OPERATION TORCH AND THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

1. OPERATION TORCH AND THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN NOVEMBER, 1942 – MAY, 1945

2. GLOBAL STRATEGY (cont’d.) • U.S. PUBLIC VIEWS JAPAN AS IMMEDIATE THREAT (SO DO MOST U.S. MILITARY LEADERS) • WHY? • PEARL HARBOR • JAPANESE SUCCESS IN PACIFIC • REVENGE FOR P.H. & PHILIPPINES • PROBLEM: • F.D.R. VIEWS GERMANY AS IMMEDIATE THREAT • F.D.R. NEEDS TO SUPPORT BRITS • BRITS. ARE HISTORICALLY THE U.S.’s CLOSEST ALLY • STALIN & SOVIETS ARE PARANOID ABOUT ANGLO-AMERICANS • STALIN THINKS ANGLO-AMERICANS WANT TO SEE RUSSIA DEVESTATED BY GERMANS

3. GLOBAL STRATEGY (cont’d.) • F.D.R. FINALLY CONVINCES MILITARY LEADERS (ex. – DOUGLAS MacARTHUR) THAT U.S. MUST DEFEAT GERMANY BEFORE JAPAN • “GERMANY FIRST” POLICY IS ADAPTED • PROBLEMS? • HOW WILL THE U.S. BECOME MORE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR? • EX.: • MORE NAVAL INVOLVEMENT? • MORE AERIAL INVOLVEMENT? • LAND-WARFARE? • WHERE WILL THE U.S. ATTACK THE GERMANS? • U.S. MILITARY LEADERS WANT TO ATTACK ACROSS THE ENGLISH CHANNEL • BRITS. OPPOSE IDEA – THINK ALLIES AREN’T READY YET • BRITS. WANT U.S. TO ATTACK SOMEWHERE IN MEDITERRANEAN • WHY? • GERMAN FORCES ARE LESS NUMEROUS THERE • BRITS ARE FIGHTING IN NORTH AFRICA & CAN USE U.S. HELP • FINAL DECISION: • U.S. FORCES WILL INVADE AXIS-HELD TERRITORY IN NORTH AFRICA • VICHY FRENCH FORCES ARE VIEWED AS RELATIVELY WEAK • U.S. WILL BE ABLE TO GAIN VALUABLE EXPERIENCE THERE BEFORE INVADING NORTHERN EUROPE • OPERATION TORCH – NOVEMBER, 1942 • ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIES LAND FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA (MOROCCO, ALGERIA)

4. OPERATION TORCH – TASK FORCE SECTORS

5. OPERATION TORCH: TASK FORCE APPROACHES

6. OPERATION TORCH, NOV., 1942 • WHERE? • NORTH AFRICA • VICHY FRANCE – AREAS CONTROLLED BY: • ALGERIA, TUNISIA, MOROCCO • WHY NOT FURTHER EAST? • BRITS ARE ALREADY FIGHTING IN EGYPT, LIBYA • BRITS HAVE PUSHED AXIS FORCES WESTWARD TOWARD TUNISIA • FORCES? • U.S. ARMY • U.S. NAVY • WHO? GEN. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER IS C/O • HOW? INVASION FORCE DIVIDED INTO 3 TASK FORCES: • WESTERN TASK FORCE: TARGET – MOROCCO COAST • CENTRAL TASK FORCE: TARGET – ORAN, ALGERIA • EASTERN TASK FORCE: TARGET – ALGIERS, ALGERIS • GOAL / OBJECTIVE: • SEIZE MAJOR COASTAL PORTS FROM VICHY FRENCH • DENY AXIS POWERS CRITICAL NAVAL PORTS • SEIZE CONTROL OF W. MEDITERANNEAN • PUSH AXIS ARMIES EAST TOWARDS TUNISIA • FORCE AXIS ARMIES TO FIGHT U.S. & BRITISH FORCES ON TWO SIDES • FORCE AXIS TO ABANDON NORTH AFRICA

7. U.S. INFANTRY RAPPEL INTO LANDING CRAFT, OPERATION TORCH, NOVEMBER, 1942

8. U.S. ARMY INFANTRY IN LANDING CRAFT, OPERATION TORCH, NOVEMBER, 1942

9. U.S. INFANTRY LANDING ON MOROCCAN COAST, NOVEMBER, 1942

11. GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, U.S. ARMY, SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, NORTH AFRICA

