodore Sorensen, Pierre Salinger

  45. Cold War • McNamara • Former Pres. Ford Motor Co. • Sec Def • All numbers • No policy • No theory

  46. Cold War • Gulf of Tonkin: The thin end of the wedge • Gulf of Tonkin staging area of the U.S. Seventh Fleet August 1964 • Destroyer USS Maddox conducting a "DeSoto patrol", an espionage mission • 2 August North Vietnamese torpedo patrol boats attack Maddox • U.S.S. Ticonderoga sent aircraft to repel North Vietnamese attackers. Sunk one boat damaged others

  47. Cold War • Gulf of Tonkin • In an attempt to possibly lure the North Vietnamese into an engagement, both the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy were in the gulf on August 4 • The captain of the Maddox had read his ship’s instruments as saying that the ship was under attack or had been attacked and began an immediate retaliatory strike into the night.

  48. Cold War • Captain concluded hours later that there might not have been an actual attack. • Event was purposely misconstrued when presented to Congress and the public by President Johnson and his administration • August 7, the "Tonkin Gulf Resolution“ passed, 416 to 0 by the House and 88 to 2 by the Senate

  49. Cold War Gulf of Tonkin

  50. Cold War • The resolution • Stipulated that the President of the United States could "take all necessary measures to repel armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” • July 1965, the U.S. would had 80,000 troops mobilized and operating in South Vietnam

More Related