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Understanding the Interplay of Violence, Governance, and Development in Africa

This analytical exploration delves into the intricate relationships between violence, governance, and development, focusing on their implications for Africa. It investigates how governance structures can influence patterns of violence and conversely, how violence can reflect and impact governance effectiveness. Key themes include the allocation of rights to violence, the role of powerful organizations, and the socio-economic factors contributing to conflict. Insights on collective action, political mobilization, and strategies for overcoming violence are also discussed, providing a comprehensive overview of these critical dynamics.

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Understanding the Interplay of Violence, Governance, and Development in Africa

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  1. Violence, Governance, Development SOAS/Mo Ibrahim Foundation Governance for Development in Africa Addis Ababa, 2012

  2. Analytical links: governance & violence

  3. Links between Governance & Violence • Allocation of rights to violence • States as war-makers • Managing the violence problem: coalitions and economic development • The perpetual and pervasive violence problem

  4. Links, continued… • Violence as lack of governance? • Violence as reflection of governance? • Violence as source of improved governance?

  5. Rents, coalitions, violence • Deterrent organizations, or credible threat • Generating rents so that violence reduces value of privileges for elites • Or just have powerful organizations of force that are subservient to law

  6. Trends, levels, classification

  7. Peace and Conflict, 2010, CIDCM

  8. Spagat, Restrepo and Vargas

  9. Source: Moser & McIlwaine, World Development, 2006

  10. Violence and Development I

  11. Grievance • Growth (5 years before onset) • Repression (elections, press freedom, etc) • Inequality (Gini coefficient) • Ethnicity (ELF)

  12. Greed • Goodies (% of primary commodity exports in GDP) • Rascals (% of 15-24 year old males in population) • Education (number of years average schooling)

  13. How to overcome constraints on collective action • Direct, material rewards, now, to individuals • Coercion • Norms & ideology • Joint production (Kriger; Kalyvas) of violence by local and national, outside and inside communities – intimacy • Whatever’s easiest (economic or social endowments) but this will shape the form of conflict (Weinstein)

  14. Friendly Fire? • Regressing endogenous variables on endogenous variables • Failing to reflect anything in the last 25 years of economic theory or technique • Conclusions not justified by findings • Might be published in an IR journal but not in a 3rd rate economics journal.

  15. Post-conflict aid

  16. From Boyce and Forman (2011), “Financing Peace” – WDR input paper

  17. From Boyce and Forman (2011), “Financing Peace” – WDR input paper

  18. Aid volatility coefficient From Boyce and Forman (2011), “Financing Peace” – WDR input paper

  19. Political His in Kenya Frances Stewart, “Kenya disturbances: note for discussion”, 2008

  20. Frances Stewart conclusions • Socio-economic HIs favour Kikuyu, regionally and within (e.g. within Rift Valley vis-à-visKalenjin) • Political ‘elite bargain’ reflected in inclusive cabinets…till 2005. • Political power offers elite benefits; socio-economic HIs facilitate mobilisation.

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