12. GEN. GEORGE S. PATTON (L) & GEN. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, NORTH AFRICA, 1942

13. GENERALGEORGE S. PATTON, U.S. ARMY,COMMANDER,U.S. ARMY II CORPS, NORTH AFRICA

15. GEN. GEORGE S. PATTON, U.S. ARMY, NORTH AFRICA, 1943

17. FIELD MARSHALL ERWIN ROMMEL, COMMANDING OFFICER, THE AFRIKA CORPS

19. FIELD MARSHALL ERWIN ROMMEL, COMMANDING OFFICER, GERMAN PANZER ARMY AFRIKA (“THE AFRIKA CORPS”)

20. TUNISIA, 1942 - 43

22. OPERATION TORCH (cont’d.) • INITIAL U.S. LANDINGS SUCCEED • WHY? • VICHY FRENCH RESISTANCE IS LIGHT • GERMANS ARE OCCUPIED IN LIBYA/EGYPT BY BRITISH • U.S. FORCES BEGIN EASTWARD ADVANCE TOWARDS TUNISIA • PROBLEMS? • U.S. TROOPS HAVEN’T BEEN TESTED AGAINST GERMANS YET • U.S. BATTLEFIELD TACTICS AREN’T TESTED • U.S. LEADERSHIP IS STILL UNTESTED • U.S. & BRITISH LEADERS DON’T ALWAYS AGREE • EXAMPLE: EISENHOWER & MONTGOMERY DON’T ALWAYS AGREE ON STRATEGY

23. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE • WHEN? JAN., 1943 • WHERE? CASABLANCA, MOROCCO • WHO? ALLIED POLITICAL & MILITARY LEADERS: • EXAMPLES? • FDR • CHURCHILL • CHARLES De GAULLE (FREE FRENCH forces) • WHY? ALLIED STRATEGY TO WIN EUROPEAN WAR NEEDED DISCUSSION • RESULT? • ALLIES WILL ONLY ACCEPT THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER (define) OF GERMANY • WESTERN ALLIES WOULD CONTINUE TO INCREASE SUPPLIES/AID TO SOVIET UNION • WESTERN ALLIES WOULD JOIN FORCES TO INVADE SICILY • INVASION OF ITALY WOULD FOLLOW SICILY INVASION

24. NORTH AFRICAN ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR GOALS

26. FDR & CHURCHILL AT CASABLANCA, JANUARY, 1943

27. KASSERINE PASS • JAN./FEB., 1943: • U.S. TROOPS CONTINUE ADVANCE TOWARDS TUNISIAN BORDER • BORDER IS MOUNTAINOUS • MOUNTAIN PASSES HAVE TO BE SECURED • KASSERINE PASS IS VITAL ROUTE CONTROLLING EAST-WEST MOVEMENT ON ALGERIAN/TUNISIAN BORDER • ALLIED TROOPS HAVE MOVED INTO PASS & ESTABLISHED POISITIONS THERE • FEB., 1943: GERMANS ATTACK ALLIED POSITIONS AT KASSERINE • RESULT? • COMPLETE GERMAN VICTORY • ALLIED (esp. U.S.) TROOPS ARE ROUTED • WHY? • POOR LEADERSHIP (esp. U.S.) • LACK OF ALLIED AIR COVER (fault of BRITS.) • SUPERIOR GERMAN ARMOR & AIR COVER • BETTER GERMAN BATTLE TACTICS • U.S. TROOPS ARE INEXPERIENCED • EFFECT? • EISENHOWER PUTS GEN. GEORGE S. PATTON IN COMMAND OF U.S. ARMOR IN TUNISIA • WHY PATTON?

28. GEN. LLOYD FREDENDALL, C/O, U.S. ARMY 2NDARMORED CORPS, TUNISIA, 1942-43

29. GENERAL LLOYDFREDENDALL, U.S. ARMY 2nd ARMORED CORPS

30. THE BATTLE OF KASSERINE PASS, TUNISIA, FEBRUARY, 1943

31. GERMANAFRIKACORPS MARK IV TANK AND CREW, TUNISIA, 1943

35. GERMAN 88 mm “FLAK” GUN

39. ALLIED VICTORY IN AFRICA • NOV., 1942: BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN • BRITISH 8th ARMY DEFEATS ROMMEL & GERMAN AFRIKA KORPS • RESULT? • GERMAN THREAT TO EGYPT & SUEZ CANAL IS OVER • GERMAN RETREAT TO TUNISIA BEGINS • GEN. BERNARD MONTGOMERY BECOMES ALLIED HERO • AFTER KASSERINE PASS: • EISENHOWER REPLACES LLOYD FREDENDALL w/GEN. GEORGE PATTON • PATTON IS C/O OF U.S. 2nd ARMORED CORPS (tanks) • PATTON IMMEDIATELY BEGINS OFFENSIVE AGAINST AFRIKA CORPS

41. 1941-42 NORTH AFRICA; LIBYA & EGYPT

42. EL ALAMEIN:UNIT DEPLOYMENT

43. FALL, 1943BATTLE OFEL ALAMEIN

44. BRITISH “CRUSADER” TANK, NORTH AFRICA, 1942

45. BRITISH “CRUSADER” TANKS, NORTH AFRICA, 1942

47. BRITISH 8th ARMY TROOPS UNDER SHELL FIRE, EL ALAMEIN

48. 8TH ARMY TROOPS ADVANCE ACROSS AFRIKA CORPS POSITIONS, EL ALAMEIN

49. 8TH ARMY TROOPS CAPTURE AFRIKA CORPS TANK, EL ALAMEIN, 1942

50. BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN, 1942