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Course of Action Decision Briefing Operation Raiders Rally OPORD 10-01 A ¼ HBCT PowerPoint Presentation
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Course of Action Decision Briefing Operation Raiders Rally OPORD 10-01 A ¼ HBCT

Course of Action Decision Briefing Operation Raiders Rally OPORD 10-01 A ¼ HBCT

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Course of Action Decision Briefing Operation Raiders Rally OPORD 10-01 A ¼ HBCT

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  1. Course of Action Decision Briefing Operation Raiders Rally OPORD 10-01 A ¼ HBCT

  2. Purpose • To brief the Brigade Commander on the best possible course of action for employing forces in AO WWWWW in support of Operation XXXX XXXX NLT DDMMMYY. • Gain the commander’s approval of COA #__. • Receive the final commander’s planning guidance.

  3. Problem Statement To identify the best course of action for the HBCT to conduct Peace Enforcement operations in AO XXXXX, Azerbaijan NLT DDMMMYY in order to bring legitimacy to the Government of Azerbaijan.

  4. Mission Statement The HBCT is to conduct Peace Enforcement operations in AO XXXXX, Azerbaijan NLT DDMMMYY in order to bring legitimacy to the Government of Azerbaijan.

  5. Recommendation COA #NEED TO DEVELOP THISis the best course of action for the HBCT to conduct in AO WWWWW in support of Operation XXXX XXXX DDMMMYY.

  6. X • X Outline

  7. HBCT Area of Operations

  8. USEUCOM Mission USEUCOM deploys elements of II(US) Corps (designated JTF) to Azerbaijan beginning DDMMMYY, to conduct stability operations in order to promote regional stability.

  9. USEUCOM Intent Purpose The President of the United States has approved this operation for the purpose of providing internal stability and support to the Government of Azerbaijan (GOA) End State A successful end state is when GOA and Azerbaijan Armed Forces (AAF) are capable of performing routine military and civil-military functions on their own; insurgent forces no longer pose a viable threat to GOA legitimacy, and JTF is safely redeployed

  10. JTF Mission Commencing DDHHHHSMMMYY, JTF deploys by air to AO WWWWW to conduct peace enforcement and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) in support of the Government of Azerbaijan (GOA) in order to increase the legitimacy of the GOA. On order, redeploy.

  11. JTF Intent(1 of 2) Purpose The purpose of this operation is to support the legitimacy of the GOA and permit them to assume full responsibility for military and civil-military operations. In order to legitimize the GOA, the GOA will be the “lead” element on matters concerning humanitarian assistance and GFAP enforcement.

  12. JTF Intent(2 of 2) End State A legitimate GOA provides support to its citizens and successfully enforces the GFAP. JTF is safely redeployed with all personnel and equipment return to home station.

  13. HBCT Mission HBCT will conduct Peace Enforcement operations NTL DDMMMYY in AO WWWWW to include: security, protection, and support to FHA operations. HBCT will establish a relationship with the HQ, 3d Bde, 4th Azerbaijan Guards Division and on order will assist the election commission in order to ensure compliance of the GFAP and increase the legitimacy of the GOA.

  14. HBCT Intent PurposeCreate a secure environment in which the Government of Azerbaijan can operate. End StateThe Government of Azerbaijan and their local authorities are viewed as the legitimate provider of a rule of law in Azerbaijan.

  15. HBCT Commander’s Guidance No Change

  16. Task Organization Update No Change

  17. Intelligence Update Terrain Weather Other considerations Threat Order of Battle Situation Templates Most Likely/Most Dangerous COAs

  18. Battlefield’s Effects(1 of 7) • Terrain Analysis: (OCOKA) (Changes from mission analysis. • Observation – No change • Cover and concealment – No change • Obstacles – No change • Key terrain – No change • Avenues of approach – No change

  19. Battlefield’s Effects (2 of 7) Terrain’s Effect on Military Operations

  20. Battlefield’s Effects (3 of 7) • Weather Analysis - Military Aspects of Weather (Changes from mission analysis): • Visibility – No change • Winds – No change • Precipitation – No change • Cloud Cover – No change • Temperature and Humidity – No change

  21. Battlefield’s Effects(4 of 7) Weather’s Effect on Military Operations:

  22. Battlefield’s Effects(5 of 7) • Analysis of Other Characteristics – (Changes from mission analysis): • Logistics infrastructure – No change • Population demographics – No change • Economics – No change • Politics – No change • Information – No change • Civil considerations (ASCOPE) – No change

  23. Battlefield’s Effects(6 of 7) • Effects of Other Considerations of the Battlefield on Military Operations

  24. Battlefield’s Effects(7of 7) • Effects on Threat and Friendly Capabilities:

  25. Evaluate the Threat(1 of 6) • Recent Enemy Actions Update: • Military Forces • Insurgent Forces • Drug Cartels • Criminal Elements • Others

  26. Evaluate the Threat(2 of 6) • Threat Model Update - Outline: • Doctrinal templates • Tactics and options • High value targets • Threat capabilities

  27. Doctrinal Templates (3 of 6) • Threat Model Update – Doctrinal Templates: • Military Forces • Insurgents • Drug Cartels • Criminal Elements • Others

  28. Tactics and Options (4 of 6) • Threat Model Update – Tactics and Options: • Military Forces • Insurgents • Drug Cartels • Criminal Elements • Others

  29. High Value Targets (HVTs)(5 of 6) • Threat Model Update – High Value Targets: • Military Forces • Insurgents • Drug Cartels • Criminal Elements • Others

  30. Threat Capabilities(6 of 6) • Threat Model Update – Threat Capabilities: • Military Forces • Insurgents • Drug Cartels • Criminal Elements • Others

  31. Evaluate the Threat(3 of 6) • Threat Model Update – Doctrinal Templates: • Military Forces • Insurgents • Drug Cartels • Criminal Elements • Others

  32. Threat Courses of Actions (COAs)(1 of 2) • COAs Available to the Threat: • The first threat COA is categorized as openly violent (Most Dangerous) and includes possible actions, or a combination of the following: • Direct military confrontation • Bombings • Sniper attacks against US personnel or operations • Kidnapping of US personnel • Arson • Political assassination • IEDs and VBIEDs

  33. Threat Courses of Actions (COAs)(2 of 2) • COAs Available to the Threat (cont.): • The second possible COA is categorized as a measured violent response (Most Likely) to US presence in AZERBAIJAN. • Riots • Sabotage of GOA and US facilities • Destruction of CMO projects • Kidnappings of GOA officials • Rise of special security groups • Illegal policing • Unauthorized checkpoints

  34. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) Update(1 of 3) • Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR): • When and where will insurgent forces attack U.S. forces? • Will insurgent/cartels attempt to impede U.S. forces, if so when, where, and how? • Where are known locations of minefields and mass graves? • Is there evidence of Georgian unconventional warfare in AO? • Is there evidence of GFAP noncompliance in AO? • Is there any evidence of sustained secure computer network attack? • Where are known weapons caches?

  35. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) Update(2 of 3) • Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR): • HBCT elements have completed occupation of AO WWWWW • Any serious HBCT incident involving injury, death, or missing status • Illegal detainment of any U.S. personnel by insurgent/cartel forces • Damage to the APOD, SPOD or MSR that will delay the flow of forces and supplies into the AO for more than two hours • OR rate falls to NMC • Personnel and/or Supply Class status drops below 90%

  36. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) Update(3 of 3) • Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI): • Location of C2 nodes, logistics hubs, and transport facilities • Primary MSR for re-supply operations • Convoy routes and times • Disposition/Strength of HBCT units (equipment and personnel) • VIP visits (U.S. or Azeri) • Level of force protection • Locations for Civil Military Operations

  37. Facts Used to Develop Critical Events (1 of 2) • Threat Most Dangerous Course of Action: • Direct military confrontation • Bombings • Sniper attacks against US personnel or operations • Kidnapping of US personnel • Arson • Political assassination • IEDs and VBIEDs

  38. Facts Used to Develop Critical Events (2 of 2) • Threat Most Likely Course of Action: • Riots • Sabotage of GOA and US facilities • Destruction of CMO projects • Kidnappings of GOA officials • Rise of special security groups • Illegal policing • Unauthorized checkpoints

  39. Assumptions Used in Wargaming • Insurgents will kill civilians in order to further their cause • Insurgents will use propaganda campaigns in order to place blame on U.S. forces and gain support • Insurgents will target key infrastructure within the AO to disrupt GOA and U.S. operations

  40. Courses of Actions COA Neutralize COA Stabilize COA Secure

  41. 3 2 HHC HHT HHB MP MP MP MP SO2 1 X BDE TROOPS … … … GS QRF DO SO3 SO1 LEGEND: Airport BSB Base Camp X X X X X X X # N CA FKM X N N N N N N N N N N SAPA N COA Sketch: Neutralize HRS II HRS III SANGACHALY KARASU MUGAN KUBALYBOLAOGLAN HRS I GOBUSTAN KICHIK-TALYSH NAVAGI KAZI-MAGOMED KALINOVKA ALYAT ALI BAYRAMLY HRS IV KHYDYRLY SOVKHOZ KARA CHALA

  42. HHB HHC HHT MP MP MP MP SO2 X BDE TROOPS GS QRF SO1 DO SO3 BSB CA NESTING DIAGRAM COA: NEUTRALIZE x • Task Organization Includes: • 2 x SBCT BN (+), and HHC • 3 x Arty BAT, and HHB • 4 x MP PLT • 1 x Sapper CO • 1 Psyop Det • 3 RSTA Troop, and HHT • Bde Troops T: Neutralize Insurgent Forces in AO WWWWW P: To provide a safe and secure environment. TASK: Contain insurgent forces in HRS IV PURPOSE: Prevent flow of insurgents into HRS I TASK: Neutralize insurgent forces in HRS1 PURPOSE: Provide safe and secure environment TASK: Contain insurgent forces in HRS III PURPOSE: Prevent flow of insurgents into HRS I TASK: Secure election process in KUBALY-BULAOGLAN PURPOSE: Ensure a legitimate election process, thereby promoting a safe and secure environment TASK: Provide sustainment to the SBCT PURPOSE: Allow the SBCT to conduct operations

  43. Critical Events • Insurgent attacks on convoys on MSR • Insurgent arson against refugee homes • Insurgent attacks against GOA key infrastructure • Insurgent assassination and kidnapping of key officials • Insurgent attacks against Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) missions • Insurgent propaganda campaigns • Insurgent control of supplies at seaport • Insurgent assassination of civilians

  44. War Gaming Method • Box Method of occupation of AO WWWWW • Threat Action • Coalition Reaction • Threat Counter-action

  45. Facts Bearing on the Problem(S1/S4) • Authorized strength to be supported is 4,031 • SBCT assigned strength is 3,621 • Priority of movement to base camps is: Class I, III(P), VIII, IX, mail, replacements

  46. Facts Bearing on the Problem(Fires) • SAPA and FKM employ unconventional indirect fire techniques (tactics) • SAPA and FKM history of emplacing unmanned mortar tubes • SAPA and FKM have extensive supply of mortar munitions and artillery rounds for terrorist ops • Artillery priority of effort to fire missions in support of troops in contact • All fire missions must be cleared by the HBCT CDR

  47. Facts Bearing on the Problem(Engineer) • SAPA and FKM employ unconventional engineer techniques (tactics) • SAPA and FKM history of employing booby traps • SAPA and FKM have extensive supply of demolitions for terrorist ops • Engineer priority of effort to projects directly related to disaster/emergency response of HN where loss of life is likely, then to FHA projects

  48. Facts Bearing on the Problem(ADM) • SAPA and FKM employ conventional and unconventional ADA techniques (tactics) • SAPA and FKM history of shooting down helicopters and drones • SAPA and FKM have extensive supply of Sagger munitions • ADM priority of effort is to protecting command posts and key civilian infrastructure

  49. Facts Bearing on the Problem(CBRNE) • SAPA and FKM employ unconventional CBRNE techniques (tactics) • SAPA and FKM history of using commercial procured chemicals as weapons • SAPA and FKM have extensive supply of ammonia nitrate and chlorine • CBRNE priority of effort is to chemical defense and decontamination

  50. Facts Bearing on the Problem(CMO) • Azerbaijan’s agribusiness in state of disarray, food shortage 3 years • Maintenance and infrastructure facility replacements deferred • Health concerns based on contamination of water supplies and food sources • Azeri Law Enforcement has the primary responsibility of civil disturbance